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 This hermeneutical inquiry is of trust and it addresses the question, “Can we live a 
day without trust?”  The purpose of this inquiry is to deepen our understanding of the 
notion of trust by situating it within three historical contexts—modern day, the Middle 
Ages, and Colonial America.  The genesis of trust is known to have begun in the Middle 
Ages due to sweeping economic changes from feudalism to the rise of capitalism.  When 
European colonists arrived in North America they brought with them their concept of 
trust.  Trust was then introduced to the Native American peoples and was used to define 
the judico-legal relationship with what became the United States government. Again, 
trust was used for economic prosperity by creating a “special trust relationship” with the 
indigenous population so that they would sign over their land rights (Newcomb, 2003).  
Ultimately, trust was used to further the dream of westward expansion and the eventual 
industrialization of America. Finally, trust is interpreted in the current modern context 
where it is ubiquitous and has reached a heightened point of emphasis in the role it is 
believed to serve in certain social institution, primarily schools and businesses. Within 
each historical period, interpretations are offered for how and why the concept of trust 
was used and often viewed as being essential to the functioning of daily life. By viewing 
trust situated in the economic, social and political circumstances of each period of time 
readers will see how trust has become increasingly necessary along with the rise of 
capitalism.  In essence, trust is and was needed in societies whereby individual economic 
prosperity became the primary focus of daily life. In this same way, trust is currently 
 
 
perceived as necessary in our schools. This concept will be explained as another place 
where perpetuating the values of capitalism is the primary aim.  Finally, I explain how 
due to the existence of capitalism we cannot live a day without trust; however; our 
personal relationships should not hinge on the expectations one wants fulfilled through 
trust but rather an ethic of care. 
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PROLOGUE 
 
Like the bird that is unaware of the air through which it flies, or the fish that does 
not notice the water in which it swims, the web of trust in which we live is so all-
encompassing and so deeply entrenched in everything we do that we do not even 
know it is there until something goes wrong.  (Shermer, 2008, p. 199) 
 
 
In the summer of 2009, I enrolled in a workshop entitled Drawing on the Right 
Side of the Brain after reading Daniel Pink’s (2006) bestseller entitled A Whole New 
Mind.  I wanted to see if, like the book claimed, I could change my perception of the 
world and actually learn to draw using the right side of my brain.  The workshop 
consisted of a one-week class taught in Soho, New York by Brian Bromeissler, a skilled 
artist and art teacher.  The class was not so much concerned with drawing as a profession, 
nor was it focused on transforming the participants into aspiring artists.  Rather, the 
purpose of the course was to help the participants quiet their internal voices of negative 
self talk, let go of past constructions and presuppositions, and only draw exactly what 
they saw.  In other words, we had to work at silencing our internal voice, which also 
meant seeing ourselves and the things we think of as familiar as other or strange.  We 
each had to shut out the years of mental imagery that led us to draw our noses, eyes, and 
hands with fairly consistent markings, none of which resembled our actual faces.  We had 
to make the familiar strange in that we had to critically examine what in our shared 
histories and stories caused us to harbor the same feelings about drawing.  We also had to 
think deeply about the processes of understanding that landed us all in the same place—
 
 
ix 
convinced we’re not artists by birth or divine right, and yet hopeful that we could actually 
produce something that closely resembled the object before us. 
On the first day of class, the instructor asked each of us to draw our self-portraits.  
He gave no detailed instructions other than “draw your face and draw only what you see.” 
My picture looked a lot like the pictures of the other 11 participants in the room.  Each of 
us drew a big circle for a head, two oval-shaped images for eyes, and the rest of the facial 
features and hair had a certain sameness in the geometrical lines and patterns that we 
drew.  Then the teacher asked a very intriguing question: “Is that really what you see or 
what you have been told to see?”  This question challenged my understanding of art, my 
actual vision, and my whole notion of how I see myself and others around me.  The 
simple answer was no—the drawing did not have the same curves, shadows, and three-
dimensional shape, but no one could argue that it did possess all of the elements of a face, 
right?  Well, maybe it did lack cheek bones, and perhaps a jaw, but anyone around me 
could tell what I was going trying to achieve.  Then it dawned on me that despite a few 
variations in age, gender, and a few other superficial details about each other, everyone in 
the fairly homogenous classroom could tell it was a face because we were taught in 
similar ways and with fairly consistent constructions about drawing.  No one in the class 
could really challenge or confront the way I drew myself because they had all received 
the same story about those who are the good “drawers” and bad ones, and things like how 
to at least get all of the basic features in place.  Basically, we all had the same 
understanding about art and how it is constructed. 
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Soon I learned how limited and narrow my thinking was: I thought that I would 
not be challenged or confronted by the other just because I was in a setting that appeared 
on the surface to be familiar.  Though the other students in the class did not necessarily 
serve as the alternate way of seeing and doing things, the instructor and his methods did.  
Over the course of the week my understanding of how to draw was challenged to the 
point that it literally brought tears to my eyes two days in a row.  For the first time, I met 
the “other” in thinking about how to draw and about art.  I was challenged with a new 
language of drawing.  I was forced to critically examine where and how I constructed the 
meanings of what made for good drawing versus bad drawing.  I had to confront my 
assumptions about how I was not suited to be an artist.  For the first time, someone read a 
different script, or at least took the one I read and presented it with a different outcome, 
and I was really in an in-between space of being able to see what was familiar and 
strange at the same time.  Although this was an uncomfortable place to be, I learned so 
much about myself and about drawing.  Moreover, I learned that the way to gain a better 
understanding of certain subjects is to challenge oneself to go beyond limits that are 
familiar.  In essence, the challenge is to be able to recognize one’s current understanding, 
and at the same time remain open to the possibilities that a revision of one’s thinking is 
always possible.  Over the course of the week I stretched my skills, abilities, and thinking 
until a real transformation occurred. In Chapter II, I will reveal to readers my actual 
drawings and explain the hermeneutic framework for this dissertation by using my 
transformative experience in this drawing workshop. 
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During the experience in New York I began to wonder where trust fit into my life.  
I began to realize that just as there are certain factors that affect the way we think about 
and approach tasks such as drawing, there are also certain traditions, values, and beliefs 
of modern society that affect the ways in which we think about other concepts and 
constructs.  Trust is a subject that has interested me for a number of years, and I began to 
wonder if I could transform my own thinking, and perhaps the thinking of others, by 
using the same approach I had when learning to draw.  Essentially, I have been interested 
in the subject of trust and what it embodies because in America there seems to be a lot of 
attention given to this topic in the press and scholarly literature.  As such, I chose to 
devote my dissertation to gaining a deeper level of understanding about this topic. 
Particularly influential in my desire to investigate trust on a more in-depth level 
was the fact that I had just taken a new job in an advising role for students at a private 
medical school.  In my new role, I felt that if I could get the students to trust me I could 
reduce their angst, increase their happiness, and even “save” them from anything bad 
happening in terms of their education.  I acknowledge that this seems a bit extreme and 
perhaps even naïve.  However, my beliefs about the positive outcomes that the presence 
of trust could allow were based on a combination of my own personal beliefs about the 
potential benefits that increased trust would provide for the aspiring medical doctors and 
from research for previous assignments I conducted as a student at The University of 
North Carolina at Greensboro.   
The idea for conducting a hermeneutical inquiry on the concept of trust began 
through a conversation with my dissertation chair, Dr. Glenn Hudak.  I approached him 
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initially with an idea for what I thought was going to be the beginning of a dissertation 
that would add to the body of research championing the need for increasing trust in 
society and societal institutions, especially schools.  My original contention was that trust 
is essential for American society because it would provide assurances and in turn reduce 
anxiety and uncertainty.  In my own naiveté, I believed with enough trust our world could 
become a friendlier place.  Though this may sound a little Pollyannaish I did believe that 
I would find that trust was something that was absolutely necessary to the functioning of 
society. 
Initially, I felt that the concept of trust had been explored to the point of 
exhaustion.  However, as any professor of philosophy worth their salt would do, my 
Chair challenged me to delve deeply into the research on the topic, and he gave me 
several questions to ponder regarding why Americans perceive trust as necessary.  As our 
conversations continued and my level of understanding trust and perceptions related to it 
increased, we arrived at the guiding question for this dissertation, namely, “Can we live a 
day without trust?” 
All of my prior investigations led me to believe that the presence of trust would 
serve as a catalyst for and serve as the foundation for increased levels of happiness and 
success in social institutions, specifically in schools.  What had not occurred to me was 
that the majority of my research and resulting claims came primarily from two fields of 
study—educational leadership and economics.  When I reflected on the fact that my 
beliefs were formed based on literature and research contained within these two realms, I 
began to ask myself questions.  I wanted to know and understand why trust was such an 
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integral part of these areas and what the connection was.  In other words, I wrote 
numerous papers without noticing that claims made about the positive effects of 
increasing trust in schools were similar to those made by business leaders excited about 
the possible positive results trust could offer in the market.  Coming to this realization, I 
began to wonder what structures or occurrences were responsible for perpetuating the 
belief that trust is necessary in today’s modern American society.  I had to know and so 
my journey began. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
I Know Trust is Good for Business. (Francisconi, 1998, p. 96) 
 
 
Like so many of our conceptions, constructions, and ideas about the elements that 
are assumed to be essential to human life in the twenty-first century, trust is a concept 
that is perceived as necessary to our current situation.  This concept was created in human 
consciousness within a particular history and culture.  As part of a specific historical 
situation trust has served certain purposes and it was used in ways that were relevant and 
particular to the lives of those who viewed it as necessary.  What is significant about trust 
is that it continues to help us cope with and make sense of our present situation as 
modern Americans.  The majority of the research related to trust claims that it is 
necessary is because humans do not live in isolation and therefore need to be able to trust 
one another so that social life can thrive.  For example, Graham Greene (1943) espoused, 
“It is impossible to go through life without trust: that is to be imprisoned in the worst cell 
of all, oneself” (as cited in Ho & Weigelt, 2005, p. 519).  Sentiments such as this help to 
create the perception that trust is necessary because of the mere fact that humans are 
social creatures and need to be able to interact with others.  Thus, without trust the feeling 
is that a sense of isolation may be inevitable. 
What is even more interesting is that this concept has grown increasingly popular 
in its use and perceived necessity in today’s modern society.  Currently, claims about the 
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necessity of trust are at an all-time high in research related to several social fields.  For 
instance, Bok (1978) claims that “trust is a social good and when it is destroyed, societies 
falter and collapse” (as cited in Cook, 2001, p. 22).  It is particularly influential in 
organizational leadership—an area that is dominant in business and in education.  Thus, 
the genesis and continued use demonstrate that trust is a concept that modern man deems 
necessary and relevant to life.   
One may ponder several possible reasons for all of the attention that the concept 
of trust is currently receiving and even question the hype over the need for trust.  Some 
might assume that business leaders have softened over the last couple of years and are 
more concerned with the feelings of their employees within the work environment.  
Others may be of the belief that increases in trust will result in increases in productivity 
and efficiency and as such makes better business sense.  Still some believe that trust is 
essential to daily life because it is responsible for creating cooperation and mutual 
respect—two highly valued aspects of modern society.  I, too, am one of those interested 
and questioning people intrigued by the concept of trust.  I wonder what it is about trust 
that causes a society to view it as necessary and capable of producing such positive 
results.  I want to gain a better understanding of how trust reached this honored seat 
amongst the virtues of American ideology.  Therefore, I feel it is time to call into 
question the concept of trust.  In essence, the concept of trust needs to be lifted out of its 
familiar surroundings and “taken-for-granted” position and instead be made to seem as 
though it is unfamiliar or strange.  To do this requires one to asks questions about the 
concept of trust that help to build a greater understanding of what it is, what it can and 
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will do and even where it came from.  Another way to question the necessity of trust is to 
think about the possibility of not having a concept of trust.  In essence, a commitment to 
thoroughly investigating this concept is what is required to expand and hopefully 
transform one’s thinking about trust. 
Challenging Conventional Wisdom 
Conventional wisdom on the subject of trust tells us things like, “trust is a need 
that is not subject to debate.  We must have it if our relationships are to work at the 
optimal level” (Marshall, 2000, p. 49).  Whether one agrees or disagrees with this 
sentiment is irrelevant to my pursuit in understanding trust.  Instead, what intrigues me 
about statements such as this is why they are made at all.  Thus, I want to gain an 
understanding of why one would believe that trust is necessary.  In other words, what 
makes us feel this way about trust?  Is it necessary for everyone to trust or just a select 
few?  Why is trust required and in what settings?  Questions such as these and many 
others make trust a subject of debate.  In essence, the purpose of my hermeneutic inquiry 
is to explain that trust can be used in manipulative, even negative ways when the intended 
goal is for one group, usually the dominant group or individual, to prosper at the expense 
of a weaker group or individual.  Though not every use of trust is negative, this concept 
does beget the need for a hermeneutical investigation so that we do not become 
complacent in our thinking that what is needed for a better society is the existence of 
more trust. Therefore, I want readers to gain a better understanding of trust through my 
interpretations of its history and use.  These interpretations will serve to explain why trust 
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is perceived as essential from a modern perspective and help to answer the question that 
this dissertation seeks to know, “Can we live a day without trust?” 
Trust in the Twenty-First Century: A Visible Concept 
In order for readers to begin thinking about trust in today’s society I will provide 
some of the modern conceptions and ways that trust is talked about in the current body of 
literature and research.  In today’s modern American society the concept of trust has been 
raised in our consciousness to a heightened level where it dominates much of our thought 
processes about both personal and societal level relationships.  As Americans, trust is 
present all around us in everything from trust funds and trust companies to our national 
motto, In God We Trust (Fisher & Mortada-Sabbah, 2003).  The word trust is visible in 
the iconic symbols of our democracy, for example, it is on our currency and is often 
found in common reading material such as magazines articles and newspaper 
advertisements.  Television pundits speak about the importance of being able to trust 
everyone from the President to the local car salesman.  
Advertisers do a brilliant job of using trust to instill a perception of security in 
certain products. For instance, Baby Magic, a line of baby care products uses the tag-line, 
“Trusted by Moms for Generations” to get moms to believe that their products are 
endorsed by generations of mothers who have used their products and approve of them. 
Additionally, just because the word trust may not be used in a slogan or tagline, 
American public works hard to create advertisements that sell products by portraying 
images of assuredness, calmness, being unshakable and even immune to the uncertainty 
that is part of daily life. The constant attention that trust receives through American 
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advertising serves as yet another example of how popular and endearing a notion that is 
amongst the masses. This term is used in the most serious of circumstances like school 
and hospital mission statements to even the most mundane instances as when people 
speak of “trusting” that their car will start each day.   
One does not have to look far nor search to find claims that trust is necessary 
because today this word appears in most every facet in our daily lives from healthcare 
and business to educational and religious institutions.  Researchers in the field of 
healthcare such as Lee (2009) posit, “Trust is fundamental for effective interpersonal 
relations and community living.  The absence of trust requires continuous anxiety or 
necessitates reclusiveness” (Lee, 2009, p. 244).  From this perspective it seems that trust 
acts as a stress reducer by helping to make social life bearable.  Still others who are 
devoted to studies related to the role of trust in education believe that, “Trust is important 
because it serves, paradoxically, as a “glue” and a “lubricant” in organizational life.  As a 
“glue” trust binds organizational participants to one another.  Without it, things fall apart.  
As a lubricant, trust greases the machinery of an organization” (Tschannnen-Moran, as 
cited in Leithwood, Mascall, & Strauss, 2009, p. 186).  Again, trust is valued in American 
social institutions because it is believed to instill a sense of security and cohesiveness.  
One could argue that across a broad spectrum, trust is viewed as an important concept in 
modern organizations and is commonly believed to be a necessary ingredient for daily 
survival. 
Though social scientists from most every field profess trust to be necessary the 
explanations for why vary greatly.  Thus, “as an inter- and multidisciplinary topic, it 
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[trust] is related to many concepts in other disciplines.  For example, “from a political 
point of view it is related to conceptions of authority, power” (Levi 2005; Lumann 1979 
as cited in Seimer & Schmidt, 2010, p. 5).  Essentially, trust is explained in multiple ways 
and by a multitude of scholars depending on the area of focus from which they approach 
the topic.  According to Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994), “The most comprehensive 
definition of trust would be ‘taken-for-grantedness’ (Holzner, 1973; Luhmann, 1988; 
Zucker, 1986) or the expectation and fulfillment of the natural and moral orders” (p. 
131).  This makes trust seem as though it exists through our social interactions even when 
we are unaware of it.  Additionally, Cook, Snijders, Buskens, and Cheshire (2009) offer 
sentiments with similar views on trust and even a few additional assertions about its 
purpose, such as: “Trust facilitates social interaction.  When it exists, it strengthens 
cooperation, provides the basis for risk-taking, and grants latitude to parties involved” (p. 
1).  Many social institutions such as schools share these beliefs about trust. 
Perhaps many of our current views about the necessity of trust emerge from the 
feeling that it is a “taken-for-granted” construct and therefore it is part of what makes us 
human.  Thus, we often assume trust to be present in society without question.  Some 
believe that trust is an action because they view it as something one does (Cook, 2001).  
In this way, trust is perceived to be something that one can earn through actions that 
others deem as proving one can be trusted.  For example, one could keep a secret with 
which they have been entrusted.  Arrow (1974) and Dasgupta (1988) “characterize trust 
as a public good” (as cited in Cook, 2001, p. 22).  Essentially, trust too becomes viewed 
as a commodity, something to be captured and even quantifiable.  For instance, one may 
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posit that a certain “amount” of trust is required in society.  Trust is often associated with 
words such as reliability, confidence, or assurance (Cook, 2001).  Therefore, the idea that 
trust is necessary is associated with the need to be able to rely on others by being 
confident in their abilities.  Though these types of claims abound in numerous sources 
and come from an array of fields of study one common theme is evident—trust is viewed 
as serving a vital role in our current society.  Therefore, it is highly visible in research 
and modern literature. 
Overview of the Chapters 
In the following chapters I investigate the historical foundations that led to the 
genesis of trust and provide interpretations for how the concept of trust was created, used 
and applied in relationships between people and institutions.  The purpose of these 
inquiries is to help readers gain a better understanding of trust by offering a multifaceted 
view of it both in terms of context and application.  To begin this hermeneutic inquiry on 
the concept of trust I situate trust within the current literature, or in its familiar and 
modern setting.  I start with the current body of research which helps one to form a 
conceptual understanding of the concept of trust and how modern scholars define it.  I 
explain five tenets of trust that I have found to be common across its use and application 
throughout history, and by doing so provide a framework for readers to use throughout 
the subsequent chapters.   
By explaining trust as it is viewed in the 21st century I hope to provide readers 
with a common language and familiar foundation to utilize when thinking of trust in the 
other historical contexts herein.  Essentially, I want readers to begin by understanding 
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how ubiquitous of a concept trust has become in recent years in American common speak 
and ideology.  Moreover, readers should begin to question why this is the case.  In other 
words, the concept of trust will become illuminated in such a way that it is essentially 
lifted off the page as the subject matter of focus throughout this dissertation.  Questioning 
how and why trust is now perceived as an essential ingredient for the functioning of 
society will need to remain at the forefront of the readers mind.  Other questions will 
likely form throughout the chapters on the history of the origination of trust and its use in 
American history.  For instance I thought about how life might look different if there 
were no concept of trust?  Additionally, I wondered if society really would not be able to 
function without trust.   
The constant questioning of trust is an essential part of the hermeneutic approach 
to understanding that I will explain in-depth in Chapter II.  Specifically, I will use my 
experiences from the drawing workshop I described in the prologue to help explain the 
hermeneutic approach to understanding. Through my process of learning to draw I will 
explain how a hermeneutic inquiry on trust is conducted and why it is an apropos method 
for investigating the concept of trust.  Hermeneutics is an interpretive approach to 
understanding that uses the dialogical conversations between the subjective knowledge of 
the reader and the subject matter at hand, in this instance trust, to help create a shared 
meaning.  The revised understanding one gains by employing the hermeneutic approach 
is considered an intersubjective way of knowing.  Through my textual interpretations the 
concept of trust and its intended uses will be explained based on what the various authors 
say about trust within the histories of study.  I will help readers understand how the 
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conversations one has with a text helps to form new interpretations for a particular 
subject matter.  For example, many readers will likely wonder, as I did, why the 
perception that trust becomes one that is necessary and yet the idea of faith is not. 
In addition to explaining the process of the hermeneutic approach, the elements 
that make this approach to understanding unique will also be discussed in detail.  These 
elements include: examining one’s prejudices about the concept of trust and 
understanding how history presupposes understanding and is always already present. 
Again, I will make these elements concrete by explaining them through my experiences 
with learning to draw. Ultimately, readers  will come to recognize that the hermeneutic 
discipline is not intent on making final truth claims about trust because it acknowledges 
that our knowledge is always finite and therefore subject to on-going revision.  Thus, the 
essential parts that make philosophical hermeneutics a unique method for understanding 
trust will be explained so that readers will understand why the chapters are based on 
interpretations of the texts rather than empirical data to reach a conclusion about the 
necessity of trust. 
In Chapter III, the hermeneutic approach will be applied to interpret the texts 
chosen to explain life in the Middle Ages.  The reason for investigating this particular 
historical period is because this is the era when, according to Desportes (2006), trust was 
said to have originated.  Some of the first known uses of trust were in the thirteenth 
century.  In order to formulate the interpretations for why the genesis of trust occurred 
during this particular history the focus will center on how the economic and political 
changes attributed to the social changes that necessitated the need for trust.  In particular, 
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the interpretations will focus on the trends and patterns of this historical and cultural 
period that caused people to need to trust one another. 
Chapter IV will move historically to the arrival of the Europeans into North 
America.  This chapter specifically focuses on interpreting why the construct of trust was 
chosen to establish a legal relationship between Euro Americans and Native American 
Peoples.  The interpretations in this chapter will come from many of the legal documents 
that were influential in establishing the special “trust relationship” between Euro 
Americans and the indigenous peoples of North America.  In particular, the Christian 
Doctrine of Discovery will be investigated and used as one of the main sources from 
which interpretations for the use of trust between these two groups of people are made.  
This document is still responsible for legislation related to Native American Peoples.  
Again, this chapter will provide another view of trust within a particular history and will 
add to understanding why trust is viewed as a necessity even today.   
By combining the textual interpretations from each chapter I will ultimately try to 
answer the guiding question, can we live a day without trust?  In doing so, I will explain 
in the final chapter how throughout each historical period from the origination until its 
use in today’s modern society there is a consistent underlying theme that appears to be 
present when trust is needed.  Ultimately, the interpretations will lead readers to 
understand that the need for trust is related to the need to perpetuate the goals of 
capitalism.  This view of trust as related to economics will be explained by looking at the 
rising need for trust through the five tenets of trust identified through my research: 
interest, risks, social capital, and productivity and efficiency.  These are elements that 
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appear throughout the texts from the historical periods.  In this way, readers will gain a 
sense of the hermeneutic circle in action whereby there in an examination of the parts of 
trust to understand the whole reason for why trust is needed which is again because its 
parts are necessary.  Next I will explain trust as it is viewed in our current modern 
American society and detail each of the five tenets of trust.  Finally, I will end this 
chapter by explaining the values of capitalism. 
The Difficulty of Defining Trust: A Modern Perspective 
In order to begin to understand why trust has evolved into a ubiquitous term it 
currently occupies in the American vernacular, a foundational understanding of trust from 
a modern perspective needs to be established.  Essentially, one needs to understand how 
American scholars define trust and how they apply the concept in different societal 
settings.  Definitions of trust range from the fulfillment of expectations, obligations and 
duties to feelings related to “confidence in or reliance on some quality or attribute of a 
person, thing, or the trust of a statement” (Oxford English Dictionary).  Modern scholars 
offer different definitions of trust depending on the setting and desired outcomes that they 
are hopeful the presence of trust will generate.  For example, Meyer, Davis, and 
Schoorman (1995) define trust as  
 
the willingness of a party (the trustor) to be vulnerable to the actions of another 
party, (the trustee) based on the expectation that the trustee will perform a 
particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or 
control the other party. (as cited in Huff & Kelly, 2003, p. 82) 
 
 
This definition comes from research related to organizational leadership as are many of 
the modern definitions of trust.   
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Because trust is an elusive term, it is difficult to reach a universally agreed upon 
definition.  Several leading scholars share the opinion that “trust is not easily defined” 
(Barber, 1983; Baier, 1986; Gambetta, 1988; Hardin, 1991, 1993, 1996; Mitzal, 1996; 
Seligman, 1997, 1998; Warren, 1999, as cited in Newton, 2001, p. 202).  This lack of an 
agreed upon definition of trust is most likely because, as Hardin (2002) states, “People 
regularly say, roughly, “when we say trust, what we mean is X” (p. xviii).  However, X 
can mean different things to different people because it is a variable.  Additionally, 
Hardin (2002) offers “trust is, not surprisingly, a messy, even confused notion” (p. xx).  
Based on my investigations I would agree that trust is a hard concept to define as well as 
to make claims about the necessity of its presence.  Due to the ambiguity that surrounds 
deciding the definition of trust leads me to wonder how something that is so undefined is 
simultaneously viewed as something we cannot live without.   
Five Common Tenets of Trust 
Though definitions of trust may vary, what can be gleaned are some commonly 
shared beliefs and ideas that are embodied in the current American perception of trust.  
Five of the commons tenets of trust I will concentrate on throughout this dissertation 
include: the notion of trust as a form of social control, the promotion and protection of 
interests, the notion of risks and risk-taking, the idea of trust as social capital, and the use 
of trust to increase productivity and efficiency.  These five themes will serve as lens for 
interpreting trust in both the past and the present.  In this way, these tenets will help 
readers to view trust from both a modern perspective while at the same time understand it 
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within another history.  Below, I will explain each aspect of trust in detail so that readers 
can understand how the modern world conceptualizes trust through each. 
Trust and Social Control 
Of particular interest, is the belief that trust allows for control and order: “The 
massive interest in trust in recent years seems to be stimulated by the inarguable view 
that social order is fundamentally dependent on cooperative relationships” (Hardin et al, 
2005, p. 1).  This commonly shared view is professed by many to be part of the trust 
relationship.  Essentially, trust can be viewed as responsible for facilitating cooperation 
that helps to add control in social settings.  This view of trust adds to the feeling that the 
presence of trust provides a level of stability and safety.  For example, in schools and 
even prisons, the teachers and guards are greatly outnumbered by the students and 
inmates, respectively.  Therefore, gaining the trust of these populations is often necessary 
to maintain a sense of security and order.  Those who trust others will likely follow the 
rules or conform to the expectations with greater willingness than those who do not.  
Therefore, several social theorists “claim that trust is required to produce cooperation on 
a large-scale in order to make societies function properly” (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 
1995, Hardin, 2002, as cited in Cook, Hardin, & Levi, 2005).  Large scale cooperation is 
also needed in our current democracy.   
The Role of Interests 
Trust relationships often involve considering the interests of both the truster and 
trustee and whether they are shared or not.  Several researchers from a wide array of 
fields speak about how trust is used to protect the interests of or at least acknowledge the 
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interests of the parties involved in the trust relationship.  In fact, the need to trust 
someone is due to the fact that people have certain interests they want to be protected.  
This need requires an obligation or commitment from another to be committed to helping 
protect those things which are valuable to another.  Baier (1994) espouses, “Trust is the 
assurance that one can count on the good will of another to act in one’s best interest” (as 
cited in Tschannen-Moran, 2004, p. 15).  According to Hardin (2004), “a minimal core 
part of a remarkable array of trust relationships is that there is a clear, fairly well defined 
interest at stake in the continuation of the relationship” (p. 6).  The concept of 
“encapsulated interest,” offered by (Hardin, 2004) claims: “I trust you because I think it 
is in your best interest to take my interest into the relevant matter serious in the following 
sense: You value the continuation of our relationship, and you therefore have your own 
interest in taking my interests into account” (p. 6).  In other words, the interests of one 
person or group are encapsulated, or valued in the interest of the other party.  This is due 
to the potential for reciprocal benefits that are contingent upon the continuation of the 
trusting relationship.  Yet, stated another way, Cook, Hardin and Levi (2005) offer, 
“Trust exists when one party to the relation believes the other party has incentive to act in 
his or her interest or take his or her interests to heart” (p. 2).  Therefore, people often trust 
others whom they know have similar or shared interests.  This helps with the assurance 
that neither party will break the trust.  For instance, mothers often look for childcare 
providers who they feel are interested in children and who have the best interests of the 
children at heart.  Thus, where one is concerned with protecting that which they value 
and hold dear, namely, their interests, trust seems to also be part of the equation. 
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However, if the relationship becomes parasitic between the two parties and 
essentially only one party is benefiting from the relationship at the expense of the other 
member then trust can be betrayed and the results can be detrimental to the relationship.  
In fact, one may question if this is a relationship that is based on trust at all.  This is 
referred to by Hardin et al. (2005) as a “conflict of interest” (p. 5).  For example, recent 
examples such as the Enron scandal show how the interests of top managers may be in 
conflict with that of the employees.  Thus while top managers are self-interested in 
earning huge salaries employees are interested in keeping their jobs.  These jobs are often 
affected in a negative way such as lay-offs when the self interest of the few is served over 
the others.  Thus, 
 
the complexity and ambiguity in every individual, interaction, and relationship: 
‘passions and interests, opposing representations of oneself and others, 
contradictory but simultaneous needs for membership and separation, and a desire 
for singularity, for protection and emancipation, for trust and for distance—are 
interwoven in a thousand ways, and they can give rise to infinite types of betrayal. 
(Samier & Schmidt, 2010, p. 10) 
 
 
When one trusts another with their own interests there are no guarantees that what each 
person values will be shared or preserved by the other party.  Therefore, it is important to 
be cognizant of the fact that when entrusting one’s interest to another the possibility of 
betrayal exist.  This leads to the next element of trust, namely the function it serves with 
regards to taking and reducing risks.   
Risk Reduction 
The act or choice to trust another is in itself to take a risk.  Risks are often 
associated with trust because one can think of the choice to trust to be a risk.  Likewise, 
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the greater the amount of trust between two people there is often the perception that this 
helps to reduce the degree of risks involved in the relationship.  In the words of Hume 
(1978), “‘Tis impossible to separate the chance of good from the risk of ill” (as cited in 
Hardin et al., 2002, p. 12).  In fact, the very notion of trust is based on the assumption 
that “there must be the possibility of exit, betrayal, or defection by the trusted” 
(Gambetta, 1988, pp. 218-219).  Essentially, trust is not relevant or necessary in fully 
deterministic settings.  For example, when students cheat in class they do so because 
there is a chance they will not get caught because it is neither predetermined nor 
inevitable.  Instead, there is a possibility that they will get by with it.  If it was guaranteed 
that they would get caught then there would be no risk involved and therefore no reason 
for trusting in the possibility of a different outcome.   
Risks can also include things such as sharing confidential information with 
someone and asking them to keep it private.  In this scenario one is taking a risk because 
they cannot be guaranteed that the other person will not tell share the information with 
others.  Annette Baier (1985) states, “trusting someone is always a risk given the partial 
opaqueness to us of the reasoning and motivation of those we trust and with whom we 
cooperate” (as cited in Cook, 2001, p. 10).  Similarly, trying something that is new or 
even frightening is a risk.  This may include activities such as skydiving.  The risks one 
takes in choosing to trust another includes the potential for the loss of something of value, 
like one’s sense of security, one’s ability to trust others, not to mention, one’s life..   
Likewise, trust is thought to reduce risks in social exchanges, thereby assuming 
that by creating a more trusting society we will increase the amount of assurance that the 
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goodwill of all involved will prevail (Yamagishi, Cook, & Watabe, 1998).  In fact, 
Shockley-Zalabek, Morreale, and Hackman (2010) posit, “We make decisions to trust 
based on many factors, including our tolerance for risk” (p. 24).  Thus some may not be 
as trusting of others because they are not willing to risk very much.  Therefore, the 
decision to trust can be calculated against the potential risk involved.  Heimer (2001) 
“sees trust as one way in which actors in social relationships can cope with the 
uncertainty and vulnerability that pervade relationships” (as cited in Cook, 2001, p. 28).   
In today’s society trust and risk seem to go hand in hand because of the view that 
modern society is one that is full of uncertainty and constantly involves risk-taking.  
These risks can include putting one’s money in the hands of financial official to 
participating in a medical trial for a new drug.  This feeling of constant risks may also be 
a large part of why we share the feeling that trust is necessary.  O’Neill (2002) states, 
“Some sociologists have suggested that the crisis of trust is real and new because we now 
live in a risk society” (p. 15).  Because trust is believed to help reduce risks and the fear 
that is often the result of uncertainty trust can serve as a way for people to feel that they 
have the next best thing to a guarantee.  Farrell (2004) states, “trust invariably involves 
some degree of uncertainty; one can never fully divine another’s interests, and thus one 
can never be entirely sure that another will behave in a trustworthy manner, although one 
may have reasonable expectations” (p. 92).  Thus, trust, regardless of the strength of the 
relationship between parties cannot guarantee that one’s expectations will be fulfilled.   
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Building Social Capital 
Another modernistic view trust as offered by many, such as Coleman (1980), 
Putnam (1995), Fukuyama (1995), Luhmann (1980), and Arrow (1974)  is that it is a form 
of social capital.  In this view, trust is something that can be accumulated or built up.  In 
fact, one of the broadest definitions of social capital is “the ability of people to work 
together for common purposes in groups and organizations” (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 10).  
Coleman (1980) asserts that social capital is “enabling” (Hardin, Cook, & Levi, 2002, p. 
83).  By enabling, Coleman (1980) posits that the ongoing relationships between families, 
friends and co-workers form the lower-level structures that “enable us as individuals or as 
corporate actors, to do many things, including cooperate successfully with one another in 
manifold ways” (Hardin et al., 2002, p. 83).    
Social capital is defined by Mencken, Bader and Embry as “the reciprocal 
networks of good will upon which community and social organizations are based” (2009, 
p. 35).  These networks are viewed as necessary for the sustainability of society because 
they create an ever-increasing web of trust relationships.  In the United States, the 
accumulation of capital, whether socially or monetarily, is perceived to be advantageous.  
For example, Luhmann (1980) claims, “trust accumulates as a kind of capital” (p. 64).  
Thus, for one to increase her or his social capital is a matter of expanding the circle of 
trusting relationships with others.  Networking, a term that is popular in modern society is 
akin to the accrual of social capital.  Thus, one could ask whether part of modern 
contentions about the necessity of trust stem from the belief that networking is crucial to 
building one’s relationship with others.  Bryk and Schneider (2003) posit: “Like human 
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capital, social capital is intangible and abstract, and accumulated for productive ends” (p. 
13). 
Increasing Productivity and Efficiency 
 While sifting through the current literature on trust I discovered yet another 
shared belief about why trust is essential today, especially in business and social 
institutions.  Currently, trust is seen a key resource for increasing productivity and 
efficiency in organizational settings.  In today’s society these two concepts are important 
and are often the greatest motivators in the market place.  This newly found attention on 
trust as it relates to the modern world of business and economics most likely is a result of 
the recent claims about the relationship between the presence of trust and its positive 
impact on organizations.  The positive impact is measured by the amount of increases in 
production and the speed at which tasks can be completed.  As Kramer (1999) observed, 
“this interest has been fueled, at least in part, by accumulating evidence that trust has a 
number of important benefits for organizations and their members” (as cited in Dirks & 
Ferrin, 2001, p. 450).  Still others claim, “Trust contributes to great efficiency when 
people can have confidence in other people’s words and deeds” (Leithwood, Mascall, & 
Strauss, 2009, p. 186).  What is interesting is that overwhelmingly the literature and 
research that serves to substantiate these claims is primarily from the business and 
educational arenas.   
This notion is of particular interest to me and leads me to question whether at the 
root of our perceived need for trust today is the relationship trust has on productivity and 
efficiency—two very important aspects of a capitalistic society.   In other words, is trust 
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necessary today because it is linked with the goals of achieving success in the market 
place?  For example, currently credit scores are used to determine one’s ability to borrow 
money.  A credit score is based on how credible one is.  In this sense credible means how 
likely one is to repay their debts and their credibility is based on their past credit history 
and other factors that modern America deem as necessary qualifications.  In essence, 
one’s credit is also viewed in terms of trust—can the individual be trusted to repay their 
debts?  In this way, trust is replaced by the word credit, yet it is what is being questioned 
and used for making the final decision about how credible one is.  This theme is one that 
will be explored as I work through the text in the subsequent chapters. 
Currently, research on the role of trust in schools also espouses that trust is 
necessary because of the increases in productivity and efficiency it provides to the 
educational goals of the schools.  In other words, because schools are concerned with 
efficiency for covering the curriculum and producing high tests scores is this where the 
need for trust in this setting comes from?   
In schools the effectiveness of trust has been measured in numerous ways by 
many authors, such as “operational success by Beeson and Matthews (1993); productivity 
by Bruhn (2001); student achievement by Bryk and Schneider (2002); positive climate by 
Goddard, Tschannen-Moran, and Hoy (2001); and productive communication by Henkin 
and Dee (2001) . . . to name only a few” (Samier & Schmidt, 2010, p. 14).  Schools—like 
businesses—share the belief that positive climates and productivity are increased as a 
result of the cultivation of trust. Schools, like businesses, share the belief that cultivation 
of trust will help with the rate and ease at which organizational goals are met.   
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The need for trust in organizations exists because, in the words of Marshall 
(2000), “We get greater speed by trusting the people we work with and by creating 
workplaces that nurture that trust.  We can outstrip any competitor and win any global 
challenge if we learn how to tap into the potential of our workforce” (p. x).  Both of these 
examples offer a view of trust as that which while in existence has the potential to make 
great things happen, and fast.  For example, Marshall (2000) states trust is “single-
handedly the fastest way to increase efficiency and production” (p. 2).  Likewise, Covey 
(2006) offers, “Speed happens when people at work truly trust each other” (p. 3).  In 
today’s fast-paced society a concept that provides for increases in the rate at which things 
are produced and profits are increased is undoubtedly thought of as essential. 
Trust as an economic necessity becomes viewed as one of the essential needs in a 
capitalistic society.  In the words of Adler (2001), professor of management and business 
at the Marshall school of Business at the University of Southern California, “Groups 
whose cohesion is based primarily on mutual trust are capable of extraordinary feats” (p. 
218).  These “extraordinary feats” are most often economic in nature.  These claims are 
made by individuals who operate from a business or economic mindset whereby the 
effects of trust are determined by bottom-lines and rising sales.  Why and how did these 
perceptions of trust as related to the goals of a capitalistic society begin? Is trust 
necessary because of the notions of competition, privatization, and self-interest have all 
increased throughout European and American history?  In essence, does the relationship 
between trust and our current economic orientation towards capitalism provide the 
answer to the overarching question that this dissertation seeks to answer: “Can we live a 
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day without trust?”  This notion will be investigated throughout the following chapters.  
Moreover, I wonder if the same is true of trust in schools.  For instance, do schools need 
trust because they too serve to promote capitalistic ends? 
Thus, trust often shows up in conversations or situations where the focus is on 
achieving economic ends.  Think for a moment where trust is talked about or used most 
often—banking, the market, and where money is concerned.  For instance, Daly and 
Cobb (1994)  ask, “Is it surprising that institutions that deal in the paper pyramids based 
on the fallacy of composition should generally try to inspire confidence by giving 
themselves such names as ‘Security, Fidelity, Prudential, Guaranty, Trust . . . 
corporations?’” (p. 422).  Ultimately, I want readers to be mindful of the fact that the 
views that trust is necessary in modern American society are influenced by and are even 
side effects of the capitalistic view of the world.  Before beginning the proceeding 
chapters an explanation of the values of capitalism is needed.  This is essential to the 
overall understanding of trust as an economic necessity because the ensuing chapters will 
show how the need for trust seemed to increase as capitalism became the economic 
orientation of Americans. 
The Parallel between Trust and Capitalism 
Capitalism, as defined by Merriam-Webster (“Capitalism,” 2008), is “an 
economic system characterized by private or corporate ownership of capital goods, by 
investments that are determined by private decision, and by prices, production, and the 
distribution of goods that are determined mainly by competition in a free market.”  In a 
capitalistic society, such as that of the U.S., individual success is favored over the 
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collective good of all peoples.  This dissertation will ultimately contend that from the 
genesis of trust until its current use in the United States, the rising need for trust has been 
on the same trajectory as the rising focus on individual success, competition over 
resources or capitalistic values.  For example, the quote below offers one example of how 
trust and business are related. 
 
The word trust embodies almost everything you can strive for that will help you to 
succeed.  You tell me a human relationship that works without trust, whether it is 
a marriage or a friendship or a social interaction; in the long run, the same thing is 
true about business, especially businesses that deal with the public. (Jim Burke, 
Former Chairman and CEO, Johnson and Johnson, as cited in Covey, 2006, p. 6) 
 
According to Geider (2003), “since the rise of capitalism two centuries ago social 
philosophers and even some economist have observed the deeply destructive collision 
and warned of the dangerous implications” (p. 44).  Among those dangerous implications 
is the fact that increasingly most Americans are looking out for themselves with little 
regard for how it impacts others.  It is important to note that not every instance of one 
looking out for oneself is bad.  For instance, in a dangerous situation where one’s 
personal safety is at risk looking out for oneself is appropriate.  However, reckless 
behavior such as that of Bernard Madoff, who stole millions of dollars from innocent 
citizens to increase his personal fortune, is an example of the dangerous side of 
capitalistic thinking.  There has been an increase in the use of, importance on, and 
necessity of trust related to an ever increasing importance on the desire of the majority of 
Americans to build individual economic success no matter the expenses involved.  This is 
probably due to a sentiment expressed by Greider (2003) that “we take direction and 
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values from both our social relationships and our place in the economic sphere” (p. 38).  
Among those values are prizing individual gain over societal or communal gain, 
competition over resources and the belief that producing more in the most efficient way 
possible is the goal we should all hope to achieve.  Thus, Greider posits: “In the 
economic sphere efficiency trumps community” (p. 35).  Therefore, I posit that the 
concept of trust has reached a crescendo in the perceived necessity because of the effects 
of our capitalistic American society.   
It is also interesting to note that trust and capitalism originated in the Middle 
Ages.  Was this coincidental or as my interpretation will ultimately ask, is there a 
relationship between capitalism and trust?  Moreover, does the relationship between these 
two social constructs provide the explanation for why trust is perceived as necessary?  
Adam Smith, philosopher turned economist, authored The Theory of Moral Sentiments in 
1759, at which time “modern capitalism was just getting underway” (Levitt & Dubner, 
2010).  In this work, Smith enlightened readers to his profound interest the effects 
capitalism seemed to have on human behavior.  “Smith was entranced by the sweeping 
changes wrought by this [capitalism’s] force” (p. 15).  Specifically, he noticed that 
“economic forces were vastly changing the way people thought and behaved in a given 
situation” (p. 15).  Essentially, when capitalism was introduced human behaviors and 
actions changed.  People changed the ways in which they interacted with one another.  
No longer were people only concerned with the well-being of others, instead the priority 
became on the accumulation of wealth and the means to protect it.  People were viewed 
with suspicion and the need for one to prove him or herself credible, dependable, and 
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worthy of trust became important among the masses.  By beginning the historical 
investigation into the origination of trust, which occurred as the rise of capitalism did, 
readers should notice the parallels and economic relationship between the concept of trust 
and the need for it.  In essence, my conclusion about the necessity of trust will show trust 
is of increased necessity when man increases his economic inclination.  Stated another 
way, trust becomes essential and something that economic man, namely, homo 
economicus cannot live without. 
In the final pages of this dissertation, I leave readers with the responsibility of 
continuing the conversation that this inquiry hopefully begins, namely constantly revising 
one’s understanding by questioning claims about the necessity of trust.  The point is not 
that we try to look for alternatives to trust by romanticizing our current situation.  That 
does not seem like a practical solution because I do not believe that our capitalistic 
orientation will disappear in the foreseeable future.  However, I do warn readers that 
when trust is viewed as essential to the success of social institutions, especially our 
schools, we need to question why it is important.  Though not every use of trust is 
economically-driven, this hermeneutic inquiry will urge us all to use a critical lens when 
trust is viewed as necessary among school leaders who are more concerned with tests 
scores and efficiency than the overall well-being of students.   In the end, readers are left 
with an alternative view for building authentic relationships, namely an ethic of care 
instead of the need for trust and hopefully, like I did through my experiences with 
drawing a transformed, broadened perspective of trust. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
HERMENEUTICS AND TRUST 
 
 
Our calling as human beings, then, is to find ourselves in the presence of others: a 
search which can be carried out in communication with others. (Hudak & Kihn, 
2001, p. 12) 
 
 
As humans, how do we come to understand anything?  Bruns (1992) asks, “what 
is it to make sense of anything, whether a poem, a legal text, a human action, a language, 
an alien culture, or oneself?” (p. 1).  For example, how do we know that a table is a table?  
Was a flat surface with four legs always known as a table?  According to philosophical 
hermeneutics, an interpretive approach to understanding, a table is known as a “table” 
because we as linguistic, thinking beings thought of this particular object in language and 
thus being as a table.  Only then did it become a table.  In this way, a table became a table 
through the shared meaning that was created about the object.  Therefore, the word table 
did not exist prior to human understanding and language.  This may sound a bit strange, 
but the point is that, “being that can be understood is language” according to the 
nineteenth century German philosopher, Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975, p. 432).  Gadamer 
was best known for this interpretative approach to understanding known as philosophical 
hermeneutics. 
In this chapter, I will explain what it means to understand a particular subject 
matter through interpretations that are reached in dialogical conversations with the 
“other.”  To make this explanation of philosophical hermeneutics concrete, I will use my 
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experiences from the “Drawing on the Right Side of the Brain” workshop I wrote about 
in the prologue to this dissertation.  Moreover, I will explain how coming to an 
understanding about the process of drawing helped me understand the hermeneutic 
framework and thus apply it to my investigation of trust.  I can think of no better way to 
do this than to invite readers to share in my transformative experience with a fairly 
common task—drawing.  Likewise, the experiences with drawing will help me to 
elucidate the basic structure of philosophical hermeneutics.   
It is important to begin with a basic understanding of where and why the 
hermeneutic tradition began. “Traditionally, hermeneutics meant the art or technique of 
interpretation” and it was derived from the Greek word “hermenuein” which literally 
means to “translate,” “explicate,” or “interpret” (Grondin, 2003, p. 3).  The simplest way 
to understand hermeneutics is as “a tradition of thinking or of philosophical reflection 
that tries to clarify the concept of understanding” (Bruns, 1992, p. 1).  As such, the issue 
at hand is to explain how humans understand anything and thus are able to form 
interpretations about subject matter in the hermeneutic encounter. 
This way of making meaning of the events, situations, and facts we encounter 
recognizes that “every aspect of our access to the world is mediated through language and 
therefore through interpretation” (Grondin, 2003, p. 16).  Thus, our understanding of the 
world and our entire being is grounded in language because we essentially think in 
language (Healy, 2005).  Nothing presupposes, in other words, comes before, language.  
Ultimately for Aristotle, man’s ability to “make what is not present manifest through his 
speaking, so that another person sees it before him” is the true marker of man’s 
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intelligence over and above other forms of life (Gadamer, 1976, p. 60).  Therefore, it is 
through the medium of language that any object comes into the being that can be 
understood.  In fact, new words, which were created in our consciousness first, come into 
spoken existence daily, just as some words drop out of existence.  In other words, as 
Zuckert claims, “new words are invented, others are taken over from foreign languages, 
some drop out” (as cited in Dostal, 2002, p. 206). 
In this same way, the concept of trust was formed within human consciousness 
because of certain circumstances, or one could say that it came into being as a result of 
the effects of the historical situation.  Thus, the concept of trust was brought into being 
through our language, and it was understood in the language of the history and tradition 
from which it came.  Therefore, “two assumptions of hermeneutics are that humans 
experience the world through language, and that this language provides both 
understanding and knowledge” (Byrne, 2001, p. 969). 
The Importance of Questions 
To explain the hermeneutic approach, one must first understand the priority of 
questions.  In other words, it is essential that readers understand that Gadamer’s notion of 
hermeneutics emphasizes that the route to understanding “always begins with a 
question”; thus, the start of this chapter began with a question and the goal of this entire 
work is to answer a question (Healy, 2005, p. 42).  In fact, the hermeneutical is an 
interrogative approach to understanding that occurs through questioning and interpreting.  
Therefore, this dissertation is not concerned with the claim that trust is something we 
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cannot live without; instead, it is focused on addressing the question, “Can we live a day 
without trust?”  
This is the guiding question of this dissertation and it was formulated through 
conversations with my Chair, Dr. Hudak.  In fact, he began by asking me a multitude of 
questions such as where my beliefs about trust come from and if I felt that trust is 
essential to life.  In other words, he challenged me to expand my horizons of 
understanding on this subject matter by engaging with me in the hermeneutic method of 
understanding from the onset. My original assumptions and perceptions about trust were 
questioned.  For instance, I initially approached the subject of trust with assumptions 
such as: with more trust schools would be better places, meaning safer and more inviting. 
What I wanted to know was not only why I felt that trust was essential, but why today 
others seem to feel the same way.  Through this hermeneutic inquiry I will in essence 
question the conventional wisdom explained in Chapter I, namely that the necessity of 
trust is indubitable.  Essentially, I want to take the concept of trust and investigate it 
through three very different historical and cultural lenses—the modern conception, as 
detailed in Chapter I, the Middle Ages, and the period of the colonization of America to 
try to interpret why trust is viewed as essential today and moreover to answer the 
question, “Can we live a day without trust?” 
 Knowing the importance of questions in hermeneutic inquiries leads me to begin 
my explanation of drawing and trust by asking, what do these seemingly unrelated topics 
have to do with one another?  This is an important question to begin a hermeneutic 
inquiry because the answer will help to explain one very unique aspect to this method of 
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interpretation.  Trust and drawing are presumably familiar words and concepts to most 
modern Americas.  In essence, for those of us living in the United States we have likely 
seen the word trust in print and used the term a time or two.  In this same way, I think it is 
safe to say that we have all drawn a picture or at least been exposed to the art of drawing 
at some point in our lives.  Therefore, one could think, so what?  In other words, one may 
wonder what else there is to understand about trust and/or drawing.  
Experience and Vantage Point 
In essence, these words and ideas seem fairly mundane and understanding them 
appears on the surface to be pretty straightforward.  On the other hand, one could argue 
that each of us have likely experienced these two concepts in different ways.  For 
example, for some of us we have probably had positive experiences when trusting others.  
Yet, others may have endured lots of heartache and disappointment with trust, or the lack 
thereof, in relationships with others.  Likewise, I was a person who was told at a young 
age that it was unlikely that I would ever become an art major.  I could barely draw a 
stick person.  Some readers likely share this experience with me, while others may create 
masterpieces each time they pick up a pencil.  Therefore, even though we may all know 
that to draw a picture involves paper, pencils, and certain hand movements, neither do we 
approach the action in the exact same way, nor do we share the same understanding of 
the process of drawing.  Likewise, we do not all share the same understanding of trust. 
The point of explaining that not all seemingly familiar concepts are experienced 
in the same way, as it relates to hermeneutics, is two-fold.  First, readers must understand 
that each of us have a different “vantage point” for seeing or understanding trust and 
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drawing.  The second point is that even though we think we understand drawing and 
trust, we possess the ability to make this subject seem alien or unfamiliar only if we are 
open-minded enough to allow for another viewpoint to be shared.  From the existential 
point of view, or our lived experience, we have come to interpret these two concepts in 
different and sometimes similar ways depending on several factors.  For instance, our 
historical situatedness, traditions, and culture all serve to create our particular vantage 
point.  Gadamer explains the notion of one’s vantage point in terms of one’s horizon: 
 
Every finite present has its limitations.  We define the concept of “situation” by 
saying that it represents a standpoint that limits the possibility of vision.  Hence 
an essential part of the concept of situation is the concept of “horizon.”  The 
horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a 
particular vantage point. (Gadamer, 1975, as cited in Bernstein, 1983, p. 143) 
 
Therefore, there exists the possibility of understanding these seemingly common 
concepts in uncommon ways.  This leads to my second point: because we do not all share 
the same understanding, there is room for us to create a revised understanding of two 
concepts for which most would assume are taken for granted in today’s society.   
The Familiar Made Strange 
 Additionally, drawing and trust are two topics that can be made strange or 
unfamiliar if we are open to the idea that a deeper level of understanding can be reached 
for both of these concepts.  This notion of making the familiar strange is another central 
feature of the hermeneutic approach to understanding.  Readers who want to know more 
about trust must be committed to the task of engaging in conversations with ourselves, 
others, or even texts that present these ideas. Davey (2006) reminds us, “The 
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hermeneutical experience of difference is not just a confrontation with the unfamiliar. It 
involves the recognition of the familiar having been rendered strange by the unfamiliar” 
(p. 16).  This is essential to the process of understanding because it allows us to take a 
step back, or become a third set of eyes between our thinking selves, namely to see our 
conscious at work alongside the others with whom we are engaged.  Hudak and Kihn 
(2001) state, “this separation from the world is an aggressive moment of pulling away 
from the undifferentiated contents of our experiences in order to make sense of them” (p. 
11). 
For example, when I began the drawing workshop the instructor told the class that 
drawing is not only about what you see, it is also about what you do not see.  This 
sounded foreign and unfamiliar to me.  In fact, I began to engage in a dialogical 
conversation, perhaps the most fundamental part of hermeneutics, with myself.  I asked 
what it could mean for drawing to be about what one does not see.  I questioned how, for 
all of these years I never knew this, and why I had not heard it presented in this way.  Did 
I have art teachers who did not know this either? 
Though I did not realize it at the time, these questions served a crucial role in my 
journey toward a revised understanding of a task about which I thought I knew all there 
was to know.  I did have some understanding about drawing, though not a lot.  Here “it is 
vitally important to recognize that the hermeneutical phenomenon encompasses both the 
alien that we strive to understand and the familiar world that we already understand” 
(Linge, 2004, p. xii).  The instructor explained that what we do not see when we are 
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focused on a particular object to draw is all of the elements that make the object appear 
complete. 
For example, when asked to draw a bowl of fruit, I would start to draw the 
bananas, apples, and eventually the bowl itself.  However, what I never thought of as 
essential to the totality of the picture were the other objects or space around the main 
object.  This is what is referred to as “negative space.”  This is the space surrounding an 
object which gives it dimension, shape, and in essence, illuminates it as the focus of the 
entire piece.  Additionally, vital to the totality of a piece of art work are features such as 
light and shadow, proportion, and a plethora of other artistic elements that make drawings 
appear to be three-dimensional and lifelike.  Thus, in just the first few hours of the first 
day, I was beginning to experience drawing as never before.  Suddenly, this familiar task 
was not so familiar. 
Similarly, the concept of trust can be made strange, even though for many modern 
Americans it is a familiar concept.  The process of making the familiar strange as it 
relates to trust is to see trust within the various historical contexts that I present in 
subsequent chapters.  For instance, Chapter III will present a view of life within a 
particular history before the concept of trust was used in language.  This idea in and of 
itself may seem strange to modern Americans for whom trust is usually an assumed or 
taken-for-granted concept.  Therefore, the questions that will begin the conversation for 
bringing a revised understanding to the concept of trust include: “Where did the concept 
of trust originate?”; “Out of what historical circumstance and events did the concept of 
trust come into being?”; “More importantly, why did trust become necessary?”; and 
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finally, one may even ask, “How can trust be anything other than necessary?”  These 
questions help in the process of re-orienting our thinking about the concept of trust by 
making it the subject matter about which we hope to know more. 
Dialogical Conversations 
 
We are intentional agents who create ourselves and our environments in 
continuous communicative interaction with others. (Anderson, 1997, p. 109) 
 
The goal of hermeneutics is understanding that emerges from authentic 
conversations whereby the words or concepts that are to be understood are discussed in a 
dialogical manner.  Put another way, a conversation is a two-way process in which 
language comes alive as participants engage in an authentic exchange of perspectives to 
achieve some purpose with others and themselves (Gadamer, 1975).  Dialogical 
conversations are not one-way conversations.  In fact, dialogue requires that the 
participants involved make room for one another’s “creativity and consciousness” 
(Braten, 1984, as cited in Anderson, 1997, p. 114).  Rather, the dialogue that helps a 
shared meaning to emerge assumes that each participant is committed to learning about 
and trying to understand the other by negotiating meaning through the use of language 
(Anderson, 1997). 
The objects that are used to bring a revised understanding of a particular subject 
matter for which one desires to know more about can be works of art, texts, and even 
people.  What is important to realize is that each participant serves a crucial role in the 
event of understanding.  In this way, the one who seeks to know more about a particular 
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object helps to concretize the other, either art, texts, or human beings by performing the 
action which the object intends. 
Intersubjective Meaning 
The conversation between the texts and the object about a particular subject 
matter, which in this case is trust, serve to create a shared meaning, or an intersubjective 
knowledge about trust.  The notion of intersubjectivity is also an essential element to 
interpretive ways of knowing, or hermeneutics.  The idea of coming to a shared meaning 
or actually creating new meanings involves active engagement and participation between 
two subjects.  Each participant brings her or his own understandings, biases, assumptions, 
and perspectives about a given object to the conversation.  The active engagement takes 
place through dialogical conversations.  Thus, shared meaning is achieved through “the 
coordinated action of continually responding to and interacting with, of exchanging and 
discussing ideas, opinions, biases, memories, observations, feelings, emotions and so 
forth” (Anderson, 1997, p. 112). 
In the drawing workshop, for example, the instructor and I were occupied in a 
continual back and forth type of engagement whereby he would present a technique or 
ask us to draw a certain line and I would question either how to do the task or why it 
needed to done in a certain manner.  For instance, early in the class we were asked to 
draw lines that represented the angle at which we saw certain objects such as a dresser 
located down a hallway or a chair across from where we were sitting in the classroom.  I 
felt myself wanting to draw straight lines that made the dresser in to a box and four 
straight legs with a rectangle on top for a chair.  These ways of doing things were 
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revealed my biases about how certain objects should be drawn and for me the angles did 
not matter.  However, the instructor questioned my way of approaching this task by 
asking me, from where I sat in the room, if all of the lines I saw were completely 
horizontal, in other words flat, or did some of them appear to be at an angle. I found 
myself wondering once again what this could mean, how were these objects which are 
composed of right angles and simple lines be so complex.  I never considered that when 
drawing not everything that is visible is located on the same angle.  In the end, these 
objects were definitely at an angle. What I came to understand through this engagement 
or dialogue was a revised meaning about the angles of lines in relation to the overall 
representation of a room (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Perspective Drawing 
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In these conversations the participation of the interpreter, the other, and the 
subject matter are equally important to the collective and revised meaning that will 
hopefully emerge.  Understanding the meaning of a text will not be formed as a result of 
just the interpreter or just the object.  Instead, “the meaning of the text is a shared 
language, shared in the sense that it is no person’s possession but rather a common view 
of the subject matter” (Warnke, 1987, p. 48). 
By engaging in conversations with the texts, this hermeneutic inquiry attempts to 
reach an “understanding as agreement” (Dostal, 2002, p. 39).  By agreement, this means 
that in order for real transformation in understanding to occur, the interaction between the 
texts and the participant must be engaging and productive activity.  The goal of the 
productive activity is about “reaching an understanding through discussion, of coming to 
an understanding in a verbal exchange” (Healy, 2005, p. 48).  However, it is also 
important to realize that agreement does not mean consensus, or “that all parties agree to 
endorse the merits of one party at the expense of another” (Healy, 2005, p. 48).  In this 
way, Gadamer insists that for transformation to occur conversations have to be authentic.  
In other words, one needs to have a real interest in the subject matter and thus engage in 
conversations about the subject matter in a trusting manner that encourages questions and 
answers to be ongoing, nontrivial, non-competitive, and ultimately that leads to deeper 
levels of understanding. 
The Hermeneutic Circle 
Another important aspect of these hermeneutic encounters is the 
acknowledgement that the shared meaning that emerges in the dialogical conversations 
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can only be understood within a particular historical situation and in a linguistic tradition. 
In other words, for one to fully understand the interpretation or shared meaning, one must 
be engaged in “the hermeneutic circle” of meaning.  In this way, meaning is co-
determined through engagement between the texts and their readers, both of which are 
part of certain histories and understand words and concepts within those histories.  In this 
way, meaning is co-determined by the interaction between the texts and its reader.  The 
circle, not in terms of a geometrical shape, but instead of an ongoing reciprocity of the 
parts and whole of an object, requires the constant awareness of one’s own historical 
situatedness and its effect on the meaning of texts and what the texts as a whole is trying 
to present that is new and even strange.  Through dialogical conversations about the 
subject matter at hand, the goal is to make familiar the strange parts of the object so that 
deeper levels of understanding can occur about the whole object.  
What keeps the process circular is that there is no ending point or final end to 
knowledge.  Just as important as the interplay between the parts and the whole of a text is 
the way in which our reading adds to its effective history, thereby contributing to the 
complexity and depth of its meaning (Ramberg & Gjesdal, 2005).  Thus, for this 
hermeneutic of trust, readers will be provided with an understanding of trust that is based 
on my interpretation of texts.  My own historical view will affect the way that I interpret 
the meaning of the texts and thus will ultimately affect the judgement I will provide about 
the essential nature of trust. 
In understanding drawing, I as one participant brought my subjective knowledge 
to the experience of drawing, the subject matter I want to know more about.  The “other” 
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for whom I engaged in the dialogical conversation with was in this case, the art 
instructor.  I questioned the process of drawing as he presented his subjective knowledge 
about drawing and as a result a shared or intersubjective meaning emerged out of our 
conversation.  Similarly, “the meaning of the text is a shared language, shared in the 
sense that it is no person’s possession but rather a common view of the subject matter” 
(Warnke, 1987, p. 48).  Therefore, the meaning that was created about drawing was the 
result of our engagement about this particular subject matter for which we shared an 
interest and desired to understand at deeper levels. 
Likewise, in the following chapters of this dissertation, I will present to readers a 
new way for thinking about the concept of trust.  Again, I will situate trust within the 
historical contexts which were previously stated and in doing so, I will explain my own 
interpretations about the genesis of trust, how and why it became necessary, and more 
importantly, try to answer the overarching question: “Can we live a day without trust?”  
Thus, my interpretations will be the intersubjectve meaning which was shaped through 
the dialogical conversations with the texts selected to conduct this hermeneutic 
investigation.  In this way, readers will be presented with the ways in which I interpreted 
the texts which will serve to reorient the readers thinking about the concept of trust. 
Hence, for readers to be transformed by the experience the way that I was requires that 
they engage with my words and explanations to see if a deeper understanding of the 
concept of trust is possible. 
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Prejudices and Prior Understandings 
When thinking of drawing, we each have our own prior understandings about this 
action before we even “get to the drawing board.”  In hermeneutics, these presuppositions 
are fundamental to the experience and are inescapable, meaning we cannot just remove 
them at will.  In essence, they are us.  As an example, the first day of class we were asked 
to draw a self-portrait.  We were provided with mirrors so that we could look at ourselves 
to aid us in the project.  The instructor gave us only one instruction: draw only what you 
“see.”  This sounded simple enough and again, my questions began.  For instance, I 
wondered, was this a trick, meaning how we could do anything different?  Would anyone 
draw something metaphorical?  As I began the project I was nervous that my portrait 
would look silly compared to the other eleven drawings.  However, I had to begin and so 
I created a self-portrait.  Because of my prior understandings about drawing I started with 
a big circle for a head, two oval shaped eyes, and my best attempt at a nose and lips (by 
far the hardest facial features for me to reproduce on paper).  I drew some straight lines 
for hair and the rest of the parts that are in the picture.  Thankfully, I was not alone in my 
rendition.  All but one classmate, an artist by trade, produced similar results.  Next, the 
instructor posted all of the portraits and he began to assess our work.  What he said was 
pivotal in my understanding of the entire process of drawing (refer to Original Self-
Portrait Drawing in the Appendix). 
The instructor told us all that the portraits we drew looked nothing like us.  He 
said this is because none of us drew what we actually saw; we drew what we had 
previously been taught to see.  What could this mean?  He explained that  he could just as 
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easily have written the word “eyes” on the page because we had obviously all been taught 
in much the same ways, namely that two oval shapes placed about an inch and a half 
below the top of our circles for heads were eyes.  I had never thought like this before.  
Again, I began to question how I had gotten by with this way of drawing for years.  How 
was I unable to understand that I was drawing, not by sight, but instead my pre-
understandings about certain subject matters?  From this first exercise a transformation in 
my thinking began. 
This example leads me to ask, what are some of the prejudices that modern 
Americans might share about the concept of trust?  In other words, what are the things we 
cannot see about trust?  What have we been taught to see, or understand about trust thus 
far?  As was explained in Chapter I, in today’s modern society, trust is thought of as 
necessary because it serves as a form of assurance in uncertain times and situations.  
Additionally, the word trust is often used when we think about protecting our interests, 
financially and in other ways.  The word trust is used when one speaks about trusting 
their child’s teacher, and for some, the concept of trust is enacted in mundane situations 
such as “I trust that other drivers will stop at stop signs.” 
No matter how we think about trust, individually or collectively, inevitably that 
we each approach this subject with a set of prejudices that affect our thinking.  In this 
way, these prejudices will have an effect on the other which we engage within the 
hermeneutic experience.  Moreover, our prejudices are composed of a combination of our 
history and culture.  In this way, our history, which is also our vantage point for 
understanding subject matter contained within it, is inescapable and always already 
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present for each of us.  Warnke (1987) states, “all knowledge of the natural or social 
world, of ethical demands, aesthetic value or the requirements of political action is 
grounded in a traditional orientation” (p. 168).  Therefore, anything we experience or 
encounter is already placed within some context, thereby allowing us to connect it with 
some other situation or event, which also means that we can interpret it.  We are always 
already effected by our history and can only think in terms of it.  Therefore, trying to rid 
ourselves of who we are and where we come from, both historically and culturally, is not 
possible. 
 
The maximal detachment and self-consciousness which are the goals of scientific 
enquiry and method are unrealizable ambitions, because the limitations of one’s 
own historical position always vitiate these claims: historical being always 
precedes consciousness. (Wisenheimer, 1985, p. 686) 
 
 
Historically-effective Consciousness 
 Thus, for modern Americans we understand trust within a framework of tradition 
that values trust as part of our day to day interactions.  Our tradition is informed by 
visible images like those mentioned in Chapter I such as the inscription on our currency, 
In God We Trust, trust funds, and federal trust responsibilities. Additionally, some of our 
common narratives, such as the story about George Washington, our first president, who 
as legend tells us in a moment of mischief, cut down a cherry tree.  When confronted 
about his naughty behavior he stated, “I cannot tell a lie.”  These images and stories have 
an effect on the way we understand trust and as such help us to interpret the concept of 
trust in various situations.  In hermeneutics this idea has been coined, “historically-
effective consciousness.”  One’s history always provides a past and present way of 
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interpreting the world.  It also shapes our thinking about the future or what will happen 
next.  Accordingly, Gadamer spoke of our traditions and their horizons as those things 
which “silently shape our expectancies of texts and their subjects matters” (Davey, as 
cited in Moran, 2008, p. 717).  In this way, each person’s history is limited or finite 
because each history has a horizon for which there is a starting point which continues 
until it reaches our current position.  Thus, we think in the language of our particular 
history.   
Figure 2 serves as an example for how one’s vantage point informs one’s 
understanding.  This particular drawing represents my vantage point when looking out 
the window at the New York City landscape.  What readers may not recognize by looking 
at this picture is that my major prejudice in this picture can be seen in the tree.  The tree 
in the room did not have this many leaves, nor did it really look exactly like this.  
However, I was more comfortable drawing the tree than anything else.  Additionally, the 
idea of proportions and calculating the size of objects in a picture to give the finished 
product a sense of depth and dimension was beyond my current horizon of understanding.  
As such, I was afraid to attempt the piece and found that it was a real internal struggle to 
fuse my horizon with the other which in this case was a technique in drawing for which I 
could not grasp.  The hermeneutic encounter is said to be difficult. 
As such, history had an effect on my experience with drawing.  For example, I 
understand drawing in terms of “art teacher,” “number two pencil,” and “lines on a 
page.”  I am a product of the seventies until the present.  One the one hand, in my 
personal history, there are those who think of art as anything one makes of it and as 
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unique in its own way; at the same time, there are those who claim that there people who 
are artists and those who are not.  I think of drawing as a task that is not limited in terms 
of who can try it, meaning that one’s gender or ethnic group is not excluded from trying 
to draw.  These are all effects of my history.  In essence, we all have histories that have 
an effect on our understanding of trust. 
 
 
Figure 2. Vantage Point Drawing 
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For example, in today’s modern society transparency and trust are often thought 
of as synonymous, or at least related (O’Neill, 2002).  Thus, trust is situated in modern 
history where we have witnessed corporate scandals, the fall of the World Trade Center, 
and more positive events like the fall of the Berlin wall.  These events and countless 
others are responsible for shaping our view of trust, individually and collectively, though 
this dissertation is concerned with the societal view of trust.  For example, during George 
W. Bush’s term in office it was commonly thought by many Americans that he was not 
forthcoming with information and always trying to distort the truth.  Thus, he was not 
perceived by many as trustworthy or transparent. Still others may have an entirely 
different view of trust because “trust is not one thing but many” (Solomon & Flores, 
2001, p. 20).  Ultimately, one’s history will always determine how one understands or 
makes sense of the concept of trust.  This is because “a really historical thought must also 
think its own history” (Warnke, 1987, p. 69). 
Because our history always affects our consciousness, we must be aware of this so 
that when trying to understand the other we are able create a temporal distance between 
ourselves and the other.  In fact, the important thing according to Gadamer (1975) “is to 
be aware of one’s own bias, so that the text may present itself in all its newness and thus 
be able to assert its own truth against one’s own fore-meanings” (p. 238).  By creating a 
distance, we are able to see where our horizon of understanding, the cultural and 
historical horizon ends, and where that of the other, trust or drawing, begins.  When 
taking a conscious step back, we are able to temporarily put our history in front of us so 
that we can see it alongside the history of the other.  Accordingly, Linge (2004) claims 
46 
 
 
that it is “the knower’s boundness to his present horizons and the temporal gulf 
separating him from his object [to be] that is the productive ground of all understanding” 
(p. xiv).  This being with or alongside the other creates what is referred to, 
hermeneutically speaking, as a fusion of horizons.   
When one lifeworld is able to meet with another lifeworld to see the subject 
matter of investigation, situated within a particular history, revised understanding can be 
made and the transformative experience can continue to evolve.  By a shared 
understanding, 
 
both persons involved in a dialogue occupy a different lifeworld but in order to 
communicate and understand each other must participate in the other by 
withdrawing from their own individual present horizons to form new horizons 
that genuinely include the other. (Taneja, as cited in Sherma & Sharma, 2008, p. 
211) 
 
 
This fusion of horizons is essential to the dialogical process of understanding.  In this 
way, understanding is formed along with the other instead of by one trying to become the 
other.  For example, a reader of a text does not try to become the author to form an 
understanding of what they author is saying. Rather, the reader tries to understand what 
the text is trying to present. Another way to understand this being alongside is that 
hermeneutics does not want us to “walk a mile in another’s shoes”; instead, it wants us to 
walk a mile beside the other. 
Until enrolling in the drawing workshop and actively engaging in the process of 
drawing, I did not know that there was actually more than one way to create a work of 
art.  For example, who would have thought of drawing Picasso upside down to achieve a 
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virtual replica of his famous work, Igor Stravinsky?  This was exactly the task I was 
asked to do on the initial day of class.  I could not believe my ears.  This approach ran 
counter to everything I ever knew about drawing.  Could this be too radical?  How would 
I create anything even close to a Picasso?  Was drawing something upside down 
something new age?  In essence, this was a struggle for me to understand and thus 
another revealing moment which only served to further my understanding of drawing.  
Refer to Figure 3 to see what came of this experience.  Though not perfect, needless to 
say, I was impressed with myself! 
 
 
Figure 3. My Drawing of Picasso’s Igor Stravinsky 
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The Hermeneutic Approach: Not an Easy Task 
The hermeneutic framework provides a way for approaching any subject matter 
for which one wants to understand more in-depth.  What is important to realize about this 
interpretive approach is that it is difficult and often uncomfortable because it challenges 
one to consider that there are infinite interpretations for the subject matters and concepts 
that exist in our lives.  “Philosophical hermeneutics is intensely interested in such 
experiences of difficulty” (Davey, 2006, p. 51).  Knowing this forces one to question 
whether or not there is a “floor” or a final, completely verifiable set of knowledge in the 
world.  According to the hermeneutic approach, the floor is that which we define as the 
floor, and it is temporary because it is only the floor for the current situation.  
Additionally, it is difficult to realize that there is no final source of knowledge that is able 
to provide final answers to the questions we have in life.  Learning and understanding is 
an ongoing, infinite process by which we are the creators of meaning.  
While in the drawing classes, I also experienced a tremendous amount of 
difficulty when trying to understand the process of drawing.  In many ways, I was 
looking for “the floor.” Essentially, I was looking for that one technique that I could 
adopt for drawing that would result in perfect pictures.  However, this very line of 
thinking goes against the hermeneutic approach because there is no set of knowledge 
beyond human understanding.  However, at the time I wanted a solution to the problems I 
was experiencing in interpreting the process of drawing.  This experience actually left me 
in tears two days in a row because I could not understand some of the ways to achieve the 
results I wanted to see on paper.  In essence, I was struggling to overcome my 
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preconceived notions and fears and what I did not accept at first was that these are part of 
what make me who I am and the drawer that I am.   
As an illustration, Figure 4 is a drawing of my hand.  When I first began this 
assignment I assumed this would be one of the easier ones to complete because it was my 
hand and I had been with it for years.  However, what I did not realize is that though I 
may have looked at my hands a thousand times, making it appear real on paper was not 
an easy task.  Moreover, there was not a prescriptive way of making my hand look like it 
does in real life.  I had to struggle to become fully engaged with the details, lines, 
wrinkles, shapes of the fingers, and everything that gives a hand its form in order to 
create the work of art.  In other words, I had to interpret my hand based on the 
combination of what I saw and what I learned from the class instead of looking for a 
photocopy, an exact replica to be the end result. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Drawing of My Hand 
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Only when I let go of looking for “the floor” did I realize that all concepts, even the one 
of drawing my hand, are interpretations.  In the end I was pleased to see my results, 
however, with the understanding that this is my representation of my hand and it is 
always subject to revision. 
The same difficulty applies to trying to gain a better understanding of trust.  This 
concept, like all others, is constantly subject to interpretation and reinterpretation.  Thus, 
a final answer does not exist to the question this dissertation hopes to answer about 
whether we can live a day without trust.  Instead, the best that can be achieved through 
my interpretations is a deeper level of understanding of this concept based on my shared 
understanding between the text and myself as the interpreter.  Even then, this dissertation 
is limited by the history and tradition in which it was written. 
The Finitude of Knowledge 
Thus, all human knowing is finite.  By finite, it is limited in terms of its horizons 
of understanding because it is always already a product of its culture and the history that 
affects one’s consciousness.  This entire notion is most likely strange to us modern 
Americans, who have been taught that knowledge must be testable and repeatable for it to 
be true.  Additionally, this implies that knowledge is something which can be obtained 
and moreover that it is permanent, not subject to revision and outside of us.  However, 
because meaning is created out of a shared experience about an object, it is never final.  
Additionally, it is always understood through a shared language and in a particular 
history.  Thus, the history and connections of one group of people about drawing or trust 
will always affect the shared meaning that is made. 
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Non-transferable Knowledge 
 As such, hermeneutics does not view knowledge as something that is 
transportable like a pail of water.  Unlike the empiricists, this view of knowledge does 
not assume that there is a “body of knowledge,” an actual set of principles and truths for 
which we can eventually learn all that there is to know.  Again, this is because meaning is 
made through conversations and it is particular to the community where a shared 
language exists.  Hermeneutics is not intent on making final truth claims about trust 
because it acknowledges that our knowledge is always finite and therefore subject to 
ongoing revision. According to Wachterhauser (1994), “there are no ‘value-free’ or 
‘conceptually-neutral’ facts to which our ‘interpretations’ might simply ‘correspond’” (p. 
53). 
In other words, the human conception of the world and the understandings we 
have about it are not justified independently of ourselves or outside of ourselves such as 
from an objective view of reality.  In fact, the important thing according to Gadamer 
(1975) “is to be aware of one’s own bias, so that the text may present itself in all its 
newness and thus be able to assert its own truth against one’s own fore-meanings” (p. 
238).  In trying to gain a better understanding of trust, one must acknowledge their 
current understanding of the subject and how these understandings were formed.    
Hermeneutics rejects this view of knowledge and instead exhorts that knowledge 
is created through our language, which is being.  Thus, there can be no subject matter that 
does not already exist in language.  This view of the world dispels the myth that there are 
final answers that exist which will never change.  Thus, “we never assess the beauty of a 
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painting or worth of an action in light of a suprahistorical standard of rationality but we 
are always indebted to the various aesthetic, scientific and ethical-political traditions to 
which we belong” (Warnke, 1987, p. 169).  Therefore, approaching the concept of trust 
through the hermeneutic framework means that no one can ever know all there is to know 
about trust.  In fact, “by calling all human knowing finite, Gadamer is pointing out that 
no one knows everything nor could anyone ever hope to know everything” (Dostal, 2002, 
p. 56).   Thus, one’s understanding of trust is always subject to revision. 
Within each historical situation and culture in which the concept of trust is still 
used and therefore has purpose or meaning, trust may be understood differently.  “The 
influence of the past obtains in our aesthetic understanding, in our social and 
psychological self understanding and in all forms of scientific understanding” (Warnke, 
1987, p. 3).  Thus, in the following chapters, I will investigate texts which will illuminate 
the concept of trust against a history which is different from the one in which I live and 
understand.   In this way, the interpretations offered in this dissertation are not final 
truths, and are instead subject to revision. The concern with the finitude or limits of 
human knowledge here is rather to understand that humans cannot know all of the 
“conditions of human knowledge” that will be presented in life.  These conditions include 
things like language and history which are themselves constantly changing. 
What Does this All Mean? 
According to hermeneutics, “the real goal of all conversations and dialogical 
encounters is a deeper understanding of the other and ourselves” (Taneja, as cited in 
Sherma & Sharma, 2008, p. 211).  Thus, in the subsequent chapters, readers will see how 
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the hermeneutic approach is used to gain a deeper understanding of the concept of trust.  
Several questions are asked throughout the chapters so that an intersubjective meaning is 
created through the interpretations made within each chapter, or historical period.  As 
such, the limits of my horizon of understanding are fused with the other historical life 
worlds which were chosen to gain a deeper understanding of trust.  In the end, I will 
provide readers with my best truth claim concerning why trust is necessary and is 
essentially a concept without which we cannot live a day.  However, it will be important 
to realize that my vantage point may be different from another reader who could read the 
same texts selected for this inquiry, because hermeneutics acknowledges that each reader 
of a text is a different interpreter.  In this same way, if I conducted this interpretation for 
second time with these exact same materials, I would likely arrive at a revised 
understanding because  I would already be influenced by the first reading which would 
become a part of my historically-effective consciousness.  Herein, readers will experience 
a hermeneutic of trust. 
In essence, foreshadowing what is possible when one remains open to and is 
committed to seeing new possibilities, I will return once more to my experience with the 
drawing classes.  On the very last day of the workshop our final assignment was the same 
as the first day—to draw a self-portrait.  The task was the same, my tools—pencils and 
paper—were the same, however; my understanding of drawing was different.  I now had 
a revised understanding of the process and it helped me to view my facial features in a 
new way.  I was able to view some of my former biases that affected the way I drew 
myself initially and yet juxtapose those against my new way of understanding.  In this 
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way, I was fusing the horizons to form a new horizon of understanding for myself.  In the 
end, I created the portrait in figure (see Final Self-Portrait Drawing in the Appendix).  
This shows that I was transformed by my experience and hope that my readers will be 
transformed in their thinking about the concept of trust. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 
 
 
Mercantile genius consists principally in knowing whom to trust and with whom 
to deal. (Lord Justice Bowen, 1883) 
 
 
In the previous chapter the hermeneutic framework was explained in detail.  Now, 
it is time to apply this approach of interpretative inquiry to understand the notion of trust 
situated within the historical context in which it was thought to have originated, namely 
the Middle Ages (Desportes, 2006).  Herein, I attempt to provide an explanation for the 
genesis of trust by investigating the sweeping socioeconomic changes that occurred from 
the fifth through the seventeenth centuries. Because this is a hermeneutic inquiry this 
chapter seeks to understand these two questions: what were the economic circumstances 
that caused the emergence of the concept of trust and what purposes did was trust serve in 
the daily lives of the medieval Europeans?  Ultimately, I will explain that it was the 
changes in the medieval economy, from the simplistic farms whereby peasants did not 
earn a living to the rise of capitalism and the resulting market influenced way of life 
beget the need for the notion of trust in the daily lives of Europeans1
                                                             
1 The term “European” will be used throughout this dissertation to refer to the mentality that the people 
who lived on the continent of Europe shared more so than specific ethnic identities.  Smith (1998) offers a 
theoretical basis for my use of the term “European” in a generalized manner.  His claim is “that 
‘Europeanness’ is born partly of a shared Indo-European barbarian cultural heritage for Celt, Gerrman, and 
Slav alike, and partly of the legacy of the empire passed on from ancient Rome, the Carolingians, and 
Byzantium.  It is that shared barbarian culture, married to an imperial past from a classical age—a past 
aped and reinvented by countless medieval rulers—which has impressed itself upon the European psyche 
 in the Middle Ages.   
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In essence, this chapter will make the claim that it was the progression from the 
non-materialistic, sedentary, rural lifestyle characteristic of the agricultural peasant 
farmers, to increases in urbanization, the rise of proliterianization, and eventually the rise 
of capitalism, which resulted in competition over resources, that may have served as 
catalysts for the first known uses of the concept of trust (Roberts, 1990).  Thus, the reader 
will learn it was primarily economic demands that led people to migrate from the close-
knit rural communities where kinship norms kept members of the group in harmony.  In 
the late Middle Ages, as the Europeans dispersed more and more to urban settings to find 
work and make money, they came into contact with others, commonly referred to as 
strangers.  Now that responsibilities were extended to others who were outside of the 
familial group, relationships began to broaden to include people who were not bound to 
each other out of blood ties, group loyalty, or the necessity of survival.  Along with these 
newly-formed relationships came the notion of risk associated with relying on or 
confiding in others to fulfill an obligation.  Additionally, the need to establish credibility 
of oneself and others, and the consideration of the interests of the people involved in the 
relationship were now part of the equation.  Ultimately, these newly-established 
relationships seemed to lead to a concept that embodies all of these ideals, namely the 
genesis of trust. 
Setting the Historical Stage 
To some, the term “Middle Ages” is very fitting because this period of time, 
marking the end of Late Antiquity to the beginning of Modernity, was definitely a middle 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and continues to inspire the inhabitants of this continent to regard themselves in spite of all their 
differences—as being in some real sense, Europeans” (Smith, 1998, p. xvii). 
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ground in which most of Western Europe was searching for order and stability.  
However, as Newman (2001) warns us, 
 
The term Middle Ages is actually a derogatory term.  Historians long after the 
Middle Ages stuck this epoch of history with the label because they viewed these 
centuries as a filler, a time in the middle between the great ages of classical 
Greco-Roman civilization and the Renaissance. (p. 2) 
 
 
Although the Middle Ages have been criticized because of its perceived “stagnancy,” it is 
important to note that it was during this historical period that the creation of universities 
transpired, the Magna Carta was composed, some of the greatest literary works such as 
the epic of Beowulf were written. The growth of towns and trade emerged eventually led 
to capitalism. 
Whatever one deems as the appropriate naming of this period of time, one of the 
common themes that the reader will notice as being very prominent about life during the 
Middle Ages is how much life changed for the Europeans between the years of 476 B.C. 
to around 1500.  Essentially, life for the people of the Middle Ages went through a vast 
and rapid transformation from small, close-knit communities that were more like a tribe 
of people with the bonds of the family and close neighbors being the norm to feudalism 
and eventually a market economy that would shape capitalism throughout the nineteenth 
century and beyond.  Haskins (1929) writes, “Localism was writ large across the Europe 
of the early Middle Ages, the localism at first of the tribe and the estate, later shaping 
itself into those feudal and manorial units upon which medieval society rested” (p. 93).   
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The Early Middle Ages 
Following the collapse of the Roman Empire in 476, “Europe saw a dramatic 
development of independent kingdoms.  The ideology which underpinned these 
kingdoms was constructed from a mixture of native traditions and systems of knowledge 
from the Mediterranean world acquired through Christianity” (Driscoll, 1998, p. 142).  
This period, classified as the early Middle Ages, extended from approximately 500 to the 
year 1050.  Historically, during this period there were basically two main classes of 
people—the nobility and the agricultural peasants.  “The lower classes of people, the 
peasant class of this period, were the emancipated slaves from the days of late antiquity” 
(Driscoll, 1998, p. 142).  In essence, after the Roman Empire collapsed “the great 
landowner of the late Roman and Merovingian periods found it to his advantage to 
emancipate slaves and settle them on his estate as dependent cultivators” (Hoyt, 1966, p. 
208).   
In this way, the peasant class was not totally free but actually became slave of a 
different kind.  Because these people were newly emancipated and as such were without 
any real property or wealth, they became slaves to the lands owned by the lords and 
kings, depending on them for their survival.  Essentially, these former slaves became 
known as “free-dependents”; an oxymoronic term by today’s standards.  In fact, 
 
in the evolution of the community toward manorialism the most important 
development . . . was the depression of freemen to the status of dependent 
peasants, tied to the soil and subject to the authority of a local lord who protected 
them in return for their economic support. (Hoyt, 1966, p. 209) 
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Even those few people who were free prior to the start of the early Middle Ages 
were often forced to turn their land over to the wealthy landowners as manors were 
becoming the new norm.  Therefore, these free peasants became legal and economic 
dependents of the great landowners as well.  Thaxton (1977) claims that “given their 
subordinate vision of the world, the peasants are by and large powerless dependents” (p. 
186).  As such, they inhabited tracts of land that were owned by a local lord and worked 
it in order to have a place to live.  They cultivated the land and practiced animal 
husbandry for survival and to produce food for the land owners.  The only real form of 
wealth during these early medieval years was in the form of land ownership.  Typically 
those considered noble and powerful were a class of citizens who were able to “own” 
anything, including land and lives of their dependents.   
Property ownership by only the upper echelon was not the only defining 
characteristic of the beginning of the Middle Ages. “Early medieval society was 
predominantly military and agrarian.  Raising crops and domestic animals and fighting 
were the main occupations during this time” (Hastings, 1981, p. 38).  Thus, the majority 
of the peasant class consisted of farmers who produced crops for subsistence and for the 
members of the upper class.  During the early Middle Ages the majority of people lived 
throughout the European countryside in small tribes which were held together by bonds 
of kinship and familial ties.  Life among the peasants was homogenous in the sense that 
everyone in this class shared the same resources, occupied an identical social status, and 
was dependent on the sharing of land and resources for survival.  In the early Middle 
Ages these “primitive people were organized according to blood ties—the family and the 
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kindred” (Cantor, 1993, p. 94).  Thus, this class of people was held together by the 
respect and loyalty associated with being a part of a family.  Chayanov (as cited in 
Roberts, 1990) describes 
 
the peasant farm as being primarily oriented to secure the subsistence needs of its 
members.  Decisions over crops or the amount of land to farm are determined by 
the number of mouths to feed and by the available number of household workers.  
The peasant, from this perspective, seeks not to maximize income or profit, but to 
ensure that all family members are adequately fed and employed. (p. 356) 
 
 
The prospect of material gain for selfish reasons was not a common aspiration among the 
peasant class.  Instead, the peasants banded together to help each other with the essentials 
needed for subsistence and survival.  For instance, 
 
no single peasant was wealthy enough to own a whole plow team of eight oxen, 
and few peasants owned plows, but by combining their oxen and plows the 
villagers could cultivate large fields jointly with greater efficiency than they could 
farm small plots with their individual resources. (Hoyt, 1966, p. 204) 
 
 
From these examples, one surmises that this class of people seemed to understand the 
importance of sharing resources.  Thus, for the majority of citizens, life during the early 
Middle Ages was one where shared communal values and beliefs were the bonds that 
held society together. 
The agrarian calendar dictated the rhythm of work and rest instead of economic 
demands.  Thus, the need for a concept of trust was probably not on the minds of the 
medieval people who occupied and worked on the lands owned by lords because 
everyone held the same social status, worked the same jobs, and vied for survival.  For 
this lowest class of people, life was predetermined by their status, as they did not have the 
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same power and material leverage as that of the nobility.  The purpose of work was not 
for economic gain or for the hopes of climbing the social ladder because unless someone 
was born into the upper echelon of medieval society there were few, if any, hopes of 
upward social mobility.   
Despite some improvements that rarely occurred in peasant status and periodic 
peasant economic gains, the lords managed to deprive agricultural workers of most of the 
surplus they created.  In fact, because the peasants were practically destined to endure 
this meager level throughout life, their internal bonds likely had to remain strong because 
outside of their socioeconomic group it was obvious they were not equals.  Therefore, 
within the peasant group the need for bonds of trust or those relationships which require a 
more formal sort of identity were virtually non-existent during this early period of the 
Middle Ages.   
Life for peasants was hard due to the fact that the vast majority of people had to 
cloister together and essentially work to keep each other alive.  In these tight-knit groups, 
cooperation and the notion of being able to rely on your neighbor were crucial.  The 
collaborative effort, the concept of caring for one another instead of material wealth, and 
the respect and reciprocity that is found in close-knit groups, was the social order of the 
peasant class during the early Middle Ages.  Kohn (2008) espouses, “familiarity 
permitted the application of a moral code based on reciprocity” (p. 34).  In this period of 
time people grew up with and shared a daily life with one another.  The bonds established 
in this type of society were strong without the need of formally labeling the ties because 
people treated one another as family. 
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  Additionally, peasants began to be used more frequently in the early Middle Ages 
as part of the military when the need for protecting lands arose because they provided 
free labor.  This group of people, referred to as the “free fighting men” of this time period 
were frequently called together to protect the village from raids by Vikings and other 
barbarians from the Scandinavian islands.  The raids during this time “were annual and 
unpredictable as to locality” (Hastings, 1981, p. 37).  From these early days of frequent 
fighting and the needed protection by local leaders, the dukes and counts, we find the 
earliest signs of feudalism due to the loyalty reciprocated by the free-dependent peoples 
who provided the service of guarding the local leader in exchange for the use of their 
lands.  For the first time we find the occurrence of the intermingling of personal 
relationships and government where hereditary power becomes assumed, allegiances are 
ignored, and possessions that are personal and inheritable are given in exchange for the 
protection of the people. 
Early in the medieval period the worries that are often associated with the 
economics of material wealth such as competition, were irrelevant to the peasants 
because they essentially had nothing, not even their own personal freedom.  In fact, “the 
essence of the manor is the subordination of the peasantry to the lord of the manor” 
(Hoyt, 1966, p. 208).  Thus, some of the common associations with the concept of trust, 
like the notion of  the risk of losing something or the probability of someone not having 
one’s best “interest” at heart did not really apply in the early Middle Ages.  Kohn (2008) 
states, “Trust does not arise when tradition dictates each person’s place and how they 
shall conduct themselves in it” (p. 5).  Peasants’ lives were determined for them and they 
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were controlled by the desires of the dominant group.  Thus, “there is no need to broach 
the subject of trust with people or things that we can utterly control” (Solomon & Flores, 
2001, p. 45).  In essence, trust was not necessary because there were no choices to be 
made. 
What will become increasingly apparent to the reader is that during the days of 
feudalism, the majority of people lived a life dictated by powerful lords and kings.  
Ultimately, for the peasant class, ownership to their life, very few luxuries of any kind, 
including power or possessions, was simply not allowed.  Therefore, a concept of trust 
may not have been necessary or relevant because there was very little, if any, risk of the 
loss of personal possessions, power, or ill will from members of the group.  In fact, the 
main risks came from the forces of nature which threatened the production of crops or 
animals that were hard to sustain.  Roberts (1990) posits, “ensuring their survival from 
one year to the next means that peasants must be conservative in their farming practices, 
sowing those crops or rearing those animals that minimize risks rather than maximize 
gain” (p. 357).  Essentially, the risk of loss, especially material loss, was virtually non-
existent as this group of Europeans did not have any possession to lose.  The greatest 
losses were shared within the group because these were usually the loss of crops or 
people due to harsh winters and the resulting famine. 
Another term that is often associated with the concept of trust is interest, as in you 
trust someone because you think they will have your best interest at heart.  The interest of 
the peasants was collective because it was that of maintaining the survival of the group 
through subsistence farming.  Therefore, the only people who shared that interest were 
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the ones who were doing the things that were necessary for survival.  Thus, the interests 
of the peasant class did not matter to the Kings and members of the nobility who 
controlled the land and resources. 
The Rise of Feudalism  
With the formation of a feudalistic society many changes occurred in the lives of 
the Europeans.  Leading these changes were increases in economic influences and legal 
matters.  Most Europeans of the 11th and12th centuries had hopes of finding a sense of 
order, especially as it pertained to matters of law and governance.  Hastings (1981) 
offers, “What we call feudalism was a method of maintaining some sort of security and 
order in a society in which centralized government had become weak” (p. 59).  Feudalism 
provided a way to control more manageable territories of land and as such provide more 
direct oversight of the people.  “At the same time that the king’s power is extended into 
the local district there is taking place a reorganization and departmentalization of the 
administration of the central government” (Artz, 1980, p. 225).  Shifts in power from that 
of a centralized government and local lords overseeing villages to an even more formal 
manorial type of arrangement added to the need for more of a working class arrangement 
whereby estate management was important.   
New relationships were being formed from the top down, meaning changes 
between different classes of people, namely the peasants and the nobility.  The 
reorganization in government contributed to a concept of establishing work for the 
peasants instead of the free-dependent structure that existed in the early Middle Ages.  
This contributed to numerous changes in the lives of the lower class of citizens as it 
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opened the door for the possibility of land ownership and thus upward social and 
economic mobility.  These changes also set in motion an entirely new way of relating to 
one another.  Now the lower and upper classes had more direct involvement and new 
roles other than the landlord and servant. 
Additionally, it was during this time that the establishment of the manorial courts 
was introduced.  Each lord of a manor had his own court.  Hoyt (1966) claims that “the 
manorial court was the heart and core of every manor” (p. 209).  Thus, the settling of 
disputes between peasants and disagreements with the laws of the manor was now 
handled outside of the kinship groups.  Again, this led to an increase in intermingling 
between the peasants and nobility.  “Except for free tenants, none of the peasants . . . had 
any legal rights against the lord of the manor” (Hoyt, 1966, p. 211).  This was important 
because it was yet another motivator for the peasants to try to become free tenants and 
this meant they had to start to live more for themselves than to help their neighbor. 
A key characteristic of feudalistic society was greater interest in power relations 
for all classes of individuals, especially economic and political power, which led to major 
changes in the way people interacted with one another.  The roles and responsibilities 
associated with kinship or tribal orders were beginning to witness some dramatic 
changes.  Jones (1999) asserts, “European societies in the Middle Ages witnessed a major 
institutional change when they moved from being primarily organized around concepts of 
kinship to being ordered around the power exercised by a king over a defined area of 
territorial jurisdiction” (p. 65).  Suddenly, how much one could produce agriculturally 
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mattered.  Geographically, simple villages were no longer an appropriate description for 
the densely populated lands occupied by the lower social classes.   
 Instead, people were now part of an increasingly intricate system of courts and 
economic norms on manorial estates.  “Study of medieval documents suggests that 
payment, whether in cash or in kind, was the main interest of the landlord; preservation 
of his subsistence and, if possible his surplus the main interest of the peasant” (Hastings, 
1981, p. 43).  In other words, the peasants seemed to become aware that they were an 
integral part of the workings of the manors and therefore, the loyalty and devotion they 
used to reserve for only members of the kinship and familial group changed.  Instead, due 
to the potential financial benefits, the primary responsibilities and duties were aligned 
with the landlords.  In essence, keeping the landlord stocked with the fruits of their labor 
meant more than just keeping the family fed.   
A noticeable social stratification was created among the peasant class.  This 
became known as the feudal hierarchy.  These classifications were economically 
determined by the amount of the tenement or land a peasant owned and their status of 
freedom.  For instance, some slaves still occupied the manorial lands and these un-free 
people were now given the duty of constant labor and time being strictly devoted the 
lord’s demesne.  The demesne was the land that was preserved strictly for the owner of 
the manor.  The hierarchy consisted of the slaves, who were the lowest class of citizens 
and as such they owned nothing and had no rights other than to work continuously in 
exchange for their basic survival.  Next, there were the cottars and cottagers who 
occupied a slightly higher class than the slaves.  This group of peasants did not own any 
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of the land surrounding the manor but they were able to claim their own huts and gardens 
in return for their work on the demesne.  A third level of people was considered half-
villeins because they essentially owned half of the usual tenement of full villeins, the 
group who owned a full tenement of the land surrounding the manor house.  With each 
rung of this economic hierarchy came varying privileges, like being able to wage a 
complaint against a lord in the event of blasphemy or exploitation. 
As the early Middle Ages drew to a close and subsistence farming gave way to a 
more sophisticated agricultural economy, dramatic changes occurred within the lives of 
the peasants.  For instance, “the economic revival after the middle of the eleventh century 
increased the importance of money, as compared with land, as a source of wealth” (Hoyt, 
1966, p. 439).  Daily work became more efficient due to new resources that were 
introduced.  For instance, within the peasants’ village, the introduction of the use of 
horses instead of oxen and the use of the plow promoted more efficient ways of 
cultivating the land which led to increased productivity of crops and food supply.  One 
outcome that resulted from the increase in agricultural methods was population growth. 
 “Whereas early medieval Europe had been pitifully short of manpower, by the late 
eleventh century some areas seem to have had an excess of people in relation to available 
land” (Cantor, 1993, p. 475).  The overabundance in the population could lead one to 
speculate about some early signs of competition over resources. 
Another consequence of increased agricultural production was the ability for 
peasants to sell or trade their excesses in meat and produce with others.  For example, 
Hoyt (1966) offers, “The revival of trade led to a rising standard of living which in turn 
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led to greater consumer demands from the nobility” (p. 439).  Peasants began to earn a 
living in exchange for a something of value, be it land or money, which ultimately led to 
their freedom.  “The peasant, fast moving out of his servile status, was becoming either a 
rent-paying fee tenant or a small landowner himself” (Cantor, 1993, p. 475).  Thus, in this 
period of time the influences of economic power, especially the potential to own a piece 
of land, became increasingly important.  Additionally, working to earn a living and 
increase one’s social status started to factor into the daily lives of the agricultural peasant 
family.  Taxation became part of the manors as well.  “The peasants, again, according to 
the personal status or according to the various sizes of their tenements, owed to the lord 
certain services or repayments” (Hoyt, 1966, p. 211).  Additionally, he was expected to 
perform “boon work” which was akin to modern day notions of the busy season when the 
villager was expected to concentrate all of his efforts on the harvest of the demesne.  
Thus, life for peasants was no longer immune to the influences of money and economics.  
Considerations other than the immediate needs of the family for survival were presented, 
and with the promise of a better future, the medieval man began to enter the economic 
realm whereby the rules and actors would greatly change as compared to kinship rules 
and rights. 
With the introduction of this system of exchange and the resulting changes in the 
dynamic of the peasant class structure, the genesis of trust may have slowly evolved.  My 
interpretation is based on a few key themes that were found in the changes that occurred 
throughout the eleventh and twelfth centuries.  First, the familiar workings of the kinship 
structure were interrupted and even overturned due to the possibility of economic gain.  
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For the first time, there existed the notion of working not for survival but for someone 
else.  This meant that one had to decide who their loyalty was pledged to—family or lord.  
Peasants were now motivated by tangible rewards and the possibility of increasing their 
status and power.   
No longer were peasants able to avoid the people in power, the Kings and Lords, 
in order to keep their lives to separate.  The possibility of escaping one’s current lot in 
life was made a reality by allowing the lower class members of society an opportunity to 
earn a living in return for their loyalty to the more powerful or dominant figures.  During 
this period of the Middle Ages ordinary men could be selected as a villein and in turn be 
afforded increases in material wealth and social status.  One’s promised word and the 
actions associated with showing devotion or loyalty to another human being served as the 
method by which to increase one’s social and economic status. In this case, Kings and 
Lords trusted their vassals to protect them.  Likewise, the vassals placed their trust in the 
members of the nobility to pay them for their work.   
Unlike the days of the Roman Empire, people of both classes were becoming 
aware of the agency that is associated with a system of exchanges in goods and power.  
Essentially, citizens of both classes began to realize that a sense of order needed to be 
maintained to ensure that the day to day functions of manor would continue as it always 
had.  These include some of the earliest definitions associated with the concept of trust.  
The word trust was said to have been first used around the middle of the thirteenth 
century, and when one takes into account the fact that sweeping economic, political, and 
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social changes that were prevalent many interpretations can be made as to why the 
genesis of trust occurred in alignment this particular period of the Middle Ages.   
One interpretation is that due to the fact that the idyllic peasant farmer no longer 
was driven by the needs of survival, and instead his new motivator was the potential for 
economic gain, perhaps this new relationship, namely the one between the lord as a boss 
and the peasant as an employee, or even one of “patron to client” initiated the genesis of 
trust (Thaxton, 1977, p. 185).  According to Kohn (2008), “trust must inhere in 
relationships between agents who are significantly unequal in power, resources or 
autonomy” (p. 2).  Thus, because the peasants are always considered the weaker party in 
relationships with the lords or vassals, the concept of trust may have been necessary to 
ensure the dominant group’s interest would be maintained by the weaker party.  For 
instance, the work of the peasant was now profitable and could result in the ability to 
purchase land which ultimately meant freedom.  Trust is usually tied to things which are 
very valuable to someone and one’s freedom is perhaps of the greatest value.  Therefore, 
the site of “the petty lord or country gentleman, smelling of the barn and fields, and the 
ambitious peasant, squeezing every possible ounce of profit from his land, were central 
figures in European rural society” (Cantor, 1993, p. 476).   
Along with the potential for gain also came the risk of loss.  Essentially, a concept 
that was virtually nonexistent among the lower classes in medieval society, namely the 
risk of losing something valuable, was now a large part of their daily lives.   
Another possible interpretation has to do with the fact that social relationships 
were being extended outside of the familiar boundaries of the kin group as the population 
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itself expanded.  Whereas the bonds of kinship had been the strongest, they were now 
beginning to be replaced with the bond between lord and man, and thus a bond in which 
blood ties were sometimes not enough.  For instance, Cantor (1993) allows, “Thus, 
during this period the importance of kinship decreased and the use of the bond of 
allegiance, or loyalty, greatly increased” (p. 94).  Land and money was at stake and with 
the promise of earning these possessions, so were power, honor, and loyalty.  Perhaps the 
concept of trust was needed to replace these former kinship bonds.  These new 
relationships carried with them a tremendous amount of responsibility and devotion to the 
lord of the manor. Likewise, the manorial lord had to instill as sense of assurance and 
gain the trust of the villagers whom he oversaw.  One could question whether 
relationships like these led to the creation of the idea of trust as loyalty. 
Along with the need to please the landlord in return for financial gain, the bonds 
established within the kinship group also changed.  Peasants who wished to move beyond 
their current status had to consider the needs of the landlord, thereby changing the 
dynamics of the relationships between familial ties to those of a more businesslike 
structure.  In this way, peasants began to turn “away from the needs of the old village 
world as they took up the values of commerce and civilization, default on their traditional 
services to their clientele in the village-peasant masses” (Thaxton, 1977, p. 186).  The 
days of simply working to meet the needs of the family for basic survival were replaced 
by working for someone outside of the kinship group, thereby causing a shift in the way 
the peasants were motivated.  Now ordinary men, former peasants could work their way 
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into positions of power, authority, and even wealth if they could prove that they were 
individuals who could perhaps be “trusted.” 
For example, vassals, through a formalized process called “homage” could pledge 
their loyalty to a lord and in return gain the respect and protection from barbarian threats 
and attacks.  Thus, the lord who oversaw the lands of the manor was usually a former 
vassal himself and above him was his feudal lord, namely a king, duke, or count.  
Because the vassal was a permanent resident onsite at the manor, “manorial 
administration and enforcement of the lord’s complex and diverse rights were ordinarily 
entrusted to an official representing the lord” (Hoyt, 1966, p. 213).  The vassal who 
occupied this role was eventually given the title of “bailiff or steward” and was allowed 
to choose his own assistant from the peasant class to help maintain control and order 
within the village.  Thus, “the medieval manor continued to be, as it had begun, a balance 
between the proprietary and jurisdictional rights of the lord and the customs of the village 
community” (Hoyt, 1966, p. 213).  The provost or reeve, as the bailiff’s assistant was 
called, had the duty of settling disputes among the peasants, ensuring that they performed 
the duties and obligations required by the lord and all the while they had to be efficient 
and amicable. 
Additionally, the chosen vassal would be given a fief, a gift from his lord that 
showed his gratitude for the vassal’s promised loyalty and dedication.  In many cases the 
fief could be left for inheritance to the vassal’s family.  This promoted a new concept of 
the exchange of goods and services for promises of devotion and protection.  It also led to 
the creation of primogeniture, and eventually even generational wealth.  With the 
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potential for a peasant to join the nobility, the idea of the common man was no longer 
widespread and the common bond was not immune to this change either.  Issues of 
loyalty and the idea of being paid for the continued proof of it, especially with the use of 
actual money versus bartered goods, were now a part of the social equation.  
Increasingly, people began to adopt more individualistic attitudes where they took care of 
themselves first and then looked out for others. 
Vassals had to earn and keep the trust of the King who selected him to this high 
state of authority.  The vassal chosen to oversee the manorial estate was chosen based on 
certain criteria, be it social status, work ethic, competence, and more than likely that he 
could be trusted.  This type of relationship entailed a vested interest in this person and 
their decisions.  In modern terms, one might agree that as Russell Hardin (2004) Proposes 
in his ‘encapsulated interest’ model of trust, we must believe that another’s interest 
encompasses ours p. 10).  In other words, the manorial lord needed to know, or be 
assured, that this chosen person would not let him down and would have his best interest 
at heart, and that the chosen person also wanted the lord to be honored and protected as 
well.  In this way, the chosen vassal’s interest also “encapsulated” the lords.   
Another phenomenon arose from the relationship between the nobility and the 
peasant class—the need for cooperation.  This became increasingly important as 
relationships became defined more by the boundaries of a territory than by the bonds 
between people.  Jones (1999) asserts, “The so-called feudal state of the Middle Ages 
was an institution that represented a limited territorialization of power, wherein a king’s 
ability to govern and rule his kingdom depended to a large extent on the cooperation of 
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his vassals” (as cited in Elias, 1982, pp. 16-17).  This meant that Kings had to choose 
men whom he was confident would oversee and manage the estate to his standards.  
Thereby, he took a risk on the person he chose, and if the vassal he chose proved disloyal 
or let the lord down, it was considered an act of betrayal and was punishable in some 
cases by death.  These new relationships involved more emotions on the part of the lord 
and the vassal. Baier (1986) reminds us that when trust is broken betrayal is the emotion 
that is usually felt instead of disappointment.  Therefore, one could interpret these events 
to mean that people began to use a concept of trust because they had a lot to lose if these 
relationships fell apart. 
Thus Jones (1999) espouses, 
 
With only a rudimentary administrative structure available to govern their 
kingdom, the rulers of medieval states were dependent upon the personal 
relationships that existed between a king and his vassals in order to exert any 
jurisdiction over the vast majority of their territories.  In effect, such control was 
largely derived from the social bond between two individuals rather than being 
based upon an objective and absolute ordering of space and territory. (p. 66) 
 
 
The need for trust became increasingly evident in this type of scenario whereby there was 
a new relationship and a defined role for each person, namely lord and man, instead of 
pure familial ties to bind people to one another. The scenario became more structured to 
the current model of “A trusts B to do x” (Kohn, 2008, p. 8).  Therefore, one could 
ascertain that, “Trust is the expectation of or within two or more entities (persons, 
organizations) that regular day-to-day behavior will be honest, cooperative, and 
predictable based on shared norms” (Neace, 1999, pp. 150-51).  Thus, there are defined 
roles, expectations associated with those roles and the risks inherent in those roles.  
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People’s lives and well-being were at stake and the emotional ties were dramatically 
increased.  Blood ties were no longer the social glue.  Something different was required.  
Perhaps theses differences are found in the bonds of trust. 
Progression towards Capitalism 
From the middle of the thirteenth century until the end of the Middle Ages 
Europeans faced another major lifestyle change, one that reshaped the interactions 
between men.  In essence, it was during the late Middle Ages that Europeans became 
enthralled in the market economy and one’s status became linked to how credible one 
could prove to be. 
For the peasant class a sense of agency and economic gain became increasingly 
prevalent during the shift from feudalism, which defined the early Middle Ages, to a 
more capitalistic and hierarchical society of the later, or high medieval period.  This was 
due to the fact that people had interest beyond mere survival and they were finally able to 
earn a living by working or engaging in commerce and trade.  Thus, Europeans of the late 
Middle Ages realized that they actually possessed some power in the economic realm, 
especially as towns became established and merchants served a crucial role in their 
sustainability.  Men of the later Middle Ages discovered that if they wanted to move 
beyond their current positions in life and experience upward social mobility, they had no 
choice but to actively participate in activities that would create wealth, and these 
economic endeavors seemed to require trust.  In other words, to trust someone became a 
common practice between craftsmen and eventually merchants, especially as the 
relationships extended to include them as creditors and debtors.  The presence of the 
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concept of trust emerged and became part of the lived experience and spoken language, 
especially in the economic sector of society. 
The economic changes that affected the peasant class were also present in the 
lives of the nobles.  Thus, “although they continued to be the predominant social class, 
the feudal nobles in most of Europe declined in power and influence during the thirteenth 
century” (Hoyt, 1966, p. 436).  In large part this was due to decreases in large scale wars 
and fighting.  Therefore, the vassals and feudal lords were no longer needed and now 
mercenary troops were hired and paid for their services.  Thus, “the old personal 
relationships and the jurisdictional powers of lords over vassals were giving way to new 
and impersonal relationships which were proprietary and economic” (Hoyt, 1966, p. 
441).  No longer were the kings tied by feudal custom to their lords: 
 
When military service grew less important as the preeminent obligation of 
vassalage, the bonds uniting lord and vassal were less intimate and personal, in 
contrast with older days when the trust between lord and vassal had been nurtured 
by service together in the field. (Hoyt, 1966, p. 436) 
 
 
Therefore, the notion of pledging one’s loyalty to a lord in return for power or land was 
no longer what defined the relationships between the peasant class and the nobility.   
During this time the desire for cash income was prized over the fiefs that 
symbolized feudalistic society.  Hence, “Under the forms of feudal tenure, a new 
relationship had emerged—an impersonal cash nexus had become more important than 
the older and personal binding ties of homage” (Hoyt, 1966, p. 440).  Perhaps a concept 
of trust became necessary as the idea of homage and fealty were replaced.  More than 
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honor and valor, now there was cash and the idea of building up savings and for some, 
fortunes. 
Historically, between the 13th and 15th centuries there was a shift in ideology from 
“confidence in change for the better to caution against change for the worse” (Hoyt, 
1966, p. 590).  This paradigm shift was the result of several factors.  First, the late Middle 
Ages experienced a decline in population growth for the first time.  One major 
contributor was the Black Death, a disease that plagued a large number of Europeans and 
resulted in a major disrupt ion in their normal existence.  Additionally, as manorial estates 
gave way to the rise of towns where trade and exchanges of cash could take place, the 
demand for agricultural production began to decline.  These changes meant that the 
nobility whose “economic position . . . was based on control of the land . . . were now, 
caught between lower prices for what was sold and steady or higher prices for what was 
bought” (Hoyt, 1966, p. 590).  The only real income being generated from the land was 
the rent that tenets had to pay or from the peasant labor that served to keep the manor in 
working order.  Therefore, as opportunities to work for wages arose in towns, more and 
more the free peasants deserted the manors in search of a life that was less dependent on 
a manorial lord and thus allowed for more personal freedom. 
As the peasant class began to desert the manors and feudalism was quickly 
declining, the nobility began to do things to try to gain control over the peasant class 
again.  This included everything from not allowing for cash payments for services on the 
land owned by the lords to charging fees for the use of equipment to fulfill duties like 
“appurtenances” such as ovens and mills.  Even the peasants who deserted the manors to 
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work in towns experienced tightened governmental control and regulations.  For instance, 
many artists could not become a part of the craft guild during the fourteenth century due 
to the need to eliminate further competition and to reduce the overproduction of goods 
that existed.  Wages were cut dramatically and the peasants and workers did not possess 
any legal rights to change their condition. 
Thus, in 1381, after too much discontent with the status quo, the peasants revolted 
in what was termed “The Peasants’ Revolt.”  Peasants were determined to change the 
way arbitrary rules could be applied to them for economic exploitation.  They aimed their 
attacks on the dominant class and were determined to have some rights and a more secure 
form of governance.  Hoyt (1966) states, “Most of the movements were also strongly 
anticlerical, because the Church was the greatest landlord, the most powerful single 
vested interest in maintaining the economic and social status quo” (p. 594).  
Unfortunately for the peasants, the positive changes which were a result of these 
uprisings did not appear until the mid-fifteenth century. 
The sweeping economic, political, and social changes that took place during the 
high to late Middle Ages all affected the way medieval people interacted with one 
another.  Relationships changed dramatically during this period of time because of factors 
such as the introduction of a money system, the decline of feudalism, and the shift 
towards manufacturing goods instead of bartering.  People began to move further and 
further away from their familiar villages to seek wage work in town.  “Proletarianization, 
it can be argued, is the most significant process in the making of the contemporary world: 
It is at the heart of modem class formation; it is associated with fundamental changes in 
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demographic processes and with restructuring of family relationships” (Roberts, 1990, p. 
354).  In essence, the family dynamic included living among strangers who had likewise 
moved to areas where the hopes of prosperity were located.   
Working outside of the home began to dictate much of the family life that had 
been so important during medieval times to the lower classes of people.  For instance, as 
the later Middle Ages progressed, 
 
the norm was close to the modern nuclear, rather than the extended family: the 
husband, the wife (often the second or third wife in a series due to high mortality 
rates in childbirth); children, perhaps one aging parent; perhaps one unmarried 
sibling; and from zero to four or so servants depending on economic 
circumstances. (Cantor, 1993, p. 478) 
 
 
The introduction of a cash society and the resulting changes in relationships to 
less intimate adds credence to the interpretation of a concept of trust finding its inception 
during this time of economic and societal redefinition.  People were not able to depend on 
just their families and kinship ties to meet all of their needs.  Europeans of this changing 
medieval society were now forced to further extend their interactions with other people, 
namely strangers.  This was especially true with the introduction of the medieval fair.  
Loyalty, honor, and military service were no longer the links or exchanges between 
people.  Instead, money was the driving force and it was now used in exchange for goods 
and services. 
Thus, economic and proprietary relationships took the place of close, personal 
relationships.  In fact, as the towns advanced further into an industrialized society the 
introduction of free private enterprise caused the craftsmen of the day to turn on one 
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another in hopes of gaining an economic advantage over others.  Competition became a 
new reality as people who were either business savvy or underhanded could increase their 
profits with different techniques and skills.  Hoyt (1966) offers, “In the small and 
relatively stable local market the rapid rise of one member’s trade could be achieved only 
at the expense of another members” (p. 443).  Did the beginning of the notion of free 
enterprise lead to the possibility of distrust, thus begetting a need for trust? 
Perhaps the most compelling interpretation for the origination of a concept of trust 
was found in another major economic change that slowly began in thirteenth century, but 
was more fully actualized in the late fifteenth century and beyond.  This was the 
introduction of the credit system.  Ultimately, the idea began because, “rather than take 
the risks of carrying with them the huge sums of money necessary to purchase goods, 
merchants preferred to take the smaller risk of trusting each other” (Hoyt, 1966, p. 445).  
Currency during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was still in the form of gold and 
silver coins, thus making it heavy and cumbersome to carry.  Additionally, it was not 
mass produced and often tangible coins were not available while material goods or 
something altogether different—credit—was available. 
Credit was a new idea that was based on the concept of trust.  In this way, the 
more credibility or believability one could profess to have the more one could use their 
credit to finance goods and services from others.  The word trust is, according to some 
sources like Merriam-Webster, synonymous with the word credit, as in “reliance on 
future payment for property” (“Trust,” 2008).  Thus, trust can be interpreted to be tied to 
economics and the idea of increasing economic efficiency for those parties who are 
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willing to take the risks inherent in trust.  Money began to be exchanged at infrequent 
intervals instead of all situations being cash and carry. 
As the practice of trust became fully accepted, medieval merchants became 
defined by roles of creditor and debtor where the sustainability of the relationship was 
based on one fulfilling one’s promise by paying one’s debts.  As long as the debtor paid 
his dues and honored his promises the concept of trust was maintained.  Additionally, 
from an etymological standpo int, trust in the sense of fiduciary responsibilities was first 
documented around the year 1630, along with the rise of capitalism.  Here we find that 
the earliest definition of trust was actually synonymous with credit and credit networks.  
Some of the effects of the credit networks are as follows: 
 
As credit networks became more complicated, and more obligations broken, it 
became important before entering into a contract to be able to make judgments 
about other people’s honesty.  The more reliable both parties in an agreement 
were in paying debts, delivering goods or in performing services, the more secure 
chains of credit became, and the greater the chance of general profit, future 
material security and general ease of life for all entangled in them.  The result of 
this was that credit in social terms—the reputation for fair and honest dealing of a 
household and its members—became the currency of lending and borrowing.  
Credit . . . referred to the amount of trust in society, and as such consisted of a 
system of judgments about trustworthiness; and the trustworthiness of neighbors 
came to be stressed as the paramount communal virtue, just as trust in God was 
stressed as the central religious duty.  Since, by the late sixteenth century, most 
households relied on the market for the bulk of their income, the establishment of 
trustworthiness became the most crucial factor needed to generate and maintain 
wealth. (Tilly, 2004, p. 5) 
 
 
Another association with trust is that of taking risks.  The notion of risks became 
extremely important as the ideas of economic life began to dominate the actions and 
attitudes of the Middle Ages man.  For instance, the teachings of Christianity such as a 
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just price for goods and services were giving way to merchants charging as much as they 
could for the risks associated with allowing goods to be purchased on credit.  Hoyt (1966) 
offers,  
 
Merchants who stood ready to suffer occasional losses of large sums, in order to 
transact their farflung business, felt justified in rejecting the formula of the just 
price.  They not only increased the price to cover their risks, but since risk are 
difficult to calculate, the erred on the side of raising the price as high as the 
market would bear—just in case their next transaction were a total loss through 
piracy or shipwreck. (p. 447) 
 
 
Again, it seems as though once money and the idea of financial prosperity 
emerged, people began to live by the idea of trust because they either wanted to use it 
positively to establish credit for themselves, again for economic gain, or they wanted to 
use trust as a way to legitimize underhanded business practices, such as inflating prices 
on goods to reduce risks and basically ensure one would not deflect, or break the bonds 
of trust.   
This chapter has explained life in the Middle Ages to interpret the genesis of the 
concept of trust.  This concept seemed to have slowly evolved throughout this historical 
period, and did so in accordance with changes in the economic structure.  When the 
bonds of kinship and family were sufficient for the simple agricultural peasant, the 
concept of trust, meaning the establishing of credibility and credit, was not relevant or 
necessary.  In fact, many of the associations with trust were irrelevant during this time.  
For instance, the notion of taking risks and the idea of protecting one’s interest did not 
seem to apply because life was determined by one’s class since their birth.  However, the 
concept of trust quickly came to the forefront of people’s minds almost in tandem with 
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the increasing influences of money and power that were present during the latter part of 
the Middle Ages. 
The interpretations offered throughout this chapter were based on the historical 
vignettes selected because they seem to illuminate the subject of trust against a backdrop 
of a society which underwent major economic changes. Due to these economic changes 
the genesis of trust appears to be the result of the pursuit of individual prosperity. As an 
example, the notion of one’s trust became synonymous with one’s credit.  To break the 
bonds of trust was to discredit someone. 
Therefore, when trying to find an answer to the question, “Can we live a day 
without trust” and further understand why in today’s postmodern American society trust 
is viewed as a necessity, a look back in time revealed that there was a relationship 
between the economic needs and desires and the need for trust.  Thus, the answer to this 
perceived necessity of trust, according to the genesis, would reveal that trust may be 
necessary where exchanges of money and the establishment of credit are needed.  
However, if this is the case and Americans often espouse that trust is necessary in 
personal relationships as well as in schools and other institutions, then what does that 
reveal or say about these relationships or the outcomes expected from them?  Is there an 
economic overtone to all of our interactions as humans living in the 21st century?  
Essentially, what is it about trust that causes Americans such as Tschannen-Moran (2004) 
to make claims such as without trust, things fall apart. In other words, what are the 
“things” we are worried will fall apart without trust? 
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At this point, one is left to question whether this economic genesis of trust is the 
reason modern Americans, who also live in a capitalistic society, view trust as necessary. 
I believe there may still be more to the explanation for the necessity of trust other than for 
capitalistic and economic pursuits therefore; in the following chapter trust will be 
interpreted from another angle.  In Chapter IV I will shift the context from medieval 
Europe to colonial America where the concept of trust will be situated in the American 
judicial system.  From this vantage point, I will try to offer a deeper understanding of 
trust based on the “trust” relationships created between the American Indians and the 
Euro Americans.  In this way, I am still committed to finding  a plausible explanation for 
why the concept of trust is viewed as necessary and to get closer to an answer to the 
question, “Can we live a day without trust.” 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
A SPECIAL TRUST RELATIONSHIP AND NATIVE AMERICAN PEOPLES 
 
 
While Indians spoke of mother Earth, non-Indians sought mother lodes. 
(Johansen, 1999, p. xv) 
 
 
In this chapter the focus will shift contextually from the changing economics of 
the Middle Ages to the creation of the judicial and legal relationship between European 
settlers and Native American peoples in colonial America that was grounded in the 
European notion of trust. As the previous chapter explained, trust originated within 
European history and tradition.  Therefore, when the Europeans encountered the Native 
American Peoples in what would eventually be labeled North America they brought 
along with them their particular concept of trust.  This chapter’s purpose is to elucidate 
how the notion of trust was used during the formation of this legalistic relationship.  I 
will explain to the reader how the European concept of trust, as that which was portrayed 
to be from the authority of the Christian God for the prosperity of Christian peoples, was 
used in an attempt to form a “relationship” with Native American peoples.  This resulted 
in the creation of Native American dependency on the United States government and 
served as a way to manipulate the indigenous peoples out of their lands, customs, and 
even their identity for the benefit of economic prosperity of the dominant white culture. 
Ultimately, trust was found throughout the legal doctrines and legislation related 
to Native Americans.  The special “trust relationship” was meant to dictate how Native 
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American peoples were to act and interact with the white man, namely as inferior 
dependents.  The term “trust” was used numerous times when defining federal Indian 
policy and the unique relationship between the United States government and the 
indigenous peoples.  For instance, Wilkins and Lomawaima (2001) state, “A number of 
terms are used to describe the relationship between the governments of tribes and the 
United States: trust, trust doctrine, trust duty, trust relationship, trust responsibility, trust 
obligation, trust analogy, ward-guardian, and beneficiary trustee” (p. 65).  This chapter 
will try to help explain how and why trust became the chosen term and thus was 
ubiquitous when it came to matters concerning Native American peoples.   
A Historical Perspective on the Need for Trust 
When the Europeans invaded North America they were delighted to find that the 
land itself was not totally unlike that of Europe because they were there to “subdue the 
newfound land and its inhabitants, and to turn them into European profit” (Axtell, 1981, 
p. 41).  In fact, the settlers quickly realized that with their knowledge of capitalism 
combined with effective methods of Western technology for cultivating land, they could 
soon establish a place all their own. 
However, what the Europeans were not expecting to find were the Native 
American peoples whose cultures were diverse, complex, and even considered strange to 
them.  In fact, according to Deloria (1973), everything from the construct of time as 
nonlinear to beliefs about respecting nature was different than that of the Europeans.  The 
diversity of the Native American peoples posed a serious threat to the European invaders 
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because they had the goal of creating an economic empire whereby all members would 
conform to their ways of life and in essence align themselves with the goal of prosperity.   
However, some of the first Europeans did realize that the indigenous peoples were 
accustomed to exchanges of property in the form of bartering and trading.  Yet as more 
European colonists invaded America they had no interest in this type of simplistic 
exchange and were determined to annihilate the native peoples.  “To these colonists . . . 
the native possessors of the soil stood as living impediments to agricultural ‘civilization,’ 
little different from stony mountains, unfordable rivers, and implacable swamps” (Axtell, 
1981, p. 42).  As such, Europeans quickly realized the only way they could ensure that 
the native peoples would conform to their plan was to rely on the Christian missionaries 
to convert them to Christianity.  Axtell (1981) states, “To convert the Indians of America 
was to replace their native characters with European personae, to transmogrify their 
behavior by substituting predictable European modes of thinking and feeling for 
unpredictable native modes” (pp. 42-43).  Europeans tried to convert Native peoples to 
Christianity and believed educating them would prove better for society in general by 
ridding the Native American peoples of their cultural behaviors.  However, neither of the 
attempts proved successful.  Eventually, conquest through wars and violence and the 
eventual relocation—or more accurately, exile—to small reservations was the only way 
the Europeans could enforce the control they desired. 
Thus, “to men accustomed to kings and queens, administrative bureaucracies, 
standing armies, police, courts and all the punitive technology of justice known to 
‘civilized’ states, the Indians seemed to suffer from unbenign neglect” (Axtell, 1981, p. 
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46).  Europeans thought of Native Americans as inferior, subhuman, and in need of 
“saving.”  As time progressed from the European invasion of America through the 
creation of an established United States’ government, interactions with Native American 
peoples were increasingly difficult and often resulted in wars.  The colonists operated 
from what they knew in Europe, and as such, they felt they needed to formalize, through 
establishing legal doctrines, their rights to own specified regions of land.  The settlers 
knew how to establish a centralized government through their experience of living under 
the monarchs of Europe.  For the colonists, an actual exchange of power, land, and rights 
could only occur through formal legislative processes whereby contracts and treaties 
were composed and signed, thus “treaty making with Indians was a practice that the 
Europeans were accustomed to” (Prucha, 1994, p. 16).   
The need for trust seemed to have originated—at least in relations between Native 
and European peoples—out of a desire by the dominant group to maintain economic and 
social control.  The concept of trust was part of the European vocabulary and as such, it 
was a foreign concept to Native American peoples, as was the idea of treaty-making and 
all of the contractual ways that the Europeans tried to gain control of the lands of Native 
American peoples “without alarming the natives” (Deloria & Lytle, 1983, p. 3).  The 
concept of trust actually seems apropos considering that trust originally emerged out of 
economic necessity and the need to ensure, almost contractually, that economic duties 
would be fulfilled.  Thus, when the colonists “discovered” America, they were interested 
in the most expedient ways to accumulate land and in turn use it to amass wealth.  
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Establishing trust with the “other” nearly made the taking of land and other resources a 
guaranteed success for the Europeans. 
This trust relationship began in the seventeenth century as one in which the first 
European colonists were able to gain a foothold in what would become America by 
making treaties with the indigenous people.  Compared to what was to come with the 
formation of federal laws and policies, treaty-making seemed to be a nonthreatening way 
for the two groups of people to live somewhat peacefully.  However, as time progressed 
and the number of European settlers grew, there began to be a more established 
government by which the colonists wanted all peoples in the country to abide.  In 1776, 
the colonies that were established by the Europeans became the United States of 
America, and treaty-making and agreements were made between Americans and Native 
American peoples.   
The United States entered into its first treaty in 1778 with the Indians of the 
Delaware tribe (Deloria & Lytle, 1983).  In fact, over the next hundred years over 600 
treaties were made with various tribes.  However, what is crucial to point out is that even 
though one goal of treaty-making was to encourage peaceful relations with Native 
Americans; the more important goal was, “they were also a means of securing an orderly 
transfer of landownership from the tribes to the United States” (Deloria & Lytle, 1983 , p. 
4).   
Establishment of a relationship based on trust whereby the Native Americans 
would need to depend on the Euro Americans seemed to be the most beneficial scenario 
for the dominant culture, namely the whites.  The concept of trust, which is an Anglo 
90 
 
 
social construction, seemed to provide the necessary language to justify the actions of the 
Europeans of covertly coercing Native American peoples out of their land, resources, and 
cultural identity.  Trust was not a foreign concept to the settlers because, as we found in 
Chapter III, the medieval concept of trust originated out of the experiences of the early 
Europeans or more accurately, life that embraced the earliest ideals of capitalism 
including a market economy where trust was an essential part of the construct.   
Thus, trust served as an unspoken contract to assist in solidifying exchanges of 
goods, services, and money.  Americans needed a justification for moving away from the 
simple treaty-making that began the relation with the indigenous peoples.  Thus, in 1823, 
the Supreme Court decided that no better legitimacy could be found than in the authority 
of their Christian God.  As will be explained in the following section, the role of religion 
was paramount in gaining the trust of Native American peoples. 
The Role of Religion in Legislation 
   An explanation of the trust relationship between the United States government 
and Native American peoples cannot occur without first discussing the fundamental role 
that religion, specifically western Christian ideology, played in the development of 
almost all policies, laws, and treaties related to the indigenous peoples of this nation.  The 
concept of “discovery” and the religiosity it implies for the idea of a “trust relationship” 
will remain a common theme throughout this chapter because it was and remains to be a 
key component in the establishment of the idea of “trust” between indigenous peoples 
and the United States government.  If fact, Wilkins and Lomawaima (2001) state, “the 
notion of trust began in the discovery era—it is no recent ‘invention’ as Prucha claims—
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but it has been shaped to fit different eras of Indian policy” (p. 69).  Christian ideals were 
used to dictate everything from the ways in which “civilized” people were to conduct 
themselves, to economic issues like the buying and selling of land between Native 
peoples and whites.  “One issue that has fascinated anthropologists, sociologists, 
historians, and scientists is the relation between religion, the material progress of a 
society, and the range of human choice” (Ekelund, Herbert, Tollison, Anderson, & 
Davidson, 1996, p. 3).  This was the case with Native American peoples and Euro 
Americans where trust was the chosen concept, albeit under a religious guise, used as the 
link to bind these two groups together to perpetuate the economic desires of the European 
colonists. 
Since their arrival in North America, European colonists tried to use the authority 
of God, or “the contention of Christians that their God is specifically working in the 
events of mankind,” to legitimate his treatment of “others,” especially Native American 
peoples (Deloria, 1973, p. 131).  This was done to make it seem as though to trust in the 
Christian was to fulfill the Will of God.  Because the Europeans operated out of the 
framework of “Christian European international law [which] regarded a Christian 
nation’s territorial possessions as sacrosanct,” they created legislation based upon these 
ideals and in them defined rights to property ownership and rights for all peoples living in 
the United States (Newcomb, 1993, p. 303).  For example, Europeans believed their 
Christian duty was to “imitate their God” thus, “bring order to chaos,” which is what they 
felt existed when they “found” America (Pearce, 1988, p. 3).  Therefore, Europeans 
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worked to create a system of government that reflected their Christian beliefs and one 
that required others to adopt them or face serious consequences. 
Furthermore, Europeans had a way of interpreting biblical text that served their 
interests and even legitimized their actions, while oppressing others.  For instance, “In 
Pslams 2:8, Yaweh (the Lord of the Old Testament) tells his chosen people (through King 
David) I shall give to the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the 
earth for thy possession” (as cited in Newcomb, 1993, p. 311).  This distinction between 
“Christian/heathen” formed the basis for the vast majority of legislation and federal 
policy regarding Native American peoples.  The examples and court cases examined 
throughout this chapter will show how the dominance of Western Christian religion 
directly shaped legal and judicial matters pertaining to the indigenous peoples of this 
country.  It is important to clarify that “the Christianity envisioned was not a disembodied 
spiritual construct but a distinct cultural product of Western Europe” (Axtell, 1981, p. 
42). 
The most profound document for defining legal relations between the United 
States and Native American peoples was the Doctrine of Christian Discovery.  The 
Doctrine of Christian Discovery dates back to the fifteenth century and began in papal 
documents between the Pope of the Catholic Church and the Kings of Spain and 
Portugal.  The first of these was the Romanus Pontifex, issued by  Pope Nicholas V to 
King Alfonso V of Portugal, which declared war against all non-Christian peoples 
throughout the world, “and specifically sanctioning and promoting the conquest, 
colonization, and exploitation of non-Christian nations and their territories” (Newcomb, 
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1992, p. 18).  The goal of Christendom was to “capture, vanquish, and subdue the 
saracens, pagans, and other enemies of Christ,” to “put them into perpetual slavery,” and 
“to take all their possessions and property” (Davenport, as cited in Newcomb, 1992, p. 
18). 
Then, Christopher Columbus began to make his “discoveries” and conquests at 
the request of the monarchs of Spain and another papal document was issued under Pope 
Alexander VI, the Inter Cetera.  This text stated the Pope’s desire that the “discovered” 
people be “subjugated and brought to the faith itself” (Davenport, 1917, p. 61). 
Therefore, when Columbus “discovered” America the acts of genocide and harm inflicted 
upon the natives he encountered were sanctioned by the Catholic Church.  Thus, “these 
papal documents were frequently used by Christian European conquerors in the Americas 
to justify an incredibly brutal system of colonization - which dehumanized the indigenous 
people by regarding their territories as being inhabited only by brute animals” (Story, 
1833, as cited in Newcomb, 1992, p. 18).  
Newcomb (1992) states, 
 
the Christian “Law of Nations” asserted that Christian nations had a divine right, 
based on the Bible, to claim absolute title to and ultimate authority over any 
newly “discovered” non-Christian inhabitants and their lands.  Over the next 
several centuries, these beliefs gave rise to the Doctrine of Discovery used by 
Spain, Portugal, England, France, and Holland—all Christian nations. (p. 18) 
 
 
Therefore, by Divine Right, only Christians, or God’s chosen people, could 
“discover” a land and claim it as “discovered.”  For instance, within a few years after the 
Europeans arrived in America they claimed that the land they settled was theirs due to the 
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fact they “discovered” it.  Although Native American peoples may have inhabited the 
land first, according to the laws of discovery they could not lay claim to it because they 
were not Christians.  The principle of discovery eventually worked its way into and 
defined legislation relating to American Indians. 
In fact, “in 1823, the Christian Doctrine of Discovery was quietly adopted into 
U.S.  law by the Supreme Court in the celebrated case, Johnson v.  McIntosh” (8 Wheat., 
543, as cited in Newcomb, 1992).  In “what has long been heralded as one of the first 
federal Indian law cases to define the nature of land title for American Indians,” Chief 
Justice John Marshall wrote the reasoning behind the Supreme Court’s decision based on 
the principles of the Christian Doctrine of Discovery (Newcomb, 1993, p. 304).  In the 
Johnson ruling Marshall, writing for a unanimous court, observed that 
 
Christian European nations had assumed “ultimate dominion” over the lands of 
America during the Age of Discovery, and that—upon “discovery”—the Indians 
had lost “their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations,” and only 
retained a right of “occupancy” in their lands.  In other words, Indians nations 
were subject to the ultimate authority of the first nation of Christendom to claim 
possession of a given region of Indian lands.  (Johnson v. McIntosh) 
 
 
In other words, Marshall utilized the Doctrine of Christian Discovery over 300 
years after it was written to legitimate the United States Supreme Court’s decision to take 
lands from Native American peoples. This does not sound like the building of a trusting 
relationship. “Marshall simply left a legacy of those conceptual principles the Court 
would need in order to keep the rights of the republic paramount to those of subordinate 
Indian peoples” (Newcomb, 1993, p. 331).  By doing so, he set into motion a hundred 
years of oppressive legislation which was and is still used to perpetuate white, Christian 
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dominance over the indigenous peoples of North America.  The ensuing battles, both on 
the field and on paper, were inevitable.   
Marshall also realized that there were too many religious references to be legally 
permitted by the United States government; therefore, 
 
when Marshall first defined the principle of ‘discovery,’ he used language phrased 
in such a way that it drew attention away from its religious bias, stating that 
discovery gave title to the government, by whose subject, or by whose authority, 
the discovery was made, against all other European governments. (Newcomb, 
1992, p. 19) 
 
 
However, when referring to the legal precedent used in 1823 case, Justice Marshall made 
a specific reference to the fifteenth century Cabot Charter which claimed its mission was 
to “seek out, discover and find whatsoever isles, countries, and regions of the heathens 
and infidels which before this time have been unknown to all Christian peoples” (Arnold, 
2010, p. 4).  Thus, Marshall was keenly aware that in order for the Doctrine of Discovery 
to have a lasting stay legally, the term “Christian” would have to be changed to 
European.  Changes like this allowed for ideas to be accepted such as, “the distinction 
was drawn between lands already occupied by Europeans and lands not so occupied, thus 
those who were Christians and those who were non-Christians” (Newcomb, 1993, p. 
307).   
Not only did the role of religion and the Doctrine of Discovery have a major 
impact on the creation of the unique trust relationship between Native American peoples 
and the United States government, economic pressures and the recognition of major 
cultural differences in the way money, power, resources, and land were viewed to have 
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had an enormous effect.  For example, unlike the Native Americans who did not view 
land as a money-making commodity, the Europeans were determined to gain control of 
the land and people.  In fact, Limerick (1987) posits, “All the cultural understanding and 
tolerance in the world would not have changed the crucial fact that Indians possessed the 
land and that Euro-Americans wanted it” (p. 190).  Native Americans were not 
accustomed to the ideas of treaties and land tenure as were their European counterparts, 
creating an unfair dichotomy.   
In fact, in the Marshall ruling, the language was changed to exclude the references 
to Christianity and instead substituted governmental verbiage; however, 
 
the Indians were unaware of the complexity of Marshall’s revision and since there 
was no international forum in which such a claim could be challenged had the 
Indians known and objected, Marshall’s definition in effect traded a vested 
property right for a recognized political right of quasi sovereignty for the tribes. 
(Deloria & Lytle, 1983, p. 4) 
 
 
In fact, the idea of amassing vast amounts of land for the sole purpose of economic 
development was a completely foreign concept to Native Americans who used the land 
they needed for survival and often viewed it as sacred. 
Deloria (1973) posits, “American Indians hold their lands—places—as having the 
highest possible meaning, and all their statements are made with this reference point in 
mind” (p. 75).  For instance, a Crow Chief named Curly explained his feelings about his 
native land when he was asked to give up more land during a land cession.  When he 
rejected the government offer he stated: 
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The soil you see is not ordinary soil—it is the dust of the blood, the flesh and the 
bones of our ancestors.  We fought and bled and died to keep other Indians from 
taking it, and we fought and bled and died helping the Whites.  You will have to 
dig down through the surface before you can find nature’s earth, as the upper 
portion is Crow.  The land as it is, is my blood and my dead; it is consecrated; and 
I do not want to give up any portion of it.  (Deloria, 1973, pp. 166-167) 
 
Native American peoples such as the Crow did not view land as merely a 
commodity or a means to an end.  Land was special and it meant more than money 
because it represented lives and experiences of a shared people.  This ideal definitely ran 
counter to the mindset of the colonists who looked at land as a necessary means to 
prosper economically. 
 Moreover, a complex legal structure was not viewed as a necessity among the 
Native Americans, as most of their disputes were handled by established kinship norms 
and expectations of the tribe.  The tribal norms were such that the group as a whole 
united to live harmoniously and no one was thought to be more valuable than another.  
All members of the group were essential to the survival of the entire tribe.  The quote 
below from Miller’s (1998) The American Indian Perspective provides a Native 
American perspective on tribal life: 
 
the ultimate aim of Dakota life, stripped of accessories, was quite simple: One 
must obey kinship rules; one must be a good relative. . . . Without that aim and 
the constant struggle to attain it, the people would no longer be Dakotas in truth.  
They would no longer be even human.  To be a good Dakota, then was to be 
humanized, civilized.  And to be civilized was to keep the rules imposed by 
kinship for achieving civility, good manners, and a sense of responsibility toward 
every individual dealt with.  Thus only was it possible to live communally with 
success; that is to say, with a minimum of friction and a maximum of good will.  
(p. 50) 
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Deloria and Lytle (1983) explain that “Indian judicial systems call upon a special 
blending of the past and the present in order to solve intratribal disputes” (p. 1).  Native 
Americans did not need a standard of written law or a defined religious code to govern 
and dictate their behavior.  However, for their European counterparts, this way of life was 
unacceptable and appeared disorderly.  In fact, the colonists felt “so subtle and covert 
were the workings of Indian justice that they [the colonists] were astonished to find that 
such societies can remain united” (Axtell, 1981, p. 47). 
One way that the Europeans were able to keep Native American peoples at a 
disadvantage was to constantly use language and concepts that were foreign to them 
thereby disallowing a true understanding of what was transpiring in regards to legislation 
to be attainable by the Native American peoples. Smith (2009) espouses, “From the 
beginning of this history the specialized vocabulary created by Europeans for ‘Indians’ 
ensured their status as strange and primitive” (p. 17).  There are several examples of the 
naming of objects and people to make them sound different or “other.”  For instance, 
Europeans are responsible for assigning labels such as chief, medicine men, and even 
tribe whereas these things were not labeled by Native American peoples (Smith, 2009).  
None of these were words that Native American peoples used to refer to themselves; 
moreover, “language became and remains a tool by which we are made ‘Other’” (Smith, 
2009, p. 17).   
Thus, it is not surprising that the concept of “trust,” which was a label given by 
white men to a special relationship between two parties, proliferated in legal matters 
between the United States government and the Native Americans.  Did Native American 
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peoples understand what trust meant or what it was supposed to achieve?  Perhaps the 
ambiguity surrounding the concept of trust was the reason the colonists chose it.  By not 
having a clear understanding or definition of the concept the government was not legally 
bound to fulfill any duty.  In fact, many commentators who have weighed in on the idea 
of the trust responsibility of the United States feel it “is only a moral obligation—not a 
legal one—on the part of the federal government” (Wilkins & Lomawaima, 2001, p. 67).  
Setting things up this way essentially means that the United States government had only 
the pressure of their moral and ethical duty to serve the tribal interests; therefore, they are 
in essence “off the legal hook.”  In fact, According to Krauss (1983), “Trust is a 
metaphor for federal control of Indian affairs without signifying any enforceable rights of 
the tribal ‘beneficiaries’” (as cited in Wilkins & Lomawaima, 2001, p. 70).   
One interpretation for the use of the idea of a unique “trust relationship” was due 
to the fact that the white settlers did not know how to classify or deal with the Native 
American peoples.  In fact, in 1831 Chief Justice John Marshall characterized the federal-
Indian relationship as “perhaps unlike that of any other two people in existence and 
marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere else” (Chambers, 1975, 
p. 1213).  It is interesting to note that the special “trust relationship” and even the choice 
of the term “trust” are reserved for matters concerning Native American peoples.  
Essentially, the United States government refused to recognize the tribes as separate 
nations or their lands as “foreign states.”  The reason for the careful attention given to 
proper nomenclature assigned to the tribes was due to its economic ramifications.  For 
instance, the first Supreme Court case in which Native American peoples tried claim 
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immunity from the United States government and “enjoin enforcement of the state 
statues” was in 1831 in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and it was met with resistance due to 
economics (Chambers, 1975, p. 1213).  In the ruling handed down by Chief Justice 
Marshall he stated that he  
 
agreed with the Cherokees’ contention that they were a “state” in the sense of 
being “a distinct political society . . . capable of managing its own affairs and 
governing itself,” but he held that the Indians were not “foreign” their lands 
compose a part of the United States and they are within the jurisdictional limits 
with respect to commercial regulations imposed by Congress.  (Chambers, 1975, 
p. 1213) 
 
 
This ruling was pivotal in determining the classification that Native American 
peoples would be subject to for a very long time and one that would help to establish the 
entire notion of a “trust relationship.”  Essentially, Marshall’s ruling established that 
Native American tribes were to be labeled as “domestic dependent nations . . . in a state 
of pupilage” (Chambers, 1975, p. 1213).   
In the same way that the classification of Native American peoples as a separate 
and distinct political entity was “unique,” the idea of a “trust relationship” shared the 
same sort of peculiarity.  The concept of trust became a sort of “special legal category” 
whereby the United States government had a duty to protect Indian people.  Newcomb 
(2008) summarizes it in this way, “According to this relationship, the United States is 
characterized as the ‘guardian’ of the Indians, who are said to be the ‘wards’ of the 
federal government” (p. xxvii).  Thus, the notion that Native American peoples were 
dependent on the federal government in the way that a ward needs a guardian was 
demeaning and paternalistic. 
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Moreover, in 1889 some of the most suppressive measures imaginable were being 
carried out against Native American peoples.  For example, “through the Rules of Indian 
Courts instigated by Commissioner Thomas J.  Morgan, nominal head of the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs,” sentiments such as this were written into an annual report: 
 
The Indians must conform to “the white man’s ways,” peaceably if they will, 
forcibly if they must . . . The tribal relations should be broken up, socialism 
destroyed, and the family and the autonomy of the individual substituted.  The 
allotments of land in severairy, the establishment of local courts and police, the 
development of a personal sense of independence and the universal adoption of 
the English language are the means to this end.  (Lee, 1997, p. 38) 
 
 
This leads to another interpretation of the use of the concept of trust instead of 
another type of relationship.  Thus, the trust relationship appears to be a predominantly 
white, European concept whereby the dominant group forces on a weaker group its 
ideals.  Europeans were convinced that they were the epitome of civilized man.  For 
instance, “from the European perspective, the Indians were deficient in three essential 
qualities: Order, Industry, and Manners.  This meant in essence that they were non-
Europeans, the polar opposite of what they should be and should want to be” (Axtell, 
1981, p. 46).  Thus, they used their westernized, white, Christian concept of trust to 
create a relationship whereby Native American peoples were made dependent upon them.  
Trust was used as a way to get the “other” to depend on or rely on the white man, or one 
could say, trust in him.   
This was also based on the presumptuous grounds that the less dominant group 
needs or desires a form of protection or guardianship from the dominant group.  
However, a look back to the arrival of the first Europeans will reveal a different story.  
102 
 
 
For instance, the first colonists were greatly outnumbered by the Native peoples and they 
did not need protection.  Native American peoples thrived due to their knowledge of the 
land, the crops they could grow, and because they knew where to hunt and fish.  
However, as the colonists spread diseases, brought over more sophisticated weaponry, 
and used oppressive measures to take away the land and cultural strength of the 
indigenous peoples, they did create a need for protection.  For instance, in 1831 Justice 
Marshall wrote about the trust relationship positing,  
 
In the exercise of the war and treaty powers, the United States overcame the 
Indians and took possession of their lands, sometimes by force, leaving them an 
uneducated, helpless and dependent people, needing protection against the 
selfishness of others and their own improvidence.  Of necessity, the United States 
assumed the duty of furnishing that protection, and with it the authority to do all 
that was require to perform that obligation and to prepare the Indians to take their 
place as independent, qualified members of the modern politic. (Board of County 
Commissioners v. Seber, 318 U.S.  705, 715 (1943), as cited in Meyer, 2002, p. 8) 
 
 
Thus, Native American peoples were left with no choice but to “trust” the United 
States government, as they were stripped of their rich cultural customs and a lifestyle that 
was successful for several hundreds of years.  The concept of trust was forced upon the 
indigenous peoples as a way to ensure control and in particular, economic control.  
Consider this question, posed by Newcomb (2008) in regards to all of the laws, treaties, 
and rules that were basically forced upon the Native American peoples: “On what basis 
are originally free and independent Indian nations presumed to be subject to the thought 
processes, legal or otherwise, and behavioral patterns of non-Indians?” (p. xvii).  In other 
words, how and why was it that the Native Americans had to endure and live by the 
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ideologies of a group of people who arrived in a land where a group of people were 
functioning without the help or harm of others?  
  Instead of being a way to create an amicable relationship where both groups could 
live harmoniously and be free to practice the customs and rituals of their own culture, it 
appears that trust was actually used as a form of manipulation out of the lands, rights, and 
eventually identity of Native American peoples.  Ultimately, “the Invasion of North 
America by European explorers, settlers, and missionaries almost led to the total 
extinction of Native American people along with their customs and beliefs” (Gill, 2002, 
p. 157).   
This does not sound like the kind of relationship where trusting the other party 
actually helps or encourages a better quality of life, particularly for the Native 
Americans.  In fact, constant turmoil and near genocide of the Native American were the 
results of the creation of the legislative and judicial arms of the United States 
government.  Between the time the colonists arrived to the mid nineteenth century, a 
plethora of laws, doctrines, and especially trust agreements were created that would shape 
and forever define the relationship between the Europeans and Native Americans.  
Wilkins (2008) states, 
 
In virtually every respect imaginable—economic, political, cultural, sociological, 
psychological, geographical, and technological—the years from the creation of 
the United States through the Harding administration brought massive upheaval 
and transformation for native nations.  Everywhere, U.S. Indian law (federal and 
state)—by which I mean the law that defines and regulates the nation’s political 
and legal relationship to indigenous nations—aided and abetted the upheaval. (p. 
204) 
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Thus, the concept of trust for Native Americans was a kind of ambiguous legal 
term used to define a sort of reciprocal relationship, albeit with an uneven distribution of 
power, whereby they would trust the United States government to hold their lands “in 
trust” so that they could occupy them and in exchange have the protection of the 
government.  Yet, the truth of the matter was that the trust they placed in the government 
did not bode well for them as a nation.  It only served to remove their power and erode 
their close-knit social structure—they were betrayed.  Gill (2002) reminds us, “The U.S. 
government repeatedly broke every treaty it had signed and continuously sought to 
destroy the native peoples” (p. 159). 
A Prime Example of Trust Gone Wrong 
An important place in history to critically examine the use of trust is what became 
known as “The Great Sheep Reductions” that “the federal government imposed upon the 
Navajo between 1933 and 1946” (Flanders, 1998, p. 427).  This is a very revealing piece 
of American history that should be critically examined, because the role of trust and 
trusteeship lead to devastation in this case.  The Navajo occupied most of what is now 
New Mexico and Arizona.  For the Navajo, life was about taking care of one another and 
equality.  As Flanders (1998) describes, “Though the Navajo sold the wool from their 
sheep, their economy was subsistence agriculture, not commercial.  As such, they did not 
attempt to maximize profit, but to reduce risk” (p. 434). 
The Federal government, as trustee of the Navajo lands, decided in 1863 that the 
Navajo “nation” needed to be moved and contained in a small region in southern New 
Mexico to make room for cattlemen and non-native western expansion.  To do so, the 
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government wiped out the majority of the sheep that were given to the Navajo by the 
Spanish in the seventeenth century.  Additionally, the United States government was 
intent on “Americanizing” the Navajo who resisted assimilation.  This eventually resulted 
in the forced move to a small reservation in New Mexico which crippled the Navajo 
nation socially and economically.  In 1868 after what the Navajo called “The Long 
Walk” they settled in an inhospitable area where they were plagued by non-potable 
waters, the outbreak of diseases, and the lack of natural resources needed for subsistence.  
The United States government capitulated after three years of Navajo suffering, allowing 
them to return to their original land.   
The United States government continued to manipulate and interfere with the 
Navajo people as they struggled to reclaim their traditional way of life.  In an attempt to 
redeem the losses suffered during the New Mexican exile, the government decided to 
“help” the Navajo by replenishing their flock of sheep and goats.  For instance, “to ensure 
their survival, the government issued 14,000 sheep and 1,000 goats in 1869 and 10,000 
more sheep a year later” (Underhill, 1967, as cited in Flanders, 1998, p. 434).  This 
proved to be too much for the land to handle, because in a period of less than 65 years the 
number of sheep exceeded one million.  With such a significant increase in livestock and 
a tremendous increase in the human population, the Navajo were essentially over 
capacity for the land they had been allowed to use.  Overgrazing and erosion became a 
huge issue for the Navajo.  By examining this in modern times, it seems that someone 
who serves the role of a trustee for another group’s interest would act in the best interest 
of that group and not through self-serving policies the way that the United States 
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government acted with regard to the Navajo.  Surely someone entrusted to care for a 
group’s interest would not breech that trust. 
This example continues to explain the ways in which the guardian-ward 
relationship, established in the name of trust, continued to oppress and dominate the 
Navajo.  Throughout the remainder of this example, it should become evident that the 
Navajo were cornered into a submissive position in which total dependency upon the 
United States government was their only option.  Once the Navajo returned to their native 
lands they struggled with overuse of the land due to the large “gift” of livestock and the 
resulting increase in the population.  Additionally, a very important dam was being 
constructed on land that adjoined theirs, later known as the Hoover Dam.  Several times 
the Navajo pleaded to have their land allotment expanded, but surrounding cattlemen 
vehemently discouraged this option.  In the end, the U.S. Soil and Conservation Service 
decided that too much silt was coming from the Navajo reservation and could be 
threatening to the new dam.  The dam was important as it was considered necessary to 
the regional economy.  Therefore, this only left one other option and “the other possible 
solution existed only because the Federal government was the trustee for all Native 
Americans: force the Navajo to reduce the number of sheep and goats” (Flanders, 1998, 
p. 435).   
In the name of trust, force was able to be used to constantly pull the strings of 
manipulation over the Navajo people.  Moreover, reducing the Navajo people to an object 
of manipulation instead of respecting them as a group of people whose traditions and 
culture were important allowed for the continued victimization of the Navajo.  Surely 
107 
 
 
something went terribly wrong along the way for trust to allow for the option of forced 
extermination to be inflicted on these people.  For instance, “coercion was used to 
enforce an equal reduction in all herds.  This affected the poor most of all because their 
herds were smaller and they were more dependent upon goats” (Flanders, 1998, p. 436).  
Essentially, not only was trust used to force reduction of the livestock, it even allowed for 
coercion that directly impacted the poor.  
The language of force and coercion in the name of trust is dangerous, and perhaps 
even sounds distrustful.  What is even more perplexing about the sheep reductions is that 
the Federal government claimed it was doing the Navajo a favor of sorts by buying the 
“reduced” sheep and giving them cash money in exchange for the livestock.  “However, 
the Navajo did receive compensation for the animals taken.  The compensation may or 
may not have been at ‘fair market value.’  In any case, the people were left with cash that, 
unlike sheep and goats, did not regenerate itself” (Flanders, 2008, p. 437).  Again, whose 
best interests were being served and moreover, did the United States government ever 
consider what the interests of the Navajo were?  Ultimately, the government as trustee of 
the Navajo people did not consider the repercussions of such a large animal population on 
limited land.  Through lack of thought and conviction that the natives would thrive 
through additional resources, the United States government rendered the Navajo 
completely at its mercy.  Instead, the trust that was built between the Navajo and the 
government was used to assimilate this tribe of people into the Euro-American way.  
Therefore, one could ask, could the Navajo live a day without trust?  It seems that the 
answer would be that before the arrival of the colonists it was probable that they did.  
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However, after they encountered the colonists it seems that trust was necessary for this 
group of people as well because of the fear of betrayal and thus the needed protection due 
to one man wanting to serve his personal needs at the expense of another. 
Though unfathomable to the colonists, Native Americans did not care about 
money, the accumulation of wealth, or controlling the lives of others.  Perhaps, left to 
their own devices and resources, Native Americans may have fared better alone than with 
the “trusting” influence of the colonists.  In fact, Alexander (1987) writes about the legal 
category of trust, stating it is “based on a conception of duty that is rooted in 
individualism” (p. 304), another belief that is not shared by Native American peoples. 
View from Today 
Some of the most foundational documents of our time, including the United States 
Constitution, were established during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which 
continue to define the legal relationship between Native Americans and the United States 
government.  For instance, the Constitution still serves as the basis for determining the 
justice, or lack thereof, in cases defining the rights of Native Americans. 
The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution gives Congress plenary 
authority to  
 
limit, modify or eliminate the powers of . . . [Native American] self-government; 
it gives Congress plenary power to determine whether a “tribe” does or does not 
exist and whether a Native American is or is not a member of it; and it gives 
Congress plenary authority to manage and control all Native American aboriginal 
lands—even to terminate their rights to that land. (as cited in Newcomb, 1992, p. 
344) 
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The “trust relationship” that was established during the 1700-1800s, whereby 
Native American peoples were deemed wards of the United States, continues to exist 
after hundreds of years.  It is also interesting to note that originally “Indian affairs were 
made the responsibility of the War Department (and later the Department of the Interior) 
rather than the state department” (Prucha, 1994, pp. 14-15).  This change occurred 
because the federal government wanted to control all of the rights to trade and the sale of 
Indian lands and not allow the states to interfere.  In fact, “into the twentieth century, the 
pattern of contact was for the Euro-Americans to take land, sometimes through purchase, 
sometimes through conquest, but often through legislation, legal judgments and 
administrative action” (Flanders, 1998, p. 426).   
 Still today, there are only three references to Native Americans in the U. S. 
Constitution, Article I and the 14th amendment (Meyer, 2002).  In fact, the current 
responsibility of the United States government to Native American peoples is written as 
“The Federal Indian Trust Responsibility is a legal obligation under which the United 
States has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust 
toward American Indian tribes” (Seminole Nation v. United States, 1942; Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia, 1831).  This federal obligation, which is part of the Trust Doctrine, is 
one of the most important principles in federal American Indian law and has been at the 
center of numerous Supreme Court cases. In fact,  
 
Late-twentieth-century Native America presents the same conflicts as the late 
eighteenth century: land and water rights, hunting and fishing, religious freedom, 
criminal and civil jurisdiction. In fact, these conflicts are typical of relations 
between indigenous peoples and colonizers on the American continent as a whole 
beginning more than five centuries ago. (d’Errico, 1999, p. 7) 
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What is more, out of the concept of trust that was inflicted upon Native American 
peoples emerged some powerful modern day statistics.  For example, “though it claims to 
be a defender of human rights around the world, the United States is among the worst 
offenders of Native peoples’ rights” (Taliman, 2010, para. 3).  Furthermore, “during the 
Bush regime . . . the U.S. was voted off the U.N. Human Rights Council, and later was 
one of only four countries to oppose the adoption of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples” (Taliman, 2010, para. 5).   
 From my investigations into the legal relationship established through “trust” 
between the United States Government and Native American peoples, it appears that the 
trust was once again used to ensure that economic prosperity would occur.  In essence, 
the EuroAmericans needed the Native Americans to trust them to ensure they could 
acquire their lands in the most efficient way possible.  Of course, land was the most 
valued form of capital.  The trust relationship between the United States government and 
Native American peoples revealed yet another example of trust being used to perpetuate 
the goals of capitalism. 
Though this historical period is obviously very different from Europe in the 
Middle Ages, interestingly seeing how the concept of trust that started in Europe still 
found utility, namely economic utility , in the United States hundreds of years after its 
origination. In fact, after gaining a better understanding of the impact of trust in the 
American judico-legal systems with regards to the treatment of Native Americans, I am 
even more perplexed when considering  the overriding question this dissertation seeks to 
answer, “Can we live a day without trust?”  In fact, because it was revealed that a lot of 
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harm can result from the misuse or abuse of another’s trust, it is hard to believe that trust 
is a concept that remains viewed as essential, especially in schools. However, when 
considering the fact that again in this example, trust was used to envelope Native 
American peoples into the Euro American system of capitalism, even at the expense of 
another cultural groups’ identity, I am reminded of scenario remains intact today.  For 
example, illegal immigrants are often not reported to the Office of Immigration as illegal 
citizens because they are paid cheap wages for manual labor. In cases such as this, trust is 
needed so that the boss or the one who hires the immigrants can be productive and 
efficient while at the same time paying an employee far less than his American 
counterparts. The employee is also in need of trust so that he or she does not get reported 
to the immigration officials.   Though I do not agree with using trust to get what one 
wants, I am better able to understand how this concept and the feeling that it is something 
we cannot live without  ever-present in our current market-dominated society. 
Knowing that trust has a dangerous side makes me think that caution is needed 
when claims are made in top education journals about how necessary it is.  What is the 
goal of trust in schools or in our society knowing the historical and legal interpretations 
of this word and concept?  Because trust was used to assimilate the Native Americans 
into a fictitious “right way” to live with the sole aim being to civilize this group of people 
into a system of capitalism and Christianity, I am curious as to why researchers and 
scholars profess trust to be necessary for school reform.  However,  it may be plausible 
that the reason  that trust is viewed as necessary in our schools is due to the fact that they 
are  places for perpetuating our system of capitalism.  For instance, trust is often thought 
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to be essential in helping to reduce risk in situations of change or unease.  Even Bryk and 
Schneider (2003) state that “trust reduces the sense of risks associated with change” (p. 
43).  This same line of thinking did not apply to the Native Americans because with 
every change they experienced, trust was actually used as a way to manipulate and reduce 
their identity as a distinct cultural group. 
Back to the Drawing Board 
It was at this point that I found myself back in conversation with  my dissertation 
chair, only this time with a very dismal view of trust, the concept that I originally thought 
would not only save the public schools in America but was actually necessary in most 
every facet of daily life for reasons other than promoting market values.  Once again, he 
challenged me with questions like, “If trust can be used to oppress, how is it also 
perceived by some as essential?”  Additionally, he reminded me of my original 
contention and perception of trust and again asked, “What purpose does it serve in 
societies and in particular, in schools?  Is trust really what we need or is there an 
alternative that may in fact be more accurate to what we aspire to build relationships with 
in schools and education?”  
As I ponder over these questions and other I will look back at what I originally 
thought about trust and why I thought of it as necessary. I originally thought trust served 
a positive role in society whereby the ultimate aim for having trust was to build 
harmonious relationships, not for protection from one another due to the dog-eat-dog 
nature of our current capitalistic situation. In trusting relationships I thought the goal 
would be that one person or group of people could rely on another because the bonds of 
113 
 
 
trust would provide assurance that each group’s interests would be honored for what they 
were and not what others wanted them to be. This may be the case in some relationships; 
however, I now question whether or not I would characterize those as “trusting” 
relationships. I did not realize that historically, trust was more of a one way street where 
the powerful or dominant person could control and manipulate others of less power.   
This idea of trust being used for social control and a way to ensure conformity of 
a group of people, usually the less powerful, causes me to question the perception that it 
is necessary and even further to wonder what a day without trust would look like. What if 
there were no trust—what would that mean?  McLeod (2006) offers the opinion that 
“trust [can be] both important and dangerous” (p. 1).  
In the final chapter, I put together my interpretations of trust that have been made 
throughout the previous chapters. In essence, I explain to readers why the relationship 
between trust and economics is the reason that trust was and still is necessary among 
citizens in the current American capitalistic situation. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
LOOKING BACK TO LOOK FORWARD 
 
 
The interpretations of trust formed by investigations made in the previous 
chapters leads to a revised understanding and even a transformation of the current view of 
trust as that which is essential to life in today’s modern, capitalistic society.  This was a 
common theme that emerged throughout the textual interpretations and leads to the 
conclusion that there is a relationship between trust and economic prosperity explaining 
why we cannot live a day without trust.  Understanding why trust was and still is 
perceived as necessary in our daily lives is likely new concept to most readers. 
Essentially, as economic changes lent themselves increasingly towards the 
economic system of capitalism, the concept of trust began to serve a crucial and essential 
role.  For example, inquiries into the genesis and historical uses of trust lead me to 
interpret the necessity of trust in America to be based on economic utility as opposed to 
other social or moral goals such as reducing selfishness or manipulative actions. 
Therefore, the absence of the necessity to understand the concept of trust meant that some 
of the key features often associated with trust—namely the valuing of self-interests, 
taking risks, the need for a network of friends as in social capital, and the ideas of 
productivity and efficiency—emerged as the economic orientation to a capitalistic view 
of the world became the new norm. 
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From Europe in the Middle Ages, when the first glimpses of capitalism and a 
concept of trust became apparent through the arrival of the colonists in North America, 
who were determined to establish a country based on individual freedoms, there appeared 
to be a parallel rise in the necessity of the concept of trust.  Again, this simultaneous need 
for the concept of trust seems to be related to the rising values of capitalism.  In order to 
show how this conclusion was reached, readers will be provided with interpretations 
through the five tenets of trust explaining why trust became essential with the increasing 
desire for individual wealth.  These explanations require a critical analysis of the ideals 
and themes that were common throughout the historical periods investigated herein.  
Readers should notice a familiar pattern between the modern conceptions of trust 
presented in Chapter I and the historical interpretations made in Chapters II and III.  In 
the following section I will provide a plausible explanation for why the role of capitalism 
and its tenets are responsible for the current American belief that we cannot live a day 
without trust. 
Lessons Learned 
Interests   
In medieval history through modern day, the concept of trust seemed to become 
increasingly necessary as individuals increased their personal interests in material 
possessions, personal wealth, and even social and economic status.  In fact, Chapters II 
and III revealed that prior to the existence of a concept of trust the majority of Europeans 
of the early Middle Ages and the indigenous peoples of America functioned and thrived 
without relying on trust to bind people together in cooperative relationships.  These small 
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communal societies appeared to be operating by keeping their ties within familiar circles 
and often relied on kinship norms to ensure their sustainability.  Prior to the existence of 
trust, the collective interests of tribal communities focused on meeting the needs of the 
family and in-group members.  Work was done for the production and consumption of 
food and items that were needed for survival, not for the accumulation of money.  Thus, 
members of these types of close-knit communal groups contributed to the collective well-
being of the group.  Self-interest did not seem to be the motivating force for working.   
However, with the introduction of a capitalist economy, whereby working for 
profits and wages became the new norm, a concept of trust was needed.  Individuals were 
able to earn money based on their occupation and productivity.  As Smith (1776) reminds 
us, 
 
the coordination of individual courses of action oriented toward self-interest 
becomes [became] an emergent property at the societal level: It is [was] not from 
the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker that we expect our dinner, 
but from their regard to their own interest. (as cited in Peil & Staveren, 2009, p. 
224) 
 
 
As such, some individuals could earn more than others and some relationships were more 
beneficial than others because of the greater return that they could offer.  As Bishop 
(2000) states, “In capitalism, possibly the most important exchange which requires trust 
is the exchange of labour for wages or salaries” (p. 233).  As societies became 
increasingly affected by the mindset of the market, which “assumes that all individuals 
pursue their own rational self-interest in economic transactions” (p. 20), the reliance on a 
concept of trust increasingly came to be part of the situation. 
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In Chapter III, for instance, the genesis of trust began as economic needs 
overshadowed and finally replaced the needs of mere survival for the majority of 
Europeans.  In other words, peoples’ interests expanded beyond basic needs to an interest 
in economic prosperity.  Thus, the interests of people were no longer collective or shared, 
but became increasingly individualistic as economic opportunities became available to 
some.  Additionally, trust seemed to be necessary when one wanted to protect their 
personal interests.  As serfs and nobles alike realized that they could engage in economic 
systems by exchanging goods and services, thereby changing their lifestyle beyond that 
of subsistence living through the establishment of a system of credit and privatization, a 
concept of trust became a necessary part of social life.   
Essentially, through building trusting relationships whereby individuals were able 
to prove they were credible, even commoners could accumulate small surpluses of money 
and goods.  This increased the desire for individuals to engage in the new system of 
private ownership particularly with regards to acquiring land.  This meant that even the 
most common citizens had new “interests” which included capital resources and material 
and monetary possessions.   
Conflict of interests.  Alternatively, in Chapter IV, the use of trust in legal 
matters pertaining to Native American peoples meant that their interests were comprised 
and even extorted.  Underlying most of the newly-created legislation that was said to 
uphold the special “trust relationship” between the United States government and Native 
American peoples, it was actually the need to protect the economic interests, namely the 
land and other resources or capital, of the European settlers that was the driving force for 
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establishing many of the policies and laws.  Here we see the scenario of the “conflict of 
interests” that was explained in the first chapter.  Namely, Native American peoples were 
manipulated out of their interests in the name of trust. 
For Native American Peoples, their primary interests included keeping the land 
sacred and only using what was necessary for subsistence farming, or survival.  Native 
American peoples were not interested in dividing and selling land in order to make 
money or for the creation of an industrialized way of life.  The newly created legislation 
by the United States government was written with the intent of protecting the interests of 
the European Americans which meant ignoring the values of the “other,” namely Native 
American peoples. 
There were numerous examples of this type of legislation where the interests of 
one group was compromised or ignored to promote and protect the interests of another.  
For example, “The Dawes Act of 1887 was designed to free up any remaining desirable 
lands for white settlement” (Francisconi, 1998 p. 5).  More recently, the Commerce 
Clause of 1831 contained legislation which was created for the explicit purpose of 
controlling the sale of indigenous people’s lands.  In fact, Native American peoples were 
told their lands were being held in “trust” by their protector and guardian—the United 
States government.  Again, the concept of trust was prevalent in conjunction with 
economic utility, which in this instance the concern was on economic interests.  It was 
under the guise of trust law that Native American peoples were forced to surrender their 
lands and water sources such as lakes and rivers for the interests of the “common good.”  
 
119 
 
 
Interests in “proper conduct.”  Another example of the difference in interests 
between Native American and Euro American peoples was seen in the way each group 
viewed the proper way to live and conduct themselves.  Essentially, Native American 
peoples were most interested in protecting their unique customs and tribal traditions.  
This included their religious and spiritual practices and the way they celebrated, grieved 
and lived each day.  The European settlers were most interested in converting the 
“heathens” into civilized, which meant Christian men and women who would need to 
conform to their perception of the ideal man.  This was the goal because European 
American people felt that this was in the best “interest” of society.  More importantly, the 
European Americans felt that the conversion of the Native American peoples was in 
accordance with the Will or interest of their Christian God.  In this way, the White man, 
or the European Americans felt they knew what was in the best interests of the Native 
American peoples.  This presumptuous behavior resulted in the creation of the “guardian-
ward” dichotomy that was explained in detail in Chapter IV.  Additionally, this was 
exactly the problem that was explained in detail concerning the Navajo Sheep Reduction.  
Assuming to know one’s interests better than the other person or persons can result in 
less than desirable outcomes. 
Thus, although the use of the concept of trust differed in each historical context, 
there continued to exist a common theme—the relationship between trust and the 
protection and promotion of at least one party’s interests are at stake in trusting 
relationships.  Essentially, before notions of individual wealth and the accumulation of 
capital became a motivating force, the concept of trust was not viewed as necessary to the 
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sustainability and functioning of communities because interests were not based on one’s 
individual desires, but rather collective needs.  Perhaps this is because as Bishop (2000) 
states, “all transactions in a free market economy depend on trust” (p. 20). 
Risk  
Along with the new concept of individual interests and even conflicts of interests 
also came a notion of risks.  Again, trust is needed when one has something they risk 
losing.  Even terms like transactions, benefits, and interests seemed to be associated with 
the market economy, as opposed to the concepts involved in tribal and village life, such 
as harmony.  People in these collectivistic cultural groups did not view resources as 
individually-owned commodities; therefore, they had little or no risk of losing anything 
because in essence they did not own things.  In fact, for the slaves of medieval Europe, 
the idea of ownership did not even apply to their lives.  Westen (1985) offers, 
“Preindustrial societies . . . are characterized by an emphasis on the value and authority of 
the group” (p. 245).  This was seen in Europe before the rise of capitalism, for the 
majority of Europeans individual ownership was not allowed under the laws of 
feudalism.   
The King was the only one who had any real ownership (Rand, Branden, 
Greenspan, & Hessen, 1966).  However, as social systems began to become more 
economically driven, people began to act more as individuals who could become 
“owners” instead of group members who were “providers.”  This was made evident in 
Chapter III when farmers realized that they could increase their production in agricultural 
goods and sell the excess for profits; instead of concerning themselves with merely 
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feeding the community, their interests shifted and became centered on the production of 
goods for money.  Now the interest associated with agriculture was not only the fear of 
starvation, but moreover, the fear of losing profits.  With the notion of becoming 
individual owners also came the notion of the risks of losing something. 
Something to Believe In 
With this idea of needing to rely on others to fulfill certain obligations also came 
the risks of betrayal because of the risks associated with trusting others.  Therefore, a 
concept that added to the feeling of security and protection from the betrayal of others 
became a necessity.  Francisconi (1998) states, “Property relations are social relations, 
and as such have socially defined rights” (p. 101).  Trust can be viewed as a social 
construct that helps to protect socially defined rights which often involve “property” no 
matter if it is tangible, emotional, or intellectual in nature.  Thus, with economic freedom 
came a concept of trust as a way to ensure more of a contractual agreement 
acknowledging individual rights to property ownership.  In this way, trust helped reassure 
people that their individual rights and interests would be protected even if this is only in 
theory.  Rand et al. (1966) define capitalism as “a social system based on the recognition 
of individual rights, in which all property is privately owned” (p. 8).  In other words, 
people began to believe in the capitalistic notions of private property ownership and 
individual rights which beget a concept that would help to guard against risks to these 
new things.  Trust became a way to conceptualize relationships between two parties who 
wanted to ensure that individual interests would be protected and that expectations would 
be fulfilled. 
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Strangers and New Behaviors 
 
A stranger is someone that you don’t know.  Most strangers will not try to harm 
you, but some strangers are dangerous, even if they dress nice or look friendly.  
Never take rides, candy, gifts or money from strangers.  It is okay to say “NO 
THANK YOU.”  (Mesa Police Department, n.d., p. 2) 
 
 
Another form of risks that further necessitated the need for a concept of trust was 
the introduction of new or “strange” people.  Chapter III explained how in the latter part 
of the Middle Ages there was a transformation from a feudalistic society to a capitalistic 
one.  Along with the change in political ideology, people were freer to move outside of 
their villages and small communities leading to a different dynamic in the village 
structure.  The integration of increasing numbers of people occurred as the medieval 
peasants and small scale farmers left the remote villages to which they were accustomed 
in order to find work in bigger towns.  The intermingling of more people was another 
product of the expansion of the market because people began to spread out 
geographically to find work and make money.  Often the purpose of the migration was to 
create a “better” life for themselves and their families.  In effect, geographical expansion, 
fueled by the spread of the rising interest in capitalism, helped to perpetuate the concept 
of trust.  Again, this was because establishing trust between parties helped to create larger 
circles of exchange of goods and services by reducing the fear of betrayal. 
In the incidences pertaining to Native American peoples, the introduction of 
“strangers,” meaning the European settlers, was necessarily of interest to the Native 
American peoples.  In other words, they did not actively seek out strangers for the 
purpose of economic prosperity.  Instead, unfamiliar others, namely the Europeans, were 
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introduced to the Native American peoples because of their pursuit of the lands occupied 
by the indigenous peoples.  The concept of trust became increasingly prevalent as the 
bonds of the family and close kin were expanded to include strangers and “others.”  
These new types of relationships were not defined by the familiar bonds of kinship and 
in-group norms, which had long defined the primary arrangement. 
Essentially, people began to form relationships with others outside of their 
immediate circle of family and friends, some of whom had similar interest and others 
who shared differing values and belief systems.  Establishing trust with others helped by 
making others seem more familiar.  “To trust or distrust others is to have some 
presumption of knowledge about them” (Braithwaite & Levi, 1998, p. 11).  Perhaps this 
is where trust as a form of social intelligence originated.  Trust has been defined by 
several leading scholars, among them Yamagishi, as a form of social intelligence, or “a 
kind of intelligence that allows individuals to assess the degree of risk they may face in 
social situations when confronted with the possibility of interacting with strangers who 
might be the path to new and beneficial outcomes” (Cook, 2001, p. xiii). 
This phenomenon changed the way people related to one another.  Ultimately, 
“strangers” were treated differently from family or kin relatives because these 
interactions involved calculating the risks to oneself and one’s property that is involved 
in the decision to trust others.  With the notion of strangers also came an element of fear 
and uncertainty, because no longer were relationships solidified solely from the bonds of 
love and family.  Therefore, one could not automatically assume another was worthy of 
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their trust.  Instead, building trust required that people prove the worth of another’s trust 
by fulfilling certain obligations and expectations. 
Neither group of peoples could take for granted or assume that strangers would 
know—much less honor—their particular interests.  What was needed was a set of rules 
or norms for interacting with one another and trust seemed to be a part of those norms.  In 
fact, as Chapter IV revealed, trust became more formalized by being written into 
doctrines and laws that served to regulate the relationship between the European 
Americans and Native American peoples.  In fact, gaining the trust of another, even if 
through manipulation as was the case in Chapter IV, helped maintain social control and 
thereby ensure economic prosperity. 
Trust as Credit 
In Chapter III, even though trust was not viewed as manipulation, the new 
dichotomy between creditors and debtors required a standard for successful business 
transactions.  In essence, by establishing a concept of trust, where one had to prove that 
they were credible, honest, and dependable, people were able to sell goods on the trust 
that the other would repay their debts, especially as money was often hard to come by 
during this historical period.  Additionally, the only form of money at the time was 
coinage, which was often too heavy for merchants to carry from town to town; therefore, 
one merchant would often have to rely on another’s trust to wait until money was 
available.  Consider that trust did and continues to aid in the continued reliance on a 
market-driven mentality where to trust means to be credible, meaning worthy of credit.  
Today, sociologists such as Moulton (2007) posit that “credit is a ubiquitous resource we 
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rely on for daily economic activity” (p. 301).  When one considers that trust became 
synonymous with credit in the fifteenth century during the late Middle Ages—when there 
was increasing attention to the creation of towns, merchants, and money—it is plausible 
that trust would retain its relationship with economics, especially considering its 
European origins, which later evolved into an American heritage. 
Globalization and the continual influence of capitalism produced a similar trend 
in modern America.  Thus, the notion of one’s geographic location being determined by 
the demands of the market still exists today and may serve as a means to perpetuate the 
notion that trust is necessary.  When “others” who are perceived as outside of the group 
are introduced into the close-knit families and communities due to changing economic 
demands, trust appears to be necessary because of the risks inherent when meeting 
someone outside of one’s familial or close-knit circle. Moving towards trust can often be 
slow and painful. 
Today, as we move toward a more globalized view of the world, and as 
advancements in technology continue to allow people to be connected from every corner 
of the world, we are constantly encountering an increased number of strangers.  As 
witnessed in the medieval ages, the need for jobs still dictates the need for people to be 
transient, and there continues to be a broader range of people encountering one another.  
Lerner (1996) offers that due to demands of the market, “high mobility [is] required of 
Americans who must move to find new employment opportunities” (p. 128).  This in turn 
means that people meet others with whom they may not feel comfortable because they 
are not familiar with the values and intentions of the other party; thus, they may need to 
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rely on the concept of trust to help with the situation.  Inherent in these encounters are the 
notions of risk-taking and the protection of one’s interest—two key features that trust is 
supposed to help alleviate.  The more capitalistic our thinking has become, the more 
reserved and judgmental modern society has become.  In essence, we have begun to 
relate to others based on how much trust we have in them.  Essentially, this means that 
trust may be necessary to assuage the greater degree of uncertainty—and perhaps even 
fear—of being betrayed or let down that comes along with the introduction of unfamiliar 
people.  Additionally, people feel more vulnerable to strangers, whereas with family or 
kin relatives the same degree of uncertainty is not a factor.   
Social Capital 
 Along with the notion of capital and personal property also came the idea that 
people needed trust to create larger webs of relationships in order to grow economically.  
Though the term “social capital” is a modern term, the underlying ideas such as 
cooperation and achieving common goals can be applied to the periods of the middle ages 
and beyond.  In essence, as the market mentality began to prevail one needed to start to 
form relationships that were beneficial.  Often, the benefits that were sought after were 
increases in personal property and prosperity.  Additionally, although the turn towards a 
capitalistic mindset fueled the trend for more individualistic thinking, it also showed that 
people with common interests needed to join together through trusting relationships to 
accomplish shared goals.  Therefore, the idea of cooperation became increasingly 
important.  In Chapter III, for instance, cooperation between large groups of people was 
needed to establish towns and places of exchange.  The common purpose became the 
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establishment of commonly acceptable trading practices and even the goal of creating 
laws to protect merchants.   
In Chapter IV, a different motive for increasing social was explained.  Though 
manipulation seemed to be part of the motivation, European Americans saw the 
importance of gaining the trust of the Native Americans in order to achieve their dream 
of colonization and westward expansion.  The social capital that resulted provided them 
with a less dangerous way of interacting with Native American peoples.  In this way, the 
Native American peoples came to be viewed as a commodity—a web of necessary 
relationships to achieve the goal of having more and more tribes who were converted to 
the ways of the Europeans. 
Social Control 
 From instances and examples of trust being used in the Middle Ages between 
peasants and their lords to the use of trust when towns were formed, a system of social 
control was established that created “rules” for how others should interact by illustrating 
what it meant to trust someone.  By gaining the trust of the peasants who occupied and 
worked on the manors, the lords were able to keep things running even when conflicts 
arose.  He could trust his villein to step in and restore the peace.  Likewise, in gaining the 
trust of his “employees,” whereby payment was given in return for work, lords could 
maintain control of his occupants due the fact that they relied on him for money.   
 In the historical examples of the interactions between Native American peoples 
and European Americans the trust that was formed was such that it allowed the European 
Americans to control the land, resources, and even the lives of the indigenous peoples of 
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the United States.  In this scenario, trust created a form of dependency and this acted as 
way by which European Americans were able to control the lives of the Native American 
peoples.  Essentially, Native Americans, by being forced into the special trust 
relationship, became like children to be tamed and trained.  European Americans forced 
Native American peoples to attend schools and churches so that they could learn how to 
act and become civilized.  In essence, for Native Americans, trust was synonymous with 
control because the United States Government began to control almost every aspect of 
their lives.  What is ironic from the modern perspective is that, as Deloria (1997) states, 
“practitioners of the traditional religions are not seeking converts and have no goal of 
gaining control of the police powers of the state to force people to say their prayers” (p. 
14).  Perhaps the concept of trust is perceived as necessary by those who are most 
interested in maintaining the status quo; therefore, controlling the lives of others seems 
necessary.  In order to gain control quickly—or as we will see next, most “efficiently”—
requires gaining the trust of others. 
Productivity and Efficiency 
Throughout history, the concept of trust has been linked to forming relationships 
that make it easier for tasks to be accomplished, often with greater speed.  The flow of 
money that began with capitalism is a prime example of this.  In this scenario trust 
between merchants and patrons was beneficial due to decreasing the wait time for goods 
and services to be exchanged because of the establishment of credit.  In essence, one 
could trust another to pay back her or his debts, therefore allowing the purchase or sell to 
transpire without money in hand.  Therefore, time was not lost in the process.  
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Additionally, the trust that was created between the European Americans and Native 
Americans made the takeover of the lands of the Native Americans very easy.  Native 
Americans were quick to enter into treaties because they trusted the United States 
government to uphold the trust they thought was part of the agreements. 
Thus, Chapters III and IV offer examples of the ways in which creating larger 
circles of relationships based on trust were essential to continued growth of the goals of 
economics that were at the forefront of most Europeans and later European Americans.  
The creation of social capital continues to remain a key element in today’s capitalistic 
culture.   
Tying it All Together 
Now that an overview of the chapters has been provided showing that a concept 
of trust has been necessary since the orientation towards a capitalistic economic system 
began, it is plausible to assume that we cannot live a day without trust.   Thus, capitalism 
served a vital role in promoting trust as necessary for human existence.  Capitalism 
values competition and individualism, and when these factors are present, trust is 
necessary to prevent people from taking advantage of others.  Eisler (2007) offers a way 
of thinking about the relationship of the historical economic structures with our current 
economic system, stating: “While shareholders have replaced kings, the modern 
corporation is basically a money-making machine, with little regard for anything else, 
including people or nurture” (p. 161).  Therefore, when one is trying to better understand 
trust and why it is so highly valued in American society people, one should consider that 
underlying this perception are the values of capitalism.  As such, we continue to be 
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immersed in a market mentality where our focus is on material accumulation, 
competition, production, efficiency, and individualism, and creating trust between one 
another helps to protect personal interests amidst a sea of economic uncertainty and risks. 
In essence, we live in a society of individuals who have to take risks, and who 
want and need to protect private interests by engaging and cooperating with one another.  
Additionally, in today’s world the goals of the market insist that we produce more with 
the greatest efficiency possible.  Thus, to escape the need for trust would likely involve a 
complete departure from our current capitalistic mindset.  In today’s society the mentality 
and common speak of the market has become the norm for creating relationships between 
many of our friends and acquaintances.  Even as I have come to this realization, I am not 
making claims as to whether the presence of trust or even its necessity is positive or 
negative. Instead, it is important for readers to realize and acknowledge that in America 
capitalism prevails—whether one likes it or not.  In essence, my only claim is that trust is 
necessary as long as we are deemed “homo economicus.”  This term was coined in 1844 
by John Stuart Mill: “Homo economicus is a model of human agency in which the 
individual actor maximizes his own well-being given the constraints he faces” (as cited in 
Peil & Stavaren, 2009, p. 223). 
Unlike what I believed when I began this dissertation, namely that trust was 
essential because its very presence would diminish suspicion and encourage people to 
live more harmoniously, my understanding of how and why trust now assumes a key 
position in American idealism is broader and has been revised.  Because trust is an 
elusive term that is hard to concretize, it does not assume just one definition.  After 
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gaining a perspective of the concept of trust among modern scholars, I have arrived at the 
conclusion that trust has a strong relationship with our modern focus on economics.  In 
essence, as modern thinkers we have assumed a new identity—that of homo economicus.  
It is within this economic arrangement that one cannot live without trust. 
Trust can be viewed as helpful in promoting societal cohesiveness; however, if 
misused, it can also be detrimental.  In our current historical context, trust is still 
necessary due to our increasingly market-oriented mindset.  For instance, Lerner (2006) 
believes that “this way of organizing our society produces selfishness, materialism, and 
disconnection” (p. 2).  Here again, the concept of trust seems to be necessary as the 
effects of capitalism, such as individualism, can create a “dog-eat-dog” atmosphere, 
though not all competition is bad.  What has to be considered is that being overly 
competitive to the point of disregarding others’ feelings is too extreme and may work 
against the creation of trusting relationships.   
Thus, it is possible to apply the lessons learned from this historical scenario to our 
current capitalistic society and make the claim that trust is necessary in modern America.  
The perceived necessity of its use seems to continuously increase, along with the rising 
economic demands associated with living in a capitalistic society.  By understanding that 
trust is a concept that is closely linked to the ideals of the market, it is not surprising that 
this concept is ever present in the twenty-first century, where individuals must constantly 
live among others who are vying for the same resources, wanting to protect their own 
interests, and depending on one another to make this happen. 
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In fact, as Chapter IV revealed, if one group abuses the trust of another group or 
takes advantage of the other by gaining their trust through manipulative means, the 
consequences can be devastating.  Chapter IV reminds us of the dangerous side of trust 
where Native American peoples were mistreated in the name of trust.  This example 
showed how trust can be used to legitimate certain actions and even to leverage the 
interests of particular groups of people.  However, one theme—whether one chooses to 
perceive of it as good or bad, right or wrong—is that when economic utility and 
prosperity are the structures that dominate the minds of people, trust is needed. 
Some modern thinkers may find it strange that while conducting a hermeneutical 
investigation on the concept of trust I would come to the conclusion that trust is a concept 
that is viewed as essential in today’s modern America society mainly because of its role 
in economics and in particular, capitalism.  However, consider that today, we are 
constantly subjected to the “bottom-line mentality that judges every activity, every 
institution, every social practice as rational, productive, or efficient only to the extent that 
it produces money or power” (Lerner, 2006, p. 2).  Therefore, we have social concepts 
like trust which are essential to capitalistic societies that value individual freedoms and 
believe in the ownership of private property.  In this arrangement, there exist continual 
risks and uncertainty because of the need to interact with others, while being cautious of 
who they are. 
 
The virtue of trust has been widely recognized as supportive of markets.  Trust 
replaces the need for contracting and monitoring and fills the gap of imperfect 
information about what may happen in the future.  It also tends to reduce costs 
under conditions of uncertainty, while enabling collective action as well as 
positive externalities between workers in organizations and labour markets more 
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generally, between entrepreneurs in clusters and networks of innovation. (Peil & 
Staveren, 2009, p. 575) 
 
 
 The conclusion offered is based on the deeper level of understanding gained by 
investigating trust along a continuum of historical, social, and economic events.  Thus, 
this inquiry shows that there is a plausible explanation for why trust is thought to be 
necessary in a capitalistic society which values individualism, productivity, and the 
continued exchange of money.  For instance, Covey (2006) alludes to this point, stating: 
“When trust is high, the dividend you receive is like a performance multiplier, elevating 
and improving every dimension of your organization and your life” (p. 1).  Essentially, 
my conclusion rests upon the belief that we cannot live a day without trust because 
America is a society that culturally and politically thinks and acts with a market-driven 
mindset.  Therefore, we need to be able to trust one another; we cannot rid ourselves or 
our society of the mentality that claims that our human purpose on this earth is to produce 
more in the most efficient and effective manner possible.  In the following section I will 
apply my findings about trust to the role it occupies in schools. 
Trust in Schools 
Burgeoning literature on trust positions it as a prized commodity in schools that 
can be created, harnessed, and cultivated.  Research on trust abounds in the literature 
related to the topics of school reform efforts and organizational leadership (Bryk & 
Schneider, 2002; Tschannen-Moran, 2001).  Likewise, a plethora of research devoted to 
the study of trust is found on topics concerning education and schooling in the twenty-
first century.  Thus, several scholars attest to the fact “that trust has increasingly been 
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investigated in education (Tarter, Bliss and Hoy, 1989; Tarter, Sabo and Hoy, 1995, 
Tschannen-Moran and Hoy, 1995)” (Tschannen-Moran, 2004, pp. 112-113).  The modern 
view of trust perceives it as necessary for personal and societal relationships.  Though 
trust is currently used primarily in economic matters, it is also thought to be essential in 
schools and other social institutions.  Does this mean that modern schools and even the 
entire institution of education are meant to serve capitalistic ends?  First, it important to 
gain an understanding of the role trust assumes in schools before further conclusions and 
connections can be made.  As such, I will describe the ways that trust is conceptualized in 
today’s schools. 
Measuring Trust 
In schools, the ideals associated with trust are usually labeled and classified so as 
to create a rubric of sorts for assessing whether or not one is worthy of another’s trust.  
The same criteria that are used to judge interpersonal trust are often used when assessing 
whether a school or institution can be trusted.  For instance, Hoy and Tschannen-Moran 
(1999) are proponents of offering knowledge-based criteria for determining the existence 
of trust in schools with their “five facets of trust [defined as]—benevolence, reliability, 
competence, honesty, and openness” (p. 7).  By identifying these indicators of the 
presence of trust, rating scales and other forms of capturing the ‘amount’ of trust can be 
used to determine whether or not an organization is trustworthy.  Moreover, these 
“facets” can be used as measurable data to determine whether or not someone or a 
particular institution embraces the concept of trust.  Again, the idea of categorizing trust 
in terms that can be assigned quantitative and qualitative measurements seems to stem 
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from a mindset of the market.  Boyles (2000) offers: “Schools suffer in translations of 
these kinds because production and provision are commodified such that the evaluative 
criteria are restricted to measurement standards that favor business” (p. 120). 
Lewis and Weigert (1985) define trust as a willingness to be vulnerable to others, 
based on the prior belief that those others are trustworthy.  Thus, the concept of trust as it 
relates to schools seems to have its own set of definitions and be based on a set of criteria 
or standards which encompasses everything from one’s knowledge and credibility to their 
kindness towards others.  This view of trust encompasses a wide range of associated 
meanings or synonyms for trust, and even goes so far as to assign measurable criteria 
which can serve as a basis to judge whether or not someone can be trusted. 
Overwhelmingly, the current views on trust believe it to be an absolute necessity 
and completely positive ideal in schools.  This positive perception of trust likely exists 
due to recent statistics that show how effective trust is when present in an organization 
and how it increases productivity.  For instance, Bryk and Schneider (2002) and 
Tschannen-Moran (2004) insist that data exists that proves schools are more productive 
and efficient when trust is present.  Trust is viewed as necessary in schools for everything 
from effective communication (Roberts & O’Reilly, 1974) to problem-solving and 
collective decision making (Hoy & Tarter, 2003; Smylie & Hart, 1999).  Still other 
leading scholars posit that “to be productive and to accomplish organizational goals, 
schools need cohesive and cooperative relationships.  Trust is essential to fostering these 
relationships (Baier, 1994; Goldring & Rallis, 1993; Louis, Kruse, & Marks, 1996)” 
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(Tschannen-Moran & Hoy, 2000, p. 550).  These views of trust are based on the 
assumption that more trust will likely ensure more benefits. 
Entrusting Precious Resources 
Still others believe that trust is essential in schools because of what schools are 
entrusted with, namely our children, our money, and even our ideals of democracy.  
Thus, the assumption is that trust is essential in schools because without it we may be at 
risk of losing or harming some of our most valuable resources.  For instance, Baier 
(1986) posits: “Trust matters because single-handedly we can neither create nor sustain 
many of the things we care most about” (p. 236).  Trust is manifest in situations in which 
we must rely on the competence of others and their willingness to look after what is 
precious to us.  Because we must allow others to help us care for what we cherish, they 
are placed in positions in which they can, if they choose, injure what we value (Baier, 
1994).   
 
As a society we invest much of what we cherish most in our schools.  We send 
our children to schools, trusting that they will be safe from harm, as well as 
guided and taught in keeping with our highest hopes for them.  Schools are also 
invested with a significant share of our collective resources in the form of tax 
dollars, school buildings, and local employment opportunities.  They foster and 
protect our ideals of respect, tolerance, and democracy, as well as the vision of 
equity in our society (Macedo, 2000). (cited in Tschannen-Moran, 2004, p. 15) 
 
 
It is evident why trust has become a pressing issue for schools.  Trusting others to protect 
the people and values we hold dear is a very lofty goal.  The concept of trust is an 
absolute necessity because it is based on the assumption that the leaders in schools will 
fulfill the expectations we have regarding our “cherished resources.”  Thus, we as 
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humans feel a personal attachment to the people or ideals we entrust to others.  Ullmann-
Margalit (2004) posits: “Trust is, after all, a personal, not an impersonal, relation” (p. 66).  
Therefore, the trust that is desired in schools is complex and emotionally charged because 
of how personal it is.  The emotional component often associated with trust is especially 
important to consider when our children are involved.  As Baier (1986) reminds us, 
“disappointment is the appropriate response when one merely relied on someone to do 
something” (p. 235); however, when trust is broken the response is that of betrayal.  In 
essence, the interpretations of the historical and legal concepts of trust remind us that 
trust can be dangerous or beneficial depending on the intentions and expectations 
between the truster and trustee.  Meier (2002) warns us that “the complicated nature of 
trust as it pertains to schooling . . . requires exploring the varied meanings of the word 
itself and reminding ourselves of its proper contradictions and limitations” (p. 5). 
Trust, Capitalism, and Schools 
Think for a moment of the parallel uses of trust in historical, legal, and modern 
examples, and its purpose in today’s society.  Trust remains a necessary ingredient in 
situations where we have interests we want to protect and risks that are taken when 
entrusting those interests in the hands of school officials.  Additionally, schools are 
institutions that favor productivity and efficiency.  The goals of today’s schools seem to 
be in alignment with the goals of capitalism; perhaps this is the reason trust is such a 
highly used and seemingly necessary term in modern-day schools.  For instance, “closely 
related to the political goal of creating loyal citizens and also essential to maintaining the 
country’s status quo, is the economic goal of creating loyal capitalists” (Hinchey, 2008, 
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p. 10).  Therefore, this seems to make my interpretation of trust more plausible because 
the role that trust plays in schools seems to be in alignment with perpetuating the goals of 
capitalism.  Consider that today students are now often thought of as the “customers” in 
the schools for whom the educators have a responsibility to ensure they “get” an 
education.  Likewise, “schools are expected not only to extol the merits of capitalism, but 
also to produce hard workers and energetic consumers” (Hinchey, 2008, p. 10).  Again, 
schools need students to trust so that the teachers and administrators know what is best 
for them as future participants in American society, which essentially means in the 
market economy.  However, Postman (1996) warns us that we [American educators and 
parents] need to change our views on the “ends” or goals of education or they will 
become the end of education.  Thus, he believes “schooling can be about how to make a 
life, which is quite different than how to make a living” (p. x).  Postman (1996) describes 
how the promise of economic utility in schools may backfire on us.  He offers: 
 
. . . so many people believe it to be the preeminent reason for schooling.  It may 
properly go by the name the god of Economic Utility.  As its name suggest, it is a 
passionless god, cold and severe.  But it makes a promise and not a trivial one.  
Addressing the young, it offers a covenant of sorts with them: If you will pay 
attention in school, and do your homework, and score well on tests, and behave 
yourself, you will be rewarded with a well-paying job when you are done.  Its 
driving idea is that the prepare children for competent entry into the economic life 
of a community. (p. 27) 
 
 
Similar to the values of capitalism, schools encourage competition and reward the 
successes of individuals.  Messages promoting moderate living are rarely offered in 
schools today and “more often we convince students that they can make it big in America 
if they study and do well in schools” (Noddings, 1992, p. 124).  Thus, the cycle continues 
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and students and teachers are encouraged to be the best performers on standardized 
achievement measures, no matter what it takes.  According to Tooby and Cosmides, who 
coined the phrase “the Banker’s Paradox,” when thinking with the mind of the market we 
not only view our money lending in terms of risks, we begin to think of “lending” our 
friendship in terms of “to whom should we extend our friendship?” (Shermer, 2008, p. 
xv).  This is alarming when one considers that this is perhaps how students and others in 
schools relate to one another.  Other market language and mentality has infiltrated our 
schools as well.  Schools, like businesses, are concerned with increasing productivity and 
efficiency.  However, focusing on speed and production mimic the goals associated with 
a factory, but not those of the educating of students.  Again, the need for trust in schools 
seems to be driven by the goals it wants to achieve, and these are the goals of capitalism. 
Now What? 
Partially concluding my hermeneutic inquiry I am at a crossroad of deciding what 
this revised level of understanding of the concept of trust means.  In other words, how 
does one do respond to my interpretation of the modern Americans view trust as that 
which is essential to the economic prosperity? How does one apply this understanding to 
the lived experience?  One possibility, albeit slightly outlandish, is to make a case for the 
need to change our current economic system of capitalism and thereby hopefully 
eliminating the mindset of the market.  However, as I acknowledged when I began this 
inquiry, this is highly unlikely and I do not want my investigation of trust to end by 
positing that the only way to avoid falling victim to the feeling that we cannot live 
without trust is to adopt a Pollyannaish view of the world where only love and happiness 
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abound and money is meaningless.  This would not be useful in the situation in which we 
find ourselves.     
Instead, I would like to propose a more attainable action.  This is one that hooks 
and West refer to as engaging in “the act of enlivened and enlightened critical 
conversations [that] assist in building a mentality of resistance” (Davis, 1992, p. 77).  In 
essence, by applying a critical eye and ear when reading literature or upon hearing 
statements that claim that more trust is necessary to the survival, sustainability, or success 
of a project or situation, one is better able to understand the motivation or space from 
which the claim comes—either economic utility or genuine care and concern.  This is not 
to imply that when trust is claimed to be necessary to the success of a project that it is 
always negative.  However, as in the case of the necessity of trust in schools, I question 
what the proposed “successes” really are and what purposes they serve. 
I wish to leave readers with the practical tasks of using a hermeneutic approach to 
understanding the role trust assumes in our current capitalistic culture and continue the 
conversation that was started with my inquiry.  For example, it is no secret or offense for 
people in today’s society to be attentive to their bank accounts and pay their taxes, 
namely engaging in economic activities.  These are nearly unavoidable duties for most 
Americans.  However, what can be transformed through this revised understanding of 
trust is the process of thinking about every interaction with others in economic terms.  
For instance, relationships do not have to be based upon risk assessment, fear, calculated 
moves, and even the possibility of potential benefits.  Friends and enemies do not need to 
be made just because they can be “trusted” to do something or fulfill obligations.   
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Even while participating in the confines of our current economic structure, it is 
possible for humans to be sincere, authentic, compassionate, and caring without the fear 
of betrayal in order to protect and promote their interests.  In other words, we can form 
relationships with others for no other reason than to enjoy their company or the joy they 
bring to our lives.  This shift in thinking is possible if we are able to dichotomize our 
thinking so that our expectations of transactions are not our expectations but those of 
others.  This is market-driven language which comes from the belief that trust in others is 
needed because of the obligations they fulfill, the duties they perform, or the desirable 
outcomes they provide.  Authentic friends and family members can do these things in 
positive ways; however, choosing to interact with others primarily for these reasons 
seems to promote the idea that trust is a necessary part of all relationships. 
A Misguided Concept 
Therefore, from my interpretations trust seems to be a misguided concept because 
it has become entangled in so many facets of our lives and beliefs.  On the one hand it is 
proclaimed to speed the flow of goods and money in the market.  Those who can be 
trusted have to prove that they are worthy of trust and do so based on conditions that vary 
with individual beliefs about the true nature of trust.  Yet, in another arena, like that of 
the United States government, trust is believed to be cultivated by becoming transparent 
(O’Neill, 2002).  However, when trust is used to manipulate others, as it has been known 
to do, the dangerous side of trust can be seen. 
Throughout my research on trust I have come to realize that as much as we would 
like to simplify our words and thoughts so that we can all agree on their meanings and 
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make things seem more universal, language in reality does not work this way.  Language 
goes back to what Gadamer explains as being contingent upon our traditions, horizons, 
and cultures.  It is about the lived experiences of our everyday lives.  It is about how we 
absorb the world on a daily basis and make sense of it.  Some may contend that language 
can only go so far; however, other researchers in the field “recognize that language and 
actions are closely related because language defines certain actions as legitimate, 
necessary, and may be even . . . the only ‘realistic’ option for a given situation” (Dunford 
& Palmer, 1996, p. 97).  Thus, the current view that trust is necessary because without it 
modern American society would falter and collapse seems to be one of those notions that 
is based on conventional wisdom.  What if another “realistic option” does exist?  What if 
there was a different view of trust? Can we survive without trust? 
Care, an Alternative to Trust 
In thinking about trust as something that is viewed as necessary primarily to 
ensure economic ends are met, I began to wonder what concept could serve as a less 
capitalistic way of thinking about our relationships.  Realizing that this would require 
distancing oneself—without totally removing oneself—from the current market 
mentality, I began pondering the possibility of how different our current view of needing 
trust may have been if our European ancestors had adopted a notion of care instead of 
one of trust.  Would the prevailing mentality that one must look out for themselves first, 
then others remain the norm?  Would money and financial successes be the goals of 
modern man?  Would Native American peoples live on reservations and be subjected to 
unfair treatment by the United States government?  Would schools be as concerned with 
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productivity and efficiency, or would their priorities shift to reflect an emphasis on care 
for the well-being of all students, thereby eliminating the need for competition? Are 
competition and unfairness necessary elements of trust? They certainly are not of caring. 
I ask these questions with the intent of providing an alternative perspective to a 
society where trust is viewed as necessary to life.  In essence, because I realize that our 
current economic system will not likely change in the near future, I would like to offer an 
alternative way of thinking about others that allows for the grip of economic thinking to 
be loosened.  My proposal is that instead of being focused on the need to cultivate, create, 
and establish more trust, we should simply focus on caring for one another. 
According to Noddings (1992), “the desire to be cared for is almost certainly a 
human characteristic” (p. 17).  I cannot say that I found the same to be true of the desire 
to be trusted, even though one might think it deserves this same sentiment.  Perhaps this 
is because some people do not care if they are trusted or not.  In fact, popular culture and 
the media like to conjure images of fear by making statements such as “trust no one,” and 
some movies depict building of trust between others as a sign of weakness.  For instance, 
William Shakespeare exhorts us to “love all, but trust few.”  Others claim that trust is still 
not enough to ensure obligations and commitments will be kept.  Ronald Reagan is 
quoted as saying, “Trust, but verify.”  Hence, one could say, “I care for you, but I don’t 
trust you”. Care is not the ubiquitous term or concept that trust currently is.  However, it 
is needed in today’s society almost as much as the air we breathe and the water we drink.  
If we truly care for one another then we respect differences and value others for who they 
144 
 
 
are, not what we want or need them to be.  Hence, we do not look for ways to use others 
to maximize our own self-interest or promote personal agendas. 
Likewise, neither do we assess the risks involved nor do we view caring for 
others, no matter how many, as a form of capital.  Noddings (1992) claims that “in order 
for one to respond as a genuine care giver, one does have to empty the soul of its own 
contents,” because “caring is a way of being in relation, not a specific set of behaviors” 
(p. 17).  Therefore, to care for someone is not a how-to; rather, it is a way of being in 
relation to others.  
The very notion of caring runs counter to the concept of trust because it does not 
involve calculative measures, determining whether to trust someone by assessing 
knowledge-based criteria and considering one’s own interest to see if the interest of the 
other party is similar or misaligned and what that may entail.  Adler (2001) offers: 
“Interests can lead to a calculative form of trust via a sober assessment of the costs and 
benefits to the other party of exploiting my vulnerability” (p. 217).  Again, there are no 
prerequisites for care to be given or received; only that we are human and we need it.  As 
such, the need to display vulnerability is not a requirement.  Care is not a calculated risk. 
Additionally, unlike research that uses knowledge-based criteria or standard 
formulae for the most effective way for building trust, “caring cannot be achieved by 
formula.  It requires address and response; it requires different behaviors from situation to 
situation and person to person” (Noddings, 1992, p. xi).  This may be due to the fact that 
unlike trust, care is not concerned with productivity, efficiency, or effectiveness in 
achieving goal, which are essentially the goals of capitalism.  To care for someone does 
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not imply that a business deal will be sealed or that an economic advantage will be seen 
as a result of the care given.  Hankivsky (2004) posits:  
 
The love, admiration, and affection that we may experience as part of our human 
relations are often completely distinct from our economic transactions.  Care is 
central to these relations, and it is not exclusively motivated by wealth 
maximization, rather it involves taking the concerns and needs for others as a 
basis for action. (p. 104) 
 
 
Therefore, care is not as visible a concept as trust because it is not concerned about the 
economic benefit one receives when caring for another.  Care is more concerned about 
the other. 
  Additionally, the power one possesses does not matter when one cares for 
another.  Power is a factor in relationships characterized by trust.  Cook et al. (2007) 
state: 
 
Trust may emerge in relationships characterized by power differences under some 
conditions, but such trust—if it occurs at all—is fragile for a number of reasons, 
including the fact that the individuals involved  typically have different 
perceptions of the nature of the relationship based on their relative positions of 
power. (p. 43) 
 
 
To care for someone does not require power and in fact does not consider one’s position 
of power as part of the relationship.  Instead, if we had more care in our schools and 
society we may not be able to “produce more” or increase the effective functioning of 
organizations, but perhaps we could live in harmony knowing that what is valued above 
all else is the collective wellbeing as humans and not consumers. The ugly truth is, those 
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who perpetuate the concept of trust have convinced us that the well-being of other is not a 
valued good.  
Acknowledging Limitations of my Inquiry 
By far the biggest limitation of this hermeneutic inquiry is that because trust is 
such a broad term and as such has multiple meanings and variations in the way it is used 
it was not possible, nor was it the intent within the contents of this work, to discuss trust 
from every angle and give every definition related to the concept.  Instead, I focused on a 
theme that I found common to the concept of trust throughout the historical periods. For 
this inquiry I hypothesized that trust is essential to uphold and perpetuate the goals of 
capitalism.  Again, this study could have taken several thousands of directions because 
trust is such a complex, multifaceted concept.  Thus, to study and understand the uses and 
implications of trust is to study humans and humanness in relation to their situation in 
history and culture. 
Another limiting factor specific to my claim that trust originated out of economic 
necessity and ultimately remained for that purpose throughout history is based on what I 
was able to obtain from medieval history based on the Oxford English Dictionary and 
other reliable sources that claim the first known uses of trust were in the thirteenth 
century.  This information cannot be checked for its validity because of the obvious fact 
that there are no persons from the Middle Ages here to validate these claims.  Moreover, 
much of the history of the Middle Ages was not written down, thus making it nearly 
impossible to find primary sources from people who lived during that period in history.  
Therefore, I cannot espouse that I have the final answer for the appropriate situating of 
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the concept of trust. What it is important for readers to understand is that I was able to 
arrive at a plausible explanation for the existence of and continued need for trust. 
The Transformation of Understanding Trust 
 Just like when I learned how to draw, I began the process with a set of prejudices 
that led me to create one-dimensional sketches.  I could only see from the vantage point 
of my lived experiences, which at the time were limited in regards to drawing. Yet, I was 
committed to expanding my horizon of understanding and my efforts resulted in a real 
transformation in the ways in which I understood myself and the other, which was 
drawing.  By deepening my understanding of the processes involved with creating works 
of art I was able to give my drawings dimension and more life-like features.  In the same 
way that I committed to relearning to draw I have had to engage in with the texts that 
helped me reach a revised understanding of trust. This hermeneutic process proved to be 
a transformative experience.  I now understand trust through my shared experience with 
the various texts used to create this dissertation.  
In similar ways, my once one-dimensional view of trust has been expanded to 
include seeing it in a whole new light and for purposes other than those I originally 
thought it was meant to serve.  Through my hermeneutic inquiry I now can see how my 
understanding of trust evolved through my conversations with the text much like the 
transformation that occurred in my drawings.  It was only by revising my understanding 
that my of trust that I am now able to see it as a concept that is closely related to our 
capitalistic mindset—something I had never thought of before.  
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